MOROCCO SAYS IT IS IN FINAL REVIEW OF SOFA AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000282

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM - DAS MCDONALD, NEA/MAG, NEA/RA AND EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019
TAGS: MARR PREL PINS MCAP MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO SAYS IT IS IN FINAL REVIEW OF SOFA AND
ACSA AGREEMENTS

REF: A. 08 RABAT 0390

B. 08 STATE 020339


Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Senior Moroccan government and military
officials assured visiting Deputy Under Secretary of the Air
Force for International Affairs Bruce Lemkin and Charge that
the Government of Morocco (GOM) was in the final stages of
review for both the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the
Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the
U.S. We have heard previous pledges in the past that have
not come to fruition on the ACSA, but we are cautiously
optimistic the GOM may be prepared to follow through this
time as advertised. Completion of the SOFA and ACSA
agreements, apart from the obvious symbolic value of
underscoring the closeness of U.S.-Moroccan relations, would
facilitate the ability of U.S. military to train on Moroccan
soil, i.e., by codifying legal protections for U.S. airmen,
soldiers, sailors, and marines, as well as the purchase
Moroccan supplies in support of training exercises,
respectively. End Summary.


2. (C) On April 2, 2009, Moroccan Inspector General of the
Moroccan Royal Armed Forces and Commander of the Southern
Zone Lieutenant General Bennani, i.e., the rough equivalent
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told visiting
Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force Bruce Lemkin, Charge,
and Defense Attache that the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces
(FAR) were making final preparations to sign the SOFA and
ACSA agreements with the United States. Bennani said that
the SOFA could be signed in a matter of weeks and that
finalizing the ACSA only required finding amendments to
accommodate prohibitions in the Moroccan Constitution against
the Moroccan military receiving money directly from a foreign
entity. Bennani said that the Moroccan military was actively
developing a "working procedure" to accommodate this law and
that it would not take long to work out.


3. (C) In a follow-on meeting later that day, Minister
Delegate to the Prime Minister in Charge of the
Administration of National Defense Abderrahmane Sbai, i.e.,
the rough equivalent to the U.S. Secretary of Defense,
confirmed General Bennani's statements that reviews of the
SOFA and ACSA were in the final stages. Sbai said, the ACSA
was a "matter of translation," while the SOFA required more
inter-ministerial coordination to ensure its legality. Sbai
said that the GOM had recently convened a meeting with high
level officials from the Ministries of Defense, Foreign
Affairs, Interior, Justice, and Finance to discuss both
documents. Poloff's follow-up phone call on April 3, with
our principle MFA contact on military affairs senior
Secretary General staff member Karim Halim said that MFA and
Ministry of Defense were ironing out the final language of
both documents and that they might be ready for formal
signing at approximately the same time.


4. (C) Bennani's assertions were made in the context of an
otherwise larger discussion with Deputy Under Secretary
Lemkin about the excellent status of relations between
Morocco and the United States, extending into the military
realm. Bennani cited the long history of good relations
between the U.S. and Morocco; the increasing sophistication
of Operation African Lion (the annual joint U.S.-Moroccan
military training exercise); and the purchases of F-16, T-6,
and Gulfstream airframes and potential purchase of M1A1
Abrams tanks as indicators of robustness of the relationship.


5. (C) In a direct appeal, Bennani said that the Moroccan
Military was counting on Deputy Under Secretary Lemkin and
the Embassy to ensure that all necessary steps, i.e.,
administrative processing through the Pentagon, Congress and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, were taken to
facilitate Morocco's acquisition of the weapon systems
according to previously agreed upon scheduling.


6. (C) Comment: The chorus of Moroccan leaders announcing
the impending final review of the ACSA and SOFA agreements
makes us cautiously optimistic. However, we are also
reminded of previous misplaced pledges made by General
Bennani that the ACSA would be signed last June (reftel).
Still, Sbai's affirmations, added to General Bennani's,
increases our optimism for follow-through. In addition to an
obvious symbolic value underscoring the closeness of

U.S.-Moroccan relationship, inking of the SOFA would
facilitate training exercises, codifying the U.S. military,s
legal status while training in Morocco and replacing previous
diplomatic notes. The ACSA, in addition to saving the GOM
money, would help facilitate the process of U.S. purchases of
Moroccan supplies to support training exercises. A high
profile signing ceremony might attract some critiques of U.S.
foreign policy in the region, resulting in some negative
press, as was the case of SOFA agreements reached in Egypt
and Iraq over the last year. We believe that a public
announcement of both agreements, while positive overall,
would not be universally welcomed by segments of the Moroccan
population. The Departments of State and Defense may want to
factor these experiences into planning for a signing.


7. (U) Deputy Under Secretary Lemkin did not have an
opportunity to clear this message. End Comment.


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Jackson