AMBASSADOR GIPS MEETS WITH DIRCO DEPMIN EBRAHIM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 002507

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KGHG AF WI ZI IR SF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GIPS MEETS WITH DIRCO DEPMIN EBRAHIM

REF: A. STATE 122234

B. STATE 123222

Classified By: Political Counselor Walter N.S. Pflaumer for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) On December 3, Ambassador Gips met with Ebrahim
Ebrahim, Deputy Minister of the Department of International
Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). Ebrahim cordially listed
points on which the SAG was content with its relations with
the U.S., he cited areas for collaboration in resolving
African conflicts, and he appealed for U.S. re-engagement on
the status of Western Sahara. On Afghanistan, where he
argued that resolution must come through political dialogue,
the SAG was willing to lend its good offices and share its
experiences in peaceful transition. The SAG supported U.S.
initiatives in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but it was
unimpressed by the Israeli "moratorium" on settlements in
lieu of a more definitive freeze. On Iran, Ebrahim urged the
U.S. to pursue bilateral talks, to engage instead of isolate
Iran, and thereby strengthen more Western-leaning elements
over anti-Western extremists. End Summary.

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SAG Content with USG Relations
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2. (C) After the Ambassador conveyed the USG's very strong
commitment to its relationship with South Africa, Ebrahim
expressed appreciation on a number of counts. He thanked the
U.S. for being the largest foreign donor on HIV/AIDS, and he
was aware of the Ambassador's November 30 announcement of an
additional US$120 million to help purchase ARVs. He was glad
of President Obama's focus on Africa, as articulated at
Accra. Approving of Secretary Clinton's proposal that
bilateral consultations be elevated to ministerial level, he
said the SAG was working toward that goal. Overall, he said,
DIRCO was "pleased and happy" in its relations with the U.S.,
whose citizens were now its second largest pool of tourists.
South Africa was now a lead beneficiary of AGOA and would
like to see more African countries follow suit. (The
Ambassador agreed, saying the U.S. would like to help
overcome infrastructure hurdles to intra-African trade.)
Ebrahim rounded off by hoping that President Obama would soon
visit South Africa.

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Africa: "Areas to Work Together"
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3. (C) With this segue to the President's agenda, the
Ambassador explained that President Obama was ambitious for
rapid progress across many foreign policy fronts, and that
the Embassy would always be eager to talk with DIRCO to
explain and consult on our approaches. The two countries'
objectives were usually the same, he argued, with only
occasional disagreements on tactics. If the SAG would share
insights with the U.S., and enable us to align our actions,
the USG and SAG could be powerful together. Ebrahim said
there were many areas where we could work together,
especially in conflict resolution, particularly in the Horn
of Africa and Sudan. He spoke of Zimbabwe as "making
progress" although there were problems, especially on the
Zanu-PF side. The SAG remained heavily involved, aware that
"we have to make a big push there." He said he had not yet
received a readout from the SAG's new faciliation team, which
had just returned from Harare.


4. (C) Ebrahim was most emphatic in his concern over Western
Sahara, which he saw as a "last vestige of colonialism" under
an unjust occupation. Having visited refugee camps there, he
feared that heretofore "secular" refugees could easily fall
Qfeared that heretofore "secular" refugees could easily fall
prey to radicalizing influences. As elsewhere around the
world, the camps there were "an example of our reluctance to
deal with these issues quickly, letting them fester, (and)
creating an ideal situation for extremists." The U.S. had
been engaged some years ago, inter alia through the Baker
Plan, but since 9/11 had been diverted by its desire to work
with Morocco on anti-terrorism issues, he said. In the Obama
administration there had been no apparent movement toward a
re-involement with the Western Sahara. The Ambassador
promised to convey to Washington South Africa's appeal for
re-engagement on the issue.

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Af-Pak, Mideast: SA Offers to Foster Dialogue
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5. (C) On global conflicts, Ebrahim said President Obama
rightly saw the Israeli-Palestinian issue in its regional
context. Afghanistan, he said, was problematic in relying on
conventional forces to fight an insurgency. He hoped the
troop surge (announced this week) could succeed. As in any
conflict, however, the solution would be political dialogue
not military victory, and he referenced the President's
comments regarding outreach to moderate Taliban. The SAG,
and the ruling ANC party, had shared its post-apartheid
experiences in peaceful transition and reconciliation in
Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Ireland, and DIRCO was "prepared to
assist" again. South Africa, said Ebrahim, had a standing in
the world to undertake this role, without a hidden agenda.
In Finland, the SAG had arranged talks among Iraqi Sunni,
Shi'a, and Kurdish factions -- and it would be willing to
serve an analogous role, discreetly, for Afghan dialogue
outside Afghanistan.


6. (C) Ebrahim lamented that President Obama's initiatives
toward Israel and Palestine had "stalled a bit," and he did
not share the optimism of some U.S. visitors. The SAG was
disappointed that Israelis were continuing to build
settlements. Taking the Ambassador's point that Israeli had
announced a "moratorium" on settlements, Ebrahim said what
the SAG wanted was not that, but rather a definitive "end" to
them altogether. In another example of fostering dialogue,
the SAG had hosted Israeli and Palestinian delegates for a
dialogue in South Africa and had provided "capacity building"
to the Fatah party. Unfortunately, for these adversaries the
exercise did not seem to bear fruit.

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Iran: U.S. Should Engage (not Isolate)
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7. (C) The Ambassador asked for DIRCO's assessment of Iran's
nuclear intentions, and recommendations for U.S. action.
Ebrahim said the SAG had established binational commissions
with Iran (as with the U.S. and China),and during recent
consultations there Iran had assured him of their purely
peaceful intentions. (Note: Ebrahim led the SAG delegation.
End Note.) He chided Canada for being "stuck" on censuring
Iran at the U.N., which "creates problems for us." Urging
the U.S. to meet with Iran alone, i.e. without any EU allies,
Ebrahim suggested "This is what Iran wants... You will get
more that way than by sanctions." Although the SAG had
expressed "great concern" to Iran over post-election
repression, it still felt Iran could play a critical role in
the Mideast, Iraq, and even Afghanistan. Iranian society was
divided, with the younger generation leaning westward. While
"axis of evil" rhetoric united Iran against the U.S., talks
would instead isolate the fundamentalist elements, he argued.


8. (C) The Ambassador affirmed that President Obama had made
multiple attempts to engage Iran, but each attempt had been
rebuffed. The President had repeatedly extended the olive
branch to Iran, and despite domestic political heat from
opposition voices in the U.S. he remained committed to the
goal of dialogue, but he was frustrated to have had no
positive response from Iran. In IAEA talks, similarly, the
U.S. had thought it was close to striking a deal with Iran,
only to be ultimately disappointed. The Ambassador urged the
SAG, when next speaking with its Iranian counterparts, to
convey that the Iranians needed to react more positively to
U.S. outreach if real dialogue was to be achieved. President
QU.S. outreach if real dialogue was to be achieved. President
Obama continued to seek ways to enable communication.

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Climate Change: U.S. Views Conveyed
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9. (C) The Ambassador shared Department perspectives on
climate change, emphasizing U.S. recognition of the challenge
to developing countries. He relayed President Zuma's comment
to him appreciating how far President Obama's own vision had
developed and progressed on this issue. Ebrahim commented
that South Africa would also participate at the summit in
Copenhagen and hoped for a positive result there.

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Ebrahim Speaks Softly, but Carries Great Weight
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10. (C) COMMENT: Deputy Minister Ebrahim is considered
President Jacob Zuma's closest advisor on foreign policy,
reputedly wielding great influence behind the scenes in
Zuma's inner circle, alongside his overt role in
international outreach. As Chair of the ANC's International
Relations Committee, he (not Minister Nkoana-Mashabane) leads
foreign policy discussions within the party. He is said to

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weigh in personally and decisively on key issues, lately
including votes at the U.N. An older man, whom an Embassy
staffer described as a "wise owl" saying little but observing
much, Ebrahim is not to be underestimated. Although in this
opening meeting he remained on the level of pleasantries and
generalities, we will work to deepen our relationship with
this unassuming but pivotal SAG insider. End Comment.
GIPS