Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PRISTINA546
2009-12-10 16:32:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: AIRSPACE CONTROL MORE THAN TECHNICAL ISSUE

Tags:  ECON CNAR PGOV KV SR 
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VZCZCXRO2882
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHPS #0546/01 3441632
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101632Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9540
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1293
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1830
RHFMIUU/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000546 

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/PGI, EEB/TRA/AN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON CNAR PGOV KV SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: AIRSPACE CONTROL MORE THAN TECHNICAL ISSUE

PRISTINA 00000546 001.2 OF 002


SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000546

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/PGI, EEB/TRA/AN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON CNAR PGOV KV SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: AIRSPACE CONTROL MORE THAN TECHNICAL ISSUE

PRISTINA 00000546 001.2 OF 002


SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Kosovo's Civil Aviation Authority has expressed
growing concerns to us about NATO-led negotiations regarding control
of the airspace over Kosovo. NATO still retains full authority over
Kosovo's airspace, but recently announced that it will release
control of upper airspace to allow for commercial overflight. Under
NATO's preliminary proposal, Albania, Serbia and Macedonia, would be
jointly responsible and each would administer a portion of Kosovo's
airspace. Kosovo officials told us that they will not agree to any
plan that cedes authority over any portion of Kosovo airspace to
Serbia. They also complained that NATO was not considering
adequately Kosovo's views as it moved forward with its plans to
relinquish control of Kosovo's airspace. NATO negotiators must
remain cognizant of the political sensitivities surrounding this
matter. END SUMMARY

NATO WILL RELEASE CONTROL OF KOSOVO AIRSPACE ...
-------------- ---


2. (SBU) Kosovo's Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA) contacted us this
week to express their growing concern over NATO-led negotiations
regarding control of the airspace over Kosovo. NATO still retains
full authority over Kosovo's airspace, but recently announced that
it will release control of upper airspace (above Flight Level 285,
or 28,500 feet) to allow for commercial overflight. Airspace below
Flight Level 290 is controlled by NATO, but Pristina International
Airport (PIA) provides air traffic control services for the
airport's two present approach corridors. PIA air traffic
controllers would require additional training to provide control
services for commercial overflights, as they are only certified for
approaches and takeoff. Since overflight cruising is the simplest
flight segment, KCAA officials believe that all necessary training
for controllers could be completed in less than 90 days. Overflight
revenues are expected to be substantial once flight corridors are
established, and the KCAA is eager to move forward.

... BUT NOT TO KOSOVO
--------------


3. (SBU) Unfortunately, because not all NATO members recognize
Kosovo's independence, NATO is unwilling to release airspace control

directly to the Kosovo government, even with a provision that Kosovo
then immediately cede authority to an agreed-upon third party.
Instead, NATO has assembled a technical panel that includes members
from Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
to work out an alternative acceptable to all parties. At a recent
meeting of the technical panel, NATO presented a proposal that would
assign Albania, Serbia and Macedonia portions of Kosovo's upper
airspace. NATO negotiator Georgio Cioni reportedly told his
superiors that NATO's proposal was well received, but Gjonbalaj made
clear to us that Kosovo will not agree to any plan that cedes
authority over Kosovo airspace to Serbia. Cioni reportedly told
Gjonbalaj to think of NATO's proposal as a big cake, where everyone
would get a slice. Mr. Gjonbalaj responded that even if that were
true, Kosovo is not NATO's cake to slice up.

KOSOVO FEELS SERBIA WOULD NOT BE HONEST BROKER
-------------- -


4. (SBU) Kosovo officials also believe that Serbia cannot be trusted
to manage Kosovo's airspace responsibly (i.e., without injecting
politics into it or in a manner that benefited Kosovo). Mr.
Gjonbalaj cited Serbia's ongoing refusal of overflight privileges to
any aircraft with Pristina as part of its flight plan as an example.
Additionally, he noted Serbia recently began charging a 3.3 Euro
security tax on all passengers departing from Serbian airports, and
that Serbia unilaterally included PIA in this policy despite the
fact that Serbia does not provide any services to Pristina. (Note:
This particular problem was resolved after KCAA officials wrote
directly to the International Air Transport Authority in protest;
the tax was removed from Pristina tickets. End Note) As a final
example of Serbia's bad faith on airspace and safety issues,
Gjonbalaj cited a serious incident roughly 3 years ago when Serbia

PRISTINA 00000546 002.2 OF 002


refused overflight permission to an aircraft with an in-flight
emergency that was low on fuel and attempting to divert from
Pristina to Sofia, Bulgaria.

COMMENT
--------------


5. (SBU) Given the political history between Serbia and Kosovo and
the specific incidents mentioned above, Kosovo sees Serbian
involvement in their airspace as an absolute showstopper. They
appear willing to cede such authority to Albania or Macedonia,
however. We believe Italy could also be an acceptable option for
Kosovo, as the radar and radio facilities in Brindisi are (according
to KCAA staff) robust enough to cover all of Kosovo airspace. That
said, Kosovo authorities may insist that NATO transfer authority for
Kosovo's airspace directly to Kosovo itself and that Kosovo then
cede authority to a third country. At this point in the NATO-led
process, Kosovo's representatives at the technical panel feel their
voices are not being heard. NATO negotiators must keep in mind the
political sensitivities surrounding the matter; we share the opinion
of Kosovo officials that while compromise is necessary, including
Serbia would be inappropriate.

DELL