THE OTHER MOROCCO PART 1, POLITICS: THE TRUST GAP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000234

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL/NESCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2029
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PINR KDEM ECON MO
SUBJECT: THE OTHER MOROCCO PART 1, POLITICS: THE TRUST GAP

REF: A. RABAT 151

B. 08 RABAT 250

C. 07 RABAT 1394

D. 07 RABAT 1864

E. 07 RABAT 1504

F. 08 RABAT 570

G. STATE 26706

Classified By: PolCouns Craig Karp for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: During a winter visit to the Middle Atlas
Mountains, PolOff encountered poverty, accusations of local
governmental inefficiency, and anger over slow response to
weather-related crises. Citizens have an ingrained and
almost reflexive distrust of government and worry about
endemic corruption and clientalism, despite tangible and
constructive efforts on the part of authorities. Officials
noted that powers are being transferred to local councils,
which have been reticent in taking them up. Electoral
politics remains dominated by vote buying, as demonstrated by
one contact who expressed glee at the prospect of income from
selling his vote. Despite anger and lack of trust in
officials, the region remains stable and generally loyal to
Mohammed VI. End Summary.

--------------
The Middle Atlas Mountains:
Part of the "The Other Morocco"
--------------


2. (C) From February 3-6, PolOff visited the rural Middle
Atlas region between two parallel mountain ranges that divide
the more prosperous coastal agricultural plain from the
Sahara. The largely Amazigh (Berber) mountain region was a
bastion of anti-government rebellion under both the French
and former King Hassan II, and thus suffered deliberate
neglect from both. PolOff's visit came one day after current
monarch Mohammed VI spent a symbolic two-night visit in the
local village of Anfghou. Three years prior, in winter 2006,
34 people died there of exposure. The village became
imprinted on the national consciousness as a symbol of "the
other Morocco" because, as one local man said, "city
Moroccans were shocked at the deaths and at pictures of
Moroccan children walking around in rags with their genitals
hanging out in this day and age."


3. (C) For residents, the 2006 events reinforced their
feelings of betrayal by the government. During the winter of
2006, local leaders contacted Spanish NGOs for help, having
been dismissed by Moroccan agencies. The Spaniards led an
aid caravan, which was initially blocked by embarrassed area
officials, to the village. Mohammed Ajghough (protect),a
local Berber activist and International Visitor Program
alumnus who helped guide the Spanish convoy, described a
night-time race in four-wheel-drive vehicles through snow to
circumvent the checkpoints. Only after the Spaniards
returned home and broke the story in European media, was
Moroccan aid sent to the community. Three years on, Mohammed
Ouaziz, a subsistence farmer in another nearby mountain town,
Tikajouine, dismissed the King's two-night stay in Anfghou to
PolOff with surprising venom in a country where the monarch
is generally revered, "He (the King) spent two days in a
heated tent, inaugurated an empty clinic and went home to his
palace."

-------------- --
Government Builds Infrastructure, But Not Trust
-------------- --


4. (C) The Government insists it has invested significant
resources and effort into improving the quality of life in
rural Morocco, and integrating it into the broader national
development plan. Mohammed Atalabi, Secretary General
(appointed Lieutenant-Governor equivalent) of the High Atlas
district of Beni Mellal said that almost every village has
access to potable water, a significant accomplishment for a
developing country. At a total cost of USD 3 billion, the
National Rural Electrification Program ended in 2008, raising
national electrification rates to almost 100 percent (Ref B).
Power pylons can be seen marching across even the most
remote hillsides and deserts throughout the country. He also
said that local authorities and the Ministry of Interior
(MOI) were working hard to improve services, and added that
most villages have a clinic or school.


5. (SBU) In October 2007, the King paid his first visit to
Anfghou to check on progress after the 2006 catastrophe.
When he found that his orders to improve the road between the
village and the provincial seat had not been carried out, he
fired the governor (a royally appointed regional
administrator) on the spot. In late 2008, over 100 national,

RABAT 00000234 002 OF 003


regional and local officials were dismissed or arrested for
malfeasance or abuse of office. However, these and other
actions still seem not to have assuaged locals' feelings of
disconnection or mistrust of government motives. In winter
2008/2009, following near unprecedented rain and snow, 600
homes in the Atlas collapsed and 300 people died from
weather-related incidents.

--------------
Thanks, But...
--------------


6. (C) Farmer Ouaziz in Tikajouine, said that he welcomed
electricity to his village, but could not afford to pay the
monthly fees; although he admitted to pirating power from the
new lines. Fatima Drimine, a community activist, said that
the local school and clinic were "no more than walls." Heavy
snowfall and lack of road clearance prevented nurses or
teachers from reaching the village during winter, and the
local nurse would not provide services without a bribe. Both
government officials and residents bemoaned a lack of
sufficient ambulance services. (Note: By chance, PolOff saw
several old ambulances bearing the phrase "A gift from the
people of the United States of America," in use several times
on roads. End Note.)


7. (C) The neighborhood of Mcharmou sits on the banks of a
sewage filled stream near the modestly developed mountain
town of Azrou. In 2007, the community signed an agreement
with the National Human Development Initiative (French
acronym INDH - The King's flagship national development
program) to provide homes with drinking water. The community
was to contribute 30 percent of the financing and INDH the
rest. Six months after the agreement was signed, the MOI
district office informed the community that it was reversing
the financing ratio, and the project died. "How can we trust
anything the government says about what it's doing for us in
light of our experience? Why would we vote or participate in
anything?" one resident asked.

--------------
Residents: We Have to Pay to Play
--------------


8. (C) In a recurring refrain, Mohammed Ataoui, a municipal
employee and community organizer in the Middle Atlas mountain
town of Tounfite reserved special ire for local officials
who, he said, only provided services to villages whose
residents could afford to pay bribes to functionaries.
Sitting in his modest home on February 4, Ataoui and the
former sheikh (tribal leader) of Tounfite described a system
whereby even basic services such as garbage collection,
social services and snow removal were governed by a complex
web of bribery and influence peddling.

-------------- --------------
Officials: Who's In Charge, the MOI or Elected Councils?
-------------- --------------


9. (C) The next morning PolOff met with the Caid
(district-level MOI executive) and Chief Gendarme (state
police district chief equivalent) of Tounfite over coffee.
They were remarkably pragmatic and professional about the
economic and social issues facing the area, placing improved
education and skills-based training at the top of the list of
priorities. They both denied playing favorites, saying they
were hamstrung by "nonexistent" resources. The Caid, a young
man in his mid-thirties recently graduated from the MOI's
training academy (Ref A) explained that he had two trucks
with which to plough almost 200 road miles in his district.
In the snowy winter, keeping the main roads open required all
of his vehicular resources, leaving little time to open
secondary routes.


10. (C) In response to a question about local councils'
professionalism, the Caid shrugged uncomfortably and said
that "in the new Morocco" the MOI had little influence or
control over councils' behavior and could not force them to
do their jobs. This mirrored subsequent comments made by
Secretary-General Atalabi of Beni Mellal who said that the
elected local council controlled the budget and operations in
"the new democracy." However, Rachid Fadili, the Director of
Information Technology at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
a community activist in his spare time said such statements
were disingenuous. "Interior still dictates policy and
procedure, only now by telephone instead of by public order,"
he explained. "When protesters demand better services or
express anger," he continued, "they march on the Wilaya (MOI
seat) not the council." However, in southern Morocco,
President of the Tiznit Town Council, Abdellatif Ouammou,
told PolOff during a November 2008 visit that councils had

RABAT 00000234 003 OF 003


more authority than they realized, but did not know how to
utilize it. He added that MOI officials are accustomed to
giving instructions and local elected officials are used to
obeying them. "Change will take time," he cautioned.

--------------
... And This Little Vote Went to Market
--------------


11. (C) In every meeting with residents, without exception,
interlocutors responded with scorn when asked whether they
would vote in the June 2009 municipal elections. One woman
spat on the ground. Other people laughed out loud. Only one
man that PolOff met was enthusiastic about the upcoming
elections saying happily, "I need some money, and it's time
to take my vote to market." He did not care who bought it as
long as they paid his price. He hoped to increase his bid to
at least 250 dirhams (USD 29),up from the 100 dirhams (USD
11) he received in the 2007 parliamentary elections. This
time, because high participation was important to the
government, which wants to increase the low rates of the 2007
parliamentary voting (Ref C-E),he hoped to command a
premium. All welcomed increased participation of women in
electoral politics, but there was little confidence the
system would become more responsive as a result.


12. (C) At the same time, many communities and individuals
seemed to lack a sense of social and political
entrepreneurship, looking almost exclusively to government or
outside actors, even the U.S. Government, to fix problems or
dispense largesse. Interlocutors also seemed unwilling to
shoulder some of the blame for participating in electoral
corruption and clientalism themselves.

--------------
Ingredients for Unrest, But Still Calm
--------------


13. (C) Despite expressions of intense bitterness and
disenchantment, the Middle Atlas remains generally calm.
However, at one point in February, protestors angry at the
MOI for its slow response to weather related crises began
attacking aid trucks and official vehicles with large rocks,
leading to a suspension of deliveries for a few days. Other
towns also witnessed protests of varying sizes over services.
Mohammed Ataoui in Tounfite said that, "At least here we can
complain to the Government and protest if we are upset, even
if they do not listen." For all the criticism, many credited
the King with providing a sense that there is a court of
final appeal beyond bureaucrats. "If we scream hard enough,
or have a riot, he will come and inaugurate projects," a
woman commented. Many interlocutors did say, however, that
if they did not begin to see real change in five years or so,
expressions of discontent would become less peaceful and more
destructive, referring to past events in Sidi Ifni (Ref F).
Agronomy professor Said Kamel recognized that while, "many
ingredients for an explosion are there, the system is
flexible enough for now that it bulges to contain anger."

--------------
Comment - All Politics Is Local:
--------------


14. (C) In the Middle Atlas region, whether justified or
not, citizens perceive their government as inefficient and
uncaring. Despite sweeping royal and ministerial rhetoric,
and strategic national-level shifts, until corruption is
brought under control and local services improve, it is
unlikely that trust in government will grow. As a result, it
is also likely that turnout in the upcoming local elections
may be as low as, or lower than, in 2007 (Ref G). Despite
government efforts, many Middle Atlas residents still seem
unwilling to give reform the benefit of the doubt. End
Comment.


*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************

Jackson