MOROCCO SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF THE DEPUTY

UNCLAS RABAT 000231

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

DEFENSE FOR DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE LEMKIN
STATE FOR NEA DAS SPIRNAK, NEA/PI, DRL/NESCA AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP PGOV MARR MCAP PHUM PTER ECON MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF THE DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
MR. BRUCE S. LEMKIN


1. (SBU) Summary: Mr. Lemkin, we are looking forward to
your visit to Morocco. Morocco has been an exemplary partner
in the struggle against terrorism, and it serves as a
regional model for economic change and democratic reform.
Our military and political cooperation is growing, and as a
result, Morocco has been designated as a "Major non-NATO
Ally." Morocco's principal foreign tie is with Europe and
has advanced status with the European Union (EU). Morocco is
one of our strongest allies in the Broader Middle East and
North Africa (BMENA) region, and its top priority is U.S.
support for its position on the Western Sahara territorial
dispute and for integration in North Africa.


2. (SBU) Morocco is a country "on the move", in the throes,
albeit unevenly, of change and reform. Economic growth has
averaged about six percent per year and investment, tourism
and remittances have boomed, although they could be
threatened by the global financial crisis. Slums are coming
down, and according to official statistics, so is
unemployment. Freedom of the press has expanded to a level
not seen here ever before and beyond the rest of the region,
but there are still some restrictions, and those who
challenge them can suffer heavy fines, libel judgments and
more rarely, jail. Political freedoms have grown as well,
although they remain constrained by a system with roots going
back hundreds of years. Neither the Parliament nor the 33
political parties with seats in it have much power. Most
voters stayed away from the last parliamentary election, in
2007, which saw the first international observation ever,
largely achieved and funded by the USG. Additionl reforms
could lead to democracy, but, with staility a priority, it
could take decades.


3. (BU) The relationship between the U.S. and Moroccanair
forces is a model of engagement between the wo militaries.
Military engagement is integral t almost all mission
priorities, including economc growth, countering extremism
and terrorism, parnership, and regional stability. The
agreement o purchase F-16 fighter aircraft and T-6 traineraircraft is at the forefront of a broader frce modernization
effort by the Moroccan military that can serve as the engine
not only of modernizing military equipment but continuing the
modernization and professionalization f Morocco,s entire
armed forces. The sales also ill provide an opening for
increased engagement y Africa Command,s 17th Air Force.
Your visit wil serve to reinforce the strong U.S. commitment
o providing the Moroccan Air Force the very best cpability
for the dollar in an F-16 program that cntinues to have
small setbacks that contribute t low-grade friction. Wealso seek to revitalize our military training and exercise
regimen, underline our interest in the Moroccan military as
an international peacekeeper, and help move the pending
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Acquisition and
Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The Moroccans are mulling
over a near-finalized text of the latter and are giving
serious consideration to our proposed SOFA. Since King
Mohammed VI serves as his own Minister of Defense, we expect
that you will meet Minister-Delegate Sbai, who largely serves
as a comptroller, CHOD Bennani and Air Force commander
Boutaleb, who has been invited to the U.S. by the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force for a counterpart visit. End summary.

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Air Force Engagement and the Mission Strategic Goals
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) Mission strategic goals are, in order, economic
growth and reform, countering terror, promoting U.S.-Moroccan
partnership, enhancing democracy and governance, and
resolving regional conflicts while maintaining close
strategic cooperation. Military-to-military engagement in
general and air force engagement specifically contribute to
progress for at least four of these goals. With regard to
economic growth and reform, we believe expanding Morocco,s
economic base will do as much to address popular
dissatisfaction with the political system as will
strengthening democratic institutions. The purchase of F-16
and T-6 aircraft, and the enhanced engagement they will
trigger, will likely promote modernization in a military
already fully under civilian control. With regard to
countering and combating terrorism, U.S. military engagement
is focused on professional training and education programs.
With regard to partnership, our engagement with the Air Force
is among the strongest peer-to-peer relationships we
maintain, and this can only improve with the addition of the
F-16 and T-6 to their baseline. The continued and expanded


robust interaction between our two militaries is an important
example of institution building that is a centerpiece of our
relationship Finally, with regard to regional stability, the
reinforcement of the Moroccan military helps to maintain the
regional balance of power, in a context of even greater
Algerian modernization expenditure, assures the Government of
Morocco that it truly is a strong, long-term Major non-NATO
Ally, and facilitates U.S. regional objectives not only in
Africa but in the Middle East.

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Military Modernization
--------------


5. (SBU) The Moroccan military has undertaken a sweeping
effort to modernize a military force that fields
predominantly Korean and Vietnam War era equipment. While
the F-16 and T-6 sales form the vast bulk of the dollar
figure for this modernization, the total Foreign Military
Sales and Foreign Military Financing portfolio totals some
120 cases in excess of USD 3 billion. The list of pending or
prospective sales includes 200 M1A1 main battle tanks, CH-47D
and SH-60 rotary wing aircraft, Gulfstream and Beechcraft
operational/Distinguished Visitor (DV) support aircraft,
Hawk, Chaparral, and Stinger anti-aircraft systems, and
solicitations for surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft
and unmanned aerial vehicles. Morocco is the second largest
recipient of excess defense articles (EDA) from the U.S.
These sales and transfers are necessary to permit the
Moroccan military to both hold its position as a regional
power and be able to interoperate and participate as a
coalition partner. They further serve to solidify the
substantial U.S. inclination by the Moroccan military,
although there are competitors that can dramatically underbid
U.S. offerings, and Morocco does not limit itself to U.S.
equipment.

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Modernization Drives Engagement
--------------


6. (SBU) Military modernization further strengthens the
institution of the Moroccan military by continuing and
expanded exposure to U.S. doctrine, tactics, techniques,
procedures and personnel. The expanded requirement to train
operators and maintainers for the F-16 and T-6 aircraft alone
will practically equal the current annual training allocation
for all Moroccan personnel across all the services and
government organizations. Moreover, the integration of a
fourth generation fighter into the Royal Moroccan Air Force
must stimulate a modernization of the full-spectrum approach
to operating and sustaining such aircraft, from facilities to
logistics to aerial employment to command and control. This
provides an unparalleled opportunity )- and a challenge )-
to shape our engagement with the Royal Air Force. However,
we think the challenge can be ably met by a combination of
our traditional security cooperation efforts and the addition
of the 17th Air Force (AF),the USAF component command to
Africa Command. A superb boost this year is the selection of
Morocco to participate in the CSAF Counterpart Visit program,
as well as Morocco,s decision to send an observer to AMC,s
Airlift Rodeo. These engagement activities add to a robust
exercise program that includes AFRICAN LION, PHOENIX EXPRESS,
and FLINTLOCK, in addition to at least two annual JCETs. The
Royal Moroccan Air Force has also requested the revival of
MAJESTIC EAGLE, an annual air exercise that the U.S.
suspended due to OIF and OEF commitments in 2003.

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Modernization Can Drive Regional Leadership
--------------


7. (SBU) The Royal Moroccan Air Force enjoys a well-deserved
status as a regional leader in training, humanitarian
assistance and peacekeeping. With regard to training,
Morocco has provided technical and operational training to
more than 300 officers and 1,400 non-commissioned officers,
primarily from francophone sub-Saharan Africa over the last
25 years, with much of that occurring in the last three
years. Morocco has further provided humanitarian assistance
to 13 countries in the same time frame, especially airlift
but also cloud-seeding. Finally, Morocco has been a
consistent provider of peacekeepers to UN and NATO-led
missions, with forces currently in Kosovo, Cote d,Ivoire,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Morocco
continually seeks the expansion and improvement of capacity


to train peacekeepers and perform these missions, and the
USAF can assist with both materiel and intellectual support
for the concepts of a C-130 refurbishment center of
excellence and a UN-sponsored peacekeeping center of
excellence.

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Support for Longer Term Issues
--------------


8. (SBU) The Embassy is currently engaged in negotiations
with the GOM on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),and
Inspector General of the Armed Forces General (CHOD) Bennani
has indicated interest in signing the Acquisition and Cross
Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the USG. However, the
negotiations over the SOFA have been ongoing for years, and
the ACSA signature has been stalled for months; we have most
recently heard the draft is under review by the military.
The Moroccans, who hosted U.S. bases throughout the Cold War,
may not be convinced a full-fledged SOFA is needed.
Unfounded rumors of prospective U.S. basing in connection
with Africa Command have been publicly controversial here.
Nonetheless, both of these agreements stand to benefit air
forces in particular, and your support for these two efforts
would be appreciated.

--------------
Your Meetings
--------------


9. (SBU) Your meeting with Minister-Delegate to the Prime
Minister in Charge of the Administration of National Defense
Abdurrahman Sbai could be used to deliver Amendment 1 to the
F-16 Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) and further discuss
the continuing effort to establish an interest-bearing
account on Morocco,s behalf that could close the disconnect
between desired capabilities and budget in the F-16 program.
Your meetings with Generals Bennani and Boutaleb afford an
opportunity to discuss the F-16 and T-6 programs, as well as
military modernization in general. You should stress to the
Moroccans how much these aircraft will change the way they
operate and urge them to allow adequate time and effort to
prepare their bases and their forces. Of particular interest
will be emphasizing the importance of base activities at the
main operating base of Ben Guerir and the pending COMSEC LOAs
as part of the recent NSA approval for Link 16 and other F-16
technologies. With the first aircraft set to be delivered in
July 2011, the GOM has many challenges ahead to prepare
infrastructure from both the operational and security
perspectives. In all your meetings, we believe that you
could also usefully advance the ACSA and the SOFA and obtain
a better understanding of Morocco,s planning for
peacekeeping and for exercises.

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External Issues
--------------


10. (SBU) Border Troubles with Algeria: The Moroccan
relationship with Algeria is difficult, and the border
between the two countries was closed by Algeria and remains
closed. While the King and other GOM officials have publicly
proposed opening the border and upgrading bilateral relations
between the two countries, their entreaties have been
repeatedly rebuffed. The GOA has linked progress on the
border to "all issues," particularly the Western Sahara.


11. (SBU) Western Sahara: Moroccan foreign policy is
dominated by defending and seeking international recognition
of its sovereignty claims over Western Sahara. The issue
remains the most visible source of tension with Algeria,
which has historically supported the POLISARIO's quest
efforts for independence by way of a UN-sponsored referendum.
The issue led Morocco to leave the African Union and has
been an obstacle to regional integration through the Arab
Maghreb Union. In April 2007, Morocco proposed a new
autonomy plan for Western Sahara, and a series of
UN-sponsored negotiations with the POLISARIO began in
Manhasset, New York. The Moroccan proposal, deemed "serious
and credible" by the USG, would provide Sahrawis, the
indigenous people of Western Sahara, autonomy in
administering local affairs while respecting Moroccan
sovereignty over the territory. There have been four rounds
of talks but none since March 2008. After the April 2008
renewal of the mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission, the
USG announced it considered independence for the territory


"not realistic."


12. (SBU) Western Sahara Continued: Following the
controversial lapsing of the contract of the former UN
Secretary General's Personal Envoy, the UN selected retired
U.S. Ambassador Chris Ross to be the new Personal Envoy, and
he made his first visit to the region in February.


13. (SBU) Western Sahara Continued: Western Sahara
experienced gross violations of human rights from 1975 until
the end of the Hassan II regime and repression intensified
after the short-lived Sahrawi "intifada" of 2005. Since late
2006, Morocco has slowly improved the human rights situation
in the territories. Arbitrary arrests have sharply
diminished and beatings and physical abuse by security forces
have all but disappeared. Even dissenters now can travel
freely. They cannot, however, publish or speak publicly in
support of independence, or a vote on self-determination. In
2008, known abusers were transferred, further easing the
situation. However, we saw an uptick in abuses in early 2009.

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Internal Issues
--------------


14. (SBU) Current Government: Prime Minister Abbas El
Fassi's government, formed after the September 2007
legislative elections, is built on a minority coalition.
There has been periodic speculation that it might not last
for the full five-year mandate of Parliament. El Fassi's
government, filled with young technocrats from within and
outside his Istiqlal party, has performed better than many
expected, however, and it now looks capable of a full term.
El Fassi has participated extensively in international events
and diplomacy. Internal democracy is growing within
political parties. A political formation founded by Fouad
Ali El Himma, an intimate of the King, has evolved into a new
Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) by grouping several
smaller parties. It has now constituted the largest
political bloc in Parliament, and could be prepared to lead
should the current coalition falter. We currently see no
prospect for a significant shift in Morocco's foreign and
security policies. However, neither Parliament nor the Prime
Minister has much say in these issues, which are managed by
the Throne directly with concerned ministries.


15. (SBU) Parliamentary Reform: Morocco's political parties
and the bicameral parliament are weak and structurally
hamstrung from taking legislative initiatives or strongly
articulating dissent. The Parliament provides no effective
check on the monarchy or government. Changing the
Constitution would be necessary in order to change the power
imbalance and institute formal democracy, but both Parliament
and parties will have to improve their capacity and
performance first. Nonetheless, both parties and Parliament
have made some technical improvements, largely thanks to
USG-funded programs from the National democratic Institute
(NDI) and the State University of New York (SUNY),which have
modestly improved the body's administrative capacity. These
include establishment of a budget analysis office, a verbatim
transcription service, and a consistent forum for training
and debate among parliamentary members and staff.


16. (SBU) Parliamentary Reform Continued: Although the
September 2007 parliamentary elections were the most
transparent in the country's history, record low
participation (i.e., 37 percent of registered voters)
reflects the lack of voter confidence in the institution.
The State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative
(MEPI) funded NDI to run the first ever international
observation. MEPI is now funding an ambitious training
program for women running for municipal councils in June.


17. (SBU) Human Rights and Reform: King Mohammed VI has
embarked on an ambitious and continuous program of human
rights reforms that includes the Arab world's first truth
commission, a revised family code and growing governmental
transparency and accountability. 2008 saw some incidents of
concern related to freedoms of expression and press.
Although Morocco is a paragon of reform in the region, the
reforms are still not deeply rooted in law or Constitution
and could be rolled back. Continued support and
encouragement from partners like the United States and Europe
are essential.


18. (SBU) Religious Freedom: The Moroccan Constitution


provides for the freedom to practice one's religion, although
Islam is the official state religion. The GOM prohibits the
distribution of non-Muslim religious materials, bans all
proselytizing, but tolerates several small religious
minorities. It also occasionally restricts Islamic
organizations whose activities have exceeded the bounds of
"acceptable religious practice" and become political in
nature ) lately targeting Shi,a. Morocco has become
protective and even positive toward the tiny remnant of its
once substantial Jewish minority.


19. (SBU) Counterterrorism: The terrorism threat in Morocco
emanates especially from small grassroots radical Islamic
cells, which have shown some capacity to attack. Security
forces disrupted six terrorist and foreign fighter cells in
2008, arresting 105. The biggest threat is that attacks
could deter tourists, an important component of the economy.
The GOM's implementation of a comprehensive counterterrorism
strategy emphasizing vigilant security measures,
counter-radicalization policies, and robust international
cooperation has been largely successful in containing the
threat to date. Economic disruption, whether from attacks or
the global economic crisis, remains the principal threat to
stability here, but most observers believe Morocco will
manage absent catastrophic collapse.


20. (SBU) Counterterrorism Continued: Under the King who as
"Commander of the Faithful" leads Moroccan Muslims and Jews,
Morocco has standardized religious doctrine, consolidated
control over religious schools, and sent specially trained
Imams to Europe to preach moderate messages to the Moroccan
diaspora. The vast majority of Morocco's population rejects
Salafist and Wahhabist approaches to Islam and so does not
support terrorist groups.

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Economics, Trade and Assistance
--------------


21. (SBU) Economics and Trade: The economy is relatively
healthy, with growth expected to be above five percent this
year, but marred by increasing disparities in wealth. Since
implementation of our Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on January
1, 2006, bilateral commerce has more than doubled. U.S.
firms are increasing their investment in Morocco, seeing new
markets develop as a result of the FTA. The Department of
Commerce's Commercial Law Development Program and the U.S.
Trade and Development Agency conduct capacity building and
technical assistance projects to assist Morocco to create an
open and transparent trading environment and fully develop
its trading potential. However, significant export growth to
U.S. and other markets will also depend on Morocco's ability
to capture a larger share of value added in its export
products. Targeted assistance programs from USAID and MEPI
aim at improving Morocco's ability to produce and market its
exports in key sectors.


22. (SBU) U.S. Assistance: We are focusing our assistance
to Morocco on youth and women, targeting four priorities:
economic growth, counterterrorism, democracy and governance,
and supporting quality education. U.S. assistance includes
projects under the Millennium Challenge Corporation, USAID,
and MEPI.


23. (U) The Millennium Challenge Corporation signed a
five-year, USD 697.5 million Millennium Challenge Account
Compact with Morocco in 2007 to reduce poverty and increase
economic growth. The five-year clock started ticking on
September 15, 2008 with the Entry into Force of the Compact.
The MCA will support five major projects selected for their
potential to increase productivity and improve employment in
high potential sectors of Morocco's economy. The MCA
projects include: Fruit Tree Productivity, Small Scale
Fisheries, Crafts, Financial Services, and Enterprise Support.


24. (U) Morocco benefits from several MEPI programs,
including country-specific projects and inclusion in regional
efforts. Some recent and ongoing programs include the
program for women candidates, breast cancer awareness,
support for civil society and youth organizations, developing
freedom of expression via the Internet, supporting
development of democratic leaders, technical assistance to
meet environmental obligations under the FTA, political party
training and capacity building, and the Financial Services
Volunteer Corps. In 2007, MEPI funded the first-ever
international observation of the Moroccan parliamentary


elections. Other USG-funded projects support anti-corruption
efforts (with the American Bar Association) and prison reform
to undermine the foundations of extremism.


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Jackson