Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PRISTINA150
2009-04-08 18:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pristina
Cable title:  

KOSOVO: MAJOR ELECTION-RELATED CHALLENGES AHEAD

Tags:  PGOV PREL EAID UNMIKV KV 
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FM AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8938
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 5239
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1157
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1664
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000150 

SIPDIS

PASS TO EUR/SCE
NSC FOR HELGERSON
USAID FOR DCHA/DC (HENNING AND MCENERY) AND E&E (SOKOLOWSKI
AND RUSSELL)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID UNMIKV KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: MAJOR ELECTION-RELATED CHALLENGES AHEAD

REF: A. PRISTINA 78

B. PRISTINA 131

Classified By: Ambassador Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 000150

SIPDIS

PASS TO EUR/SCE
NSC FOR HELGERSON
USAID FOR DCHA/DC (HENNING AND MCENERY) AND E&E (SOKOLOWSKI
AND RUSSELL)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID UNMIKV KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: MAJOR ELECTION-RELATED CHALLENGES AHEAD

REF: A. PRISTINA 78

B. PRISTINA 131

Classified By: Ambassador Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Kosovo's political scene is increasingly
focusing on municipal elections widely expected to take place
in autumn-winter 2009, though no date has yet been set.
Coalition and opposition parties alike see municipal
elections as an opportunity to gain momentum for national
elections, currently slated for 2011. The municipal
elections present several challenges: the President's LDK
party is counting on a strong showing to heal internal
divisions, but may break apart and harm the governing
coalition if it fails to do well; the Central Elections
Commission (CEC),charged with conducting the elections, is
seized with an ongoing power struggle between the two senior
coalition partners, PDK and LDK, and is currently unable to
direct the elections without external assistance; the OSCE
Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) wants to offer technical assistance
in administering and monitoring, but disputes within the
OSCE's Permanent Council in Vienna over the recognition of
Kosovo's independence may constrain this ability; and there
is currently no other external actor on the ground who can
provide necessary assistance to ensure that these elections
are generally free and fair. Given the high stakes involved
-- Kosovo will be under intense international scrutiny to
conduct a legitimate process, its first since becoming
independent in February 2008 -- Embassy and USAID have begun
contingency planning for IFES to provide substantial support
to Kosovo's municipal elections. END SUMMARY

BACKGROUND


2. (C) Kosovo last held comprehensive elections in November
2007, when residents voted for national and municipal
offices. Despite speculation that Kosovo would again hold
national elections in 2009 according to the Ahtisaari Plan's
suggestions, President Sejdiu and International Civilian
Representative Pieter Feith announced in December 2008 that
national candidates elected in 2007 would have a four-year
mandate and that no national elections would occur in 2009,

arguing that the earlier elections were Ahtisaari-compliant.
Municipal office holders, however, only possess a two-year
mandate because the Ahtisaari Plan envisioned new municipal
elections following the completion of decentralization that
establishes local self-governance and creates six new
Serb-majority municipalities. (Note: Decentralization's goal
is to empower Serbs with local control, thus increasing their
motivation to participate in elections and integrate within
Kosovo institutions. Kosovo Serbs had extraordinarily low
participation in 2007, with only 3297 Serbs (0.57% of votes
cast) coming to the polls.) Decentralization, however, is
proceeding slowly, and it is unlikely that any of the new
Serb-majority municipalities will be functioning this year.
We also do not expect large numbers of Serbs in Kosovo to
participate in upcoming elections absent approval or at least
tolerance from the Government of Serbia (reftels). End Note.)


3. (C) Local speculation holds that President Sejdiu will
make his announcement on a date for municipal elections in
May or June. The Law on Local Elections states that the
President must call elections no later than four months and
no earlier than six months before the date of the local
elections. The Law further states that municipal elections
should occur in the same month four years following the
previous election. An UNMIK regulation, however, limited
municipal mandates for the most recent election to two years.
This suggests that municipal elections could be called for
November 2009. A liberal interpretation of fine points in
the election law would allow the President to delay the
municipal elections until January 2010 or even move them up
to October 2009. We hear, however, that the GOK is hesitant
to postpone elections until next year, fearing that this will
increase pressure to hold national elections concurrently,

PRISTINA 00000150 002 OF 003


something opposition parties have lobbied for heavily.

IMPACT OF ELECTIONS ON GOVERNMENT STABILITY


4. (C) Municipal elections will likely have a direct impact
on the governing coalition's stability. Junior coalition
partner LDK is in disarray, with competing factions fighting
for control over the party's future. President Sejdiu's
loyalists count themselves in the party's old guard and see
Sejdiu as the spiritual successor to former President Ibrahim
Rugova -- credited among many as the political father of
modern, independent Kosovo. A dissatisfied element within
the party, gathered loosely under the moniker "Gorenje
Group"(named for a local hotel where this group meets),
contend that Sejdiu's leadership is ossified and point to the
LDK's poor showing in the 2007 elections as evidence that the
party needs new direction. Over the previous months, Embassy
has been counseling representatives from both factions to
work on party development focusing on policies and platform
rather than wholesale reform which would result in a purging
of party leaders to motivate quick change, but which could
also bring down the coalition government and create
instability in Kosovo.


5. (C) The LDK suffers from serious internal problems,
including poor organization and a disaffected grassroots, all
stemming from a weak and divided leadership. Another poor
electoral outcome for the party coming after 2007,s
disastrous results will likely engulf the LDK in a bloodbath
of bitter infighting for control of what remains of the
party. We have already seen former LDK senior official
Blerim Kuci defect to Ramush Haradinaj's AAK party, and
rumors persist that other LDK members may follow. A
worst-case scenario following municipal elections this year
is that some LDK MPs might leave the party, forming either
their own splinter as the LDD did in 2007 or joining another
Assembly caucus, most likely the opposition AAK. Regardless,
any fracturing of the LDK would destabilize the coalition and
possibly motivate earlier-than-desired national elections
that would throw senior officials into full-time campaign
mode and distract them from progress on critical political
and economic objectives.

CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION


6. (C) For municipal elections in 2009 to have a chance of
success, the Central Election Commission (CEC) needs major
capacity improvement. Currently, the CEC's secretariat lacks
a CEO, the official charged with directing the commission's
activities. The CEO's position has been vacant for months, a
consequence of tensions between the PDK and LDK, as each
party strives for influence on the CEC.


7. (C) The CEC itself is an 11-member body with a chair that
the Kosovo president selects from the Supreme Court and 10
members from political parties represented in the Assembly.
Zait Xhemajli, the CEC's current chair, tells us that the CEC
is currently incapable of conducting elections on its own and
requires technical assistance from the OSCE Mission in Kosovo
(OMIK). (NOTE: Currently, OMIK has 20 staff working within
the CEC, and OMIK has confirmed Xhemajli's warnings --
including concern about the possibility of counting fraud --
to us on several occasions. END NOTE). Xhemajli has
complained to us that the CEC members' political affiliations
prompt inter-party conflicts, and he is concerned about what
will happen when it comes time for the CEC to start counting
votes. He wants objective, expert assistance for a full
range of functions, including organizing elections in Serb
enclaves, managing vote counting, compiling and updating
voter lists, developing an operational plan to allow
displaced voters to participate, and registering political
parties. He has conveyed this same message to the OSCE on
several occasions, including to OSCE Head of Mission Werner
Almhofer, who has indicated his willingness to assist but has
never offered a detailed plan of what OMIK can or will do.

PRISTINA 00000150 003 OF 003



ROLE FOR THE OSCE


8. (C) OMIK is divided on how to proceed with its technical
assistance on elections. OMIK's Head of Democratization,
Wilma Theuws, has an ambitious plan that would second an
experienced OMIK local staffer to CEC as the new CEO. This
would give the CEC's Secretariat a non-partisan technocrat to
plan elections, who could coordinate the CEC's activities
with OSCE election workers that Theuws wants to provide for
the months leading up to the election.


9. (C) OMIK HOM Almhofer is far more circumspect about the
plan and is nervous that if OMIK's support during the
election is too bold, the non-recognizing OSCE member states
on the Permanent Council will complain that OMIK's activities
are inconsistent with OSCE's "status neutral" position
towards Kosovo independence. Almhofer allowed Theuws to
submit her plan for election support to Vienna for approval,
and we hear that OMIK is expecting a response within two
weeks. But even an affirmative response is no guarantee of
future engagement. While Theuws believes that she can
navigate the Permanent Council's concerns with carefully
worded reports that couch OSCE activities in terms of
"monitoring," the possibility exists that OSCE, reflecting
pressure from Moscow, Belgrade, or the five EU
non-recognizing countries, could withdraw its assistance at
any time during election preparations and derail the process.

COMMENT


10. (C) The stakes for the upcoming municipal elections are
high. Kosovo will be under intense international scrutiny to
conduct a free and fair process -- the first since the
country became independent in February 2008. A recent
USAID/Washington elections assessment team heard concerns
from a number of stakeholders here about the integrity of the
elections, and we fear that a failed process would be
destabilizing for Kosovo and the region. Other problems loom
as well: security for these elections would be of paramount
concern, particularly in Kosovo's north, and the unresolved
question of the Strpce municipality (where the Serb majority
boycotted the 2007 elections and a Serb parallel government
now claims control) would again come to the fore. As of now,
the Central Election Commission is incapable of directing
elections on its own, and OMIK cannot guarantee its
continuing assistance.


11. (C) While we could seek to delay elections to allow the
LDK time to get its house in order, give the CEC time to grow
into its job with the OSCE's assistance, and give
decentralization more time to develop and attract more Serb
voters, we do not see any of these developments happening
soon, and immense pressure from Kosovo's opposition to hold
these elections gives the government little room for
flexibility. Given this situation, we have begun contingency
planning to prevent a failed election. USAID, with a grant
to IFES, played a critical role to ensure that the 2007
elections proceeded fairly, and we believe it could provide
even greater assistance this year. We need, however, greater
clarity from OSCE on what assistance it will provide; this
should be a topic of discussion for USOSCE in its dealings
with the OSCE hierarchy and other delegations. End comment.
KAIDANOW