Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PRETORIA1392
2009-07-09 14:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pretoria
Cable title:  

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CRITICIZES SOUTH AFRICA'S

Tags:  PREL ZIM NI SF 
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RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSA #1392/01 1901400
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 091400Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9015
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 6981
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 1096
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 9349
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 001392 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: PREL ZIM NI SF
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CRITICIZES SOUTH AFRICA'S
FOREIGN POLICY

PRETORIA 00001392 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR RAYMOND L. BROWN. REAS
ONS 1.4(B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 001392

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: PREL ZIM NI SF
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CRITICIZES SOUTH AFRICA'S
FOREIGN POLICY

PRETORIA 00001392 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR RAYMOND L. BROWN. REAS
ONS 1.4(B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. On 24 June, the Institute for Security
Studies hosted a debate on the role of human rights in South
Africa's foreign policy under newly elected President Jacob
Zuma. Keynote speakers included Ken Roth, Executive Director
of Human Rights Watch in New York, who described South
Africa's foreign policy under Mbeki as hypocritical and
retrograde, and Dr. Siphamandla Zondi of the Institute for
Global Dialogue (IGD),who argued that South Africa's
policies have been consistent, misunderstood, and no more
hypocritical than those of any other Western nation. The
debate ended with Zondi's prognostication that any foreign
policy the Zuma administration pursues will have to first and
foremost benefit South Africa domestically. In the process,
Zondi dismissed Roth's hope that South Africa regain its
former reputation as a global human rights champion. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) On 24 June, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
hosted a seminar to discuss South Africa's past and future
emphasis on human rights in its foreign policy. Ken Roth,
Executive Director of Human Rights Watch in New York,
reflected on what he considers South Africa's tarnished
reputation when it comes to human rights, while Dr.
Siphamandla Zondi of the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD)
argued that South Africa's principle-based foreign policies
have gotten them nowhere and that foreign policy under Zuma
will seek to bring home tangible benefits to South Africans
first and promote ANC ideology second.

--------------
SOUTH AFRICA'S MORAL HIGH GROUND LOST
--------------


3. (C) Roth was highly critical of South Africa's foreign
policy over the past decade, squarely laying the blame on
former President Mbeki's feet for squandering South Africa's
greatest asset, which was its ability to appeal to others
from a moral high ground. Mbeki, he said, will be best known
in the human rights community for "cozying up" to Mugabe and
to a lesser extent for his denialist views on HIV/AIDS. Roth
did give some credit to Mbeki for his desire to level the
international playing field, but believes his goal, however
laudable, was overshadowed by his refusal to acknowledge

human rights abuses around the world.


4. (C) Roth also spoke at length about what he considers
South Africa's disastrous two-year rotation on the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) from 2006 to 2008, calling
its positions on certain issues "retrograde." Roth said, "It
was as if the 1990's never happened; South Africa used
arguments that even Russia and China won't use anymore and
that is that human rights are not a security issue and thus
do not belong in the UNSC." As a result, he said the human
rights community, which had such high hopes for South Africa,
now considers South Africa a huge disappointment and no
longer an ally. South Africa, he said, has morphed into a
version of every other country on the council, including the
US, with contradictory and hypocritical foreign policy goals.


--------------
BUT NOT ALL LOST
--------------


5. (C) Roth argued that South Africa's domestic human rights
record is something to be proud of and that international
policies have not been all bad. He gave Mbeki credit for his
Qpolicies have not been all bad. He gave Mbeki credit for his
work in conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts on the
continent, including mediation efforts in Burundi and the
Democratic Republic of Congo. South Africa's role in
encouraging 30 African countries to sign up to the
International Criminal Court was also monumental, he said, as
was South Africa's influence in getting the African Union to
officially reject anyone on the continent who comes to power
through a coup.

-------------- ---
MBEKI PERSONIFIED FOREIGN POLICY, NOT DEFINED IT
-------------- ---


6. (C) According to Dr. Zondi, however, Mbeki should not be
made the scapegoat for South Africa's foreign policies since

PRETORIA 00001392 002.2 OF 003


Mbeki did not make foreign policy in a vacuum, but rather
articulated the ANC's foreign policy. Using this logic, he
argued that Zuma's presidency will not necessarily lead to a
sea change in foreign policy direction. As examples, Zondi
noted that the ruling ANC party--not Mbeki--has never been
willing to name and shame, always sought greater South-South
cooperation, and always had an unwavering faith in the belief
that diplomacy can solve the world's problems. In this vein,
ANC foreign policy has had some continuity since Mandela was
President. Zondi argued that people have been blinded to
this fact because they see Mandela as a messiah and Mbeki as
the devil. He went on to say that the departure from making
human rights South Africa's number one foreign policy
priority began under Mandela when he chose to support China
over Taiwan and Indonesia over East Timor.

--------------
SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY GOES DOMESTIC
--------------


7. (C) Zondi believes South Africa's foreign policy under
Zuma will be driven by three factors. First, the ANC is
under pressure to show domestic dividends from foreign
policy. Zondi noted that 15 years after apartheid, people
are still languishing in poverty and asking why their lives
are not better. An unnamed Department of International
Relations and Cooperation (DICO) official echoed this comment
from the audience, saying, "The international beauty of South
Africa's transition is lost on the average South African."
Zondi complained that countries with worse human rights
records like Angola receive more international assistance and
more foreign direct investment than South Africa. Second,
the ANC still believes that the world's power is unbalanced
and needs to be redistributed. Zondi added that Western
nations often use human rights as a romantic notion to cover
up their own self-interests and South Africa is criticized
for pointing this out. Third, the ANC feels an obligation
to help other African countries. Underlying all of these
demands is South Africa's unwillingness to act alone after
South Africa was ostracized by other African nations for
criticizing former Nigerian President Abacha in 1995. Zondi
believes that while on the UNSC, South Africa learned
valuable lessons, namely that it cannot change the world,
that it should not take any country's support for granted,
and that politics is dirty. Zondi added that South Africa
got into the UNSC boxing ring with the US and UK and was
surprised when it was hit in the face.


--------------
LOOKING AHEAD: BRIGHT SPOTS OR ONE-OFFS?
--------------


8. (C) Roth believes that he has already seen some subtle
differences in South Africa's foreign policy under Zuma:

-- Pretoria reversed its original decision under interim
President Motlanthe not to grant the Dalai Lama a visa;

-- Pretoria objected to the arrest of Burmese opposition
leader Aung San Suu Kyi, with Deputy Foreign Minister Ebrahim
Ebrahim going so far as to offer to send a delegation to
facilitate negotiations;

-- Pretoria expressed concern about potential human rights
abuses by the Sri Lankan government, but Roth noted that when
it really mattered at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC),
Pretoria's "final delivery lacked" when it voted for a
QPretoria's "final delivery lacked" when it voted for a
watered down resolution;

-- Zuma appeared willing to stand by South Africa's legal
obligations as a member of the Rome Statute by warning
Sudanese President Bashir that he would be arrested if he
came to Pretoria for Zuma's inauguration. Roth noted that
this is in sharp contrast to Mbeki, who argued for an Article
16 deferral to put off Bashir's prosecution for another year.
(COMMENT: In fact, the Zuma administration does not want
Bashir arrested either and has argued Bashir's arrest would
not lead to a solution to the political crisis in Sudan. END
COMMENT)

-- South Africa showed a level of leadership at the African
Union not seen under Mbeki when South Africa worked the
corridors and invoked a simple procedural rule at a recent AU
meeting that prevented non-member states pushing for a

PRETORIA 00001392 003.2 OF 003


rejection of the Bashir indictment.


9. (C) Roth, however, noted that Zimbabwe appears to be a
mixed bag. Zuma has publicly stated that some leaders should
not stay on forever, with many believing that he was
referring to Zimbabwean President Mugabe. Additionally,
South Africa has relaxed visa requirements for Zimbabweans.
However, Roth noted the idea of amnesty is "ludicrous,"
especially in the case of Zimbabwe where Mugabe is not
honestly implementing the Global Political Agreement, Prime
Minister Tsvangirai is a figurehead, and security forces are
still committing abuses. More disturbing, the lack of
progress in Zimbabwe is not on SADC's agenda, which is
chaired by South Africa.

--------------
CHALLENGES AHEAD
--------------


10. (C) As for foreign policy challenges ahead of South
Africa, Roth listed Somalia and the threat of international
prosecutions, security in eastern Congo, and ongoing conflict
in Darfur. Roth remarked that South Africa needs to change
its policy of supporting a deferral for Bashir, and Zimbabwe,
which needs to be pushed toward a genuine sharing of power,
an equal share of policymaking, and respect for human rights.
Roth also hopes that South Africa will be willing to play a
more constructive role at the UNHRC, but more specifically by
replacing Egypt and Algeria as leaders of the African bloc.


11. (C) Zondi believes South Africa needs to balance
pragmatism, human rights, democracy, good governance, and
realpolitik -- i.e., driven by South Africa's national
interests. More specifically, he believes first that South
Africa should try to draw concessions from superpowers, not
change them. Second, South Africa should place a greater
emphasis on diplomacy, collectives, and multilateral fora.
Third, South Africa should give greater attention to human
rights but not blindly, adding that public and economic
diplomacy should be equally considered. Fourth, South Africa
should pursue restorative justice, not punitive justice
unless for peace, i.e. South Africa should push for more
truth and reconciliation commissions, amnesties, and other
conditions that lead to durable peace. (NOTE: Roth took
great exception to Zondi's suggestions, noting that the world
has moved beyond TRCs and that no dictator has ever stepped
down when offered amnesty. Dictators step down, he said,
only after they lose the capacity to rule. The more
regularized justice is applied, the more effective it will
be. END NOTE)

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) The ANC's foreign policy ideology, namely loyalty to
other liberation movements, desire to be viewed as an African
brother rather than regional hegemon, commitment to
decision-making by consensus in multilateral fora, and
South-South cooperation, have not changed. Most or all of
these goals, however, at some point have naturally come into
conflict with the agendas of international human rights
activists, especially the goal of promoting African
solidarity which has at times come at the expense of human
rights and accountability. Moreover, the ANC and Zuma are
facing a dissatisfied public that is calling for tangible
government benefits in the form of jobs, houses, and improved
social services, not improving other countries' human rights
records. Given that there is little public engagement on
Pretoria's foreign policy stances, much less its positions on
QPretoria's foreign policy stances, much less its positions on
human rights, Zuma and the ANC are not likely to face any
significant domestic pressure -- outside of opposition
denuciation, editorials, op-eds, and NGO critiques -- to
change these stances either. As a result, South Africa is
likely scale back some of its activities in the foreign
policy arena, but this does not necessarily preclude new
doors from opening for the USG to pursue mutually beneficial
goals.
CONNERS