GOE EXPLAINS HIGH LEVEL TRIP TO WASHINGTON

S E C R E T QUITO 000246

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS
TAGS: PREL SNAR PINR MARR KCOR EC CO
SUBJECT: GOE EXPLAINS HIGH LEVEL TRIP TO WASHINGTON

REF: QUITO 103

Classified By: Ambassador Heather Hodges for reason 1....


id: 201261
date: 4/7/2009 20:03
refid: 09QUITO246
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 09QUITO103
header:
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DE RUEHQT #0246/01 0972003
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0240
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8087
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4139
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3492
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ APR LIMA 3143
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4252
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL


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S E C R E T QUITO 000246

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS
TAGS: PREL SNAR PINR MARR KCOR EC CO
SUBJECT: GOE EXPLAINS HIGH LEVEL TRIP TO WASHINGTON

REF: QUITO 103

Classified By: Ambassador Heather Hodges for reason 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: FM Falconi and Government Minister Jalkh on
April 6 expressed concern to the Ambassador about an Embassy
official's meeting with unsavory characters, and said that
President Correa had asked a delegation to go to Washington
to express GOE concern. The Ambassador made clear that the
meeting in question was one of many that Embassy officers
conduct and that we had not initiated it. She suggested the
meeting was possibly an attempt to frame the Embassy official
by someone wanting to create distance between our
governments, and urged the GOE to investigate further. The
GOE officials appeared willing to accept the Ambassador's
version of events. Jalkh reported the Ecuadorians were well
received in Washington. End Summary.


2. (SBU) The Ambassador met with FM Fander Falconi,
Government Minister Gustavo Jalkh, Coordinating Minister for
Internal and External Security Miguel Carvajal, Vice FM
Lautaro Pozo, and MFA Under Secretary Jorge Orbe on April 6
at the MFA's request. DCM and PolCouns also attended.

FOREIGN MINISTER'S EXPLANATION OF TRIP


3. (C) FM Falconi prefaced his remarks by stressing the
GOE's interest in a constructive dialogue with the U.S. on
political, environmental, migration, and other matters. He
conveyed President Correa's "affectionate greetings" to the
Ambassador. Falconi then turned to what he called the
delicate subject of intelligence indicating that an Embassy
official had been involved in questionable meetings, which
was a matter of grave concern for the GOE. He said President
Correa decided to send a delegation, consisting of Government
Minister Jalkh, Vice FM Pozo, and Ecuador's three ambassadors
in the U.S., to discuss the matter directly with Washington.
The GOE delegation's objective was to stress that the
Ecuadorian individuals were not appropriate people for the
Embassy to see, and to request an in-depth investigation.
Falconi described the delegation's meetings with WHA A/S
Shannon, the NSC, and various Members and staffers in
Congress as positive, saying the interlocutors indicated that
Washington also wanted a climate of confidence between the
two governments.

AMBASSADOR EXPLAINS EMBASSY ACTIONS


4. (C) The Ambassador responded that she accepted that
Correa had decided to conduct this diplomacy in Washington,
but considered it unfortunate that the GOE had not spoken
with her first. She emphasized that neither she nor any
official of the Embassy had an interest in overthrowing the
government or interfering in the election. To the contrary,
we want stability under the elected government. The
Ambassador noted that she had been very careful in her
dealings with the opposition.


5. (S) The Ambassador acknowledged that some Embassy
officials speak with disreputable individuals, explaining
that this happens here in Quito and in our other embassies,
because these are the people who can provide information
about drug trafficking, human smuggling, or other subjects.
When we obtain useful information, our law enforcement
agencies share it with the GOE, for instance the Ecuadorian
police, and with the Manta Forward Operating Location if it
is a case where aerial surveillance could locate the vessel.
Coast Guard attache Heath Brown had received information with
some validity in the past from one of the individuals in the
photographs the GOE presented in Washington, Camilo Rodas.
This time Rodas called to suggest a meeting with his cousin,
Cao Lay Munoz.


6. (S) In this instance, Brown misunderstood Cao Lay Munoz's
name and wrote it as Caoli Munoz, thus embassy checks on the
name prior to the meeting revealed nothing. The Ambassador
showed Falconi the internal Embassy entry request form where
Brown had misspelled the name. She added that if Brown had
nefarious ends in mind, he would not have met at the Embassy
where Rodas and Munoz could easily be observed entering. She
emphasized that even though Munoz was well known to the GOE,
there were many people at the U.S. Embassy who would not have
recognized the name.


7. (S) The Ambassador read an account of the meeting, which
also included an assistant Embassy security officer. She
cautioned that she in no way intended to say that the
statements by Munoz were accurate. Munoz described himself
to the Embassy officials as having assisted past governments,
and more recently former president Lucio Gutierrez, by paying
people off. Munoz stated that he was thrown in jail last
year after he refused to assist the government in framing
Gutierrez without payment, and was warned by presidential
security to keep quiet after his release this year. Munoz
claimed he approached the Embassy because he thought the U.S.
did not want Correa to win the April 26 election. He
referred to Chavez as the "big rat" and Correa as the "little
rat," urging the U.S. to take care or the continent would be
full of rats. (This caused Falconi to flinch; he later
called the "bad rats" language inconsistent with the GOE's
commitment and achievements.) Munoz claimed to have

additional information against Correa, and asked protection
and safe travel to the U.S. if he went to the press.


8. (S) The Ambassador explained that Brown told Rodas and
Munoz that he would call them if he was interested in the
information. She described how Brown escorted Rodas and
Munoz out of the Embassy building, where Rodas told Brown
that someone else who claimed to have information on the
Ostaiza brothers (reftel) wanted to talk to him on Rodas'
cell phone. This likely allowed Brown to be photographed.
Since then, Brown has twice told Rodas that he had no
interest in his information.

DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS


9. (C) Government Minister Jalkh jumped in to say that the
Ambassador might see such meetings as a daily event, but in
the context of actions that caused the GOE to expel two
Embassy officers and the upcoming election, it was of grave
concern to the GOE. He noted that Ecuador appreciated A/S
Shannon's promise to investigate. Vice FM Pozo insisted that
the Embassy should have known Munoz's background. The
Ambassador made clear that she herself would not have known,
since there was nothing in the press since her arrival, and
neither did Brown.


10. (C) Coordinating Minister Carvajal said that the Embassy
version of the incident was completely different than the GOE
understanding. He said he was told Munoz had planned to
publicize the information on CNN. Carvajal suggested that
"certain interests" might want to create a provocation. He
said it would be prudent when the Embassy received
information of this type for it to tell the GOE directly to
protect them from the interests of third parties. The
Ambassador emphasized that it would not be worth passing all
information, but that we do inform the police of the
information we consider useful and credible.


11. (S) The Ambassador inquired if the GOE had audio of
Brown speaking with Munoz and Rodas. Both Carvajal and Jalkh
admitted they did not. Carvajal explained that the
Ecuadorian Embassy in Washington's original request for DVD
equipment was an erroneous assumption on its part. The
Ambassador reiterated that she had no way to investigate
further since she had already explained the extent of the
Embassy's involvement. If indeed the operation was a setup,
then it would appear the GOE needed to do more investigation.
Those Ecuadorians present appeared to agree. The Ambassador
requested that the facts she had shared be conveyed to
President Correa. Jalkh said Correa had already been
informed.


12. (C) Jalkh suggested that an opportunity could be made
out of this crisis. While recognizing the value of USG
cooperation on counternarcotics, he urged a better balance
between U.S. relations with Colombia and with Ecuador,
complaining that the U.S. saw Colombia as fighting against
the drug trade despite continued extensive cultivation of
drug crops, but did not appreciate Ecuador's efforts.
However, many of the U.S. interlocutors in Washington had
made an effort to learn about the situation and recognized
GOE efforts.

COMMENT

13. (S/NF) Part one of this meeting focused on Falconi
laying out that Correa had ordered the delegation to
Washington. This struck us as a quasi-apology/explanation of
why they did not come to the Embassy first. It looks as if
the GOE wanted us to see why they viewed the meeting as
"inappropriate" and "serious," but they also seemed to
acknowledge that our perception could be different. Whether
it is an excuse, we do not know, but they also seemed ready
to believe this was a deliberate setup by someone (perhaps
the opposition, although they did not say so) to provoke
President Correa to expel another diplomat and drive the
bilateral relationship to a crisis.

HODGES

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