Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PRETORIA1031
2009-05-20 15:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Pretoria
Cable title:
DEMARCHE DELIVERED: URGENT NEED TO PROMOTE SOMALIA
how-toP 201552Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8558 INFO AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN PRIORITY AMCONSUL DURBAN PRIORITY AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRETORIA 001031
DEPT FOR AF/E - WALSHMP AND AF/S - MARBURGJR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER EAID ER SO SF
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: URGENT NEED TO PROMOTE SOMALIA
CEASEFIRE, SUPPORT SOMALIA TFG, AND PRESSURE ERITREA TO
STOP SUPPORTING EXTREMISTS
REF: STATE 50007
Classified By: Political Counselor Raymond L. Brown. Reasons 1.5
(b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRETORIA 001031
DEPT FOR AF/E - WALSHMP AND AF/S - MARBURGJR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER EAID ER SO SF
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: URGENT NEED TO PROMOTE SOMALIA
CEASEFIRE, SUPPORT SOMALIA TFG, AND PRESSURE ERITREA TO
STOP SUPPORTING EXTREMISTS
REF: STATE 50007
Classified By: Political Counselor Raymond L. Brown. Reasons 1.5
(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Poloff delivered reftel points on Somalia and
Eritrea to Department of International Relations and
Cooperation (DIRC) Deputy Director Phindile Xaba on May 20,
2009. Xaba acknowledged that Eritrea's public actions,
including not recognizing Somalia's Transitional Federal
Government (TFG),pointed to possible collusion with the
enemies of the TFG, but she wondered whether the accusations
of Eritrea providing weapons to insurgents were true. She
explained that DIRC officials were waiting for instructions
from their new Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane on foreign
policy issues across the board, although she expects no major
changes. The South African Government (SAG) is planning to
provide capacity building to the TFG. End summary.
2. (C) In the view of DIRC Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean
Islands Deputy Director Phindile Xaba, the conflict in
Mogadishu is not between Islamic extremists and the TFG.
Rather, it is a personal conflict between Sheikh Hassan Dahir
Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. She commented that
when she met Aweys last year in Asmara, he looked very
comfortable and it appeared that the Eritreans were taking
good care of him. She thought it made sense that the
Eritreans had provided supplies to Aweys forces, but she
asked whether anyone had verified these reports.
3. (C) Xaba worries that Sharif's government won't last past
June 2009. She lamented that, "The international community,
including ourselves, is just watching. The African Union and
UN representatives have just made noise about foreign
fighters." According to Xaba, South Africa is planning to
support the TFG with capacity building in the key government
departments and institutions, although none has been selected
yet. (Note: South Africa was asked to provide police force
training, but the SAG declined because the SAG does not have
police available to provide training, according to Xaba. End
note.) She explained that while planning for capacity
building continues, there has generally been a pause in
foreign policy activities due to the transition in the new
SAG administration. She said, "The new Zuma administration
has said there will be no major changes (in foreign policy),
but we're waiting to see if there will be a change in
emphasis."
4. (C) Xaba acknowledged the threat posed to the region if
the insurgents succeeded in toppling the TFG. She mentioned
al-Shabab leader Abu Mansoor's December 19, 2008 Islamist
pronouncement that, "We will establish Islamic rule from
Alaska and Chile to South Africa, Japan, Russia, the Solomon
Islands and all the way to Iceland, be warned, we are
coming." She believes al-Shabab may target South Africa
because of incidences of violence against Somalis in South
Africa even before the eruption of xenophobic attacks of May
2008. According to Xaba, Somalis own many businesses in the
Cape Town area and have formed strong associations in
Johannesburg. She went on to say that a leader of one of the
Johannesburg association of Somalis admitted that Somalis
have not integrated well into South African society, but keep
to themselves.
5. (C) Comment: Analysts, government officials, and Zuma
insiders agree that there will be no major foreign policy
changes in South Africa and that focus will turn to domestic
issues. The previous Mbeki administration never found a
formula for SAG intervention in Somalia, even though he
described it as appositive obligation in terms of African
solidarity. Observers think the current SAG government will
be less "aggresively internationalist" than Mbeki in its
approach to governing and foreign policy, which may result in
South Africa remaining aloof or only nominally engaged with
other African states on Somalia. It is therefore unlikely
that South Africa will go forward with high level engagement
to respond to the current violence in Mogadishu at least
until the new minister, Nkoana-Mashabane, has settled into
her position and assembled her team. End comment.
LA LIME
DEPT FOR AF/E - WALSHMP AND AF/S - MARBURGJR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER EAID ER SO SF
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: URGENT NEED TO PROMOTE SOMALIA
CEASEFIRE, SUPPORT SOMALIA TFG, AND PRESSURE ERITREA TO
STOP SUPPORTING EXTREMISTS
REF: STATE 50007
Classified By: Political Counselor Raymond L. Brown. Reasons 1.5
(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Poloff delivered reftel points on Somalia and
Eritrea to Department of International Relations and
Cooperation (DIRC) Deputy Director Phindile Xaba on May 20,
2009. Xaba acknowledged that Eritrea's public actions,
including not recognizing Somalia's Transitional Federal
Government (TFG),pointed to possible collusion with the
enemies of the TFG, but she wondered whether the accusations
of Eritrea providing weapons to insurgents were true. She
explained that DIRC officials were waiting for instructions
from their new Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane on foreign
policy issues across the board, although she expects no major
changes. The South African Government (SAG) is planning to
provide capacity building to the TFG. End summary.
2. (C) In the view of DIRC Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean
Islands Deputy Director Phindile Xaba, the conflict in
Mogadishu is not between Islamic extremists and the TFG.
Rather, it is a personal conflict between Sheikh Hassan Dahir
Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. She commented that
when she met Aweys last year in Asmara, he looked very
comfortable and it appeared that the Eritreans were taking
good care of him. She thought it made sense that the
Eritreans had provided supplies to Aweys forces, but she
asked whether anyone had verified these reports.
3. (C) Xaba worries that Sharif's government won't last past
June 2009. She lamented that, "The international community,
including ourselves, is just watching. The African Union and
UN representatives have just made noise about foreign
fighters." According to Xaba, South Africa is planning to
support the TFG with capacity building in the key government
departments and institutions, although none has been selected
yet. (Note: South Africa was asked to provide police force
training, but the SAG declined because the SAG does not have
police available to provide training, according to Xaba. End
note.) She explained that while planning for capacity
building continues, there has generally been a pause in
foreign policy activities due to the transition in the new
SAG administration. She said, "The new Zuma administration
has said there will be no major changes (in foreign policy),
but we're waiting to see if there will be a change in
emphasis."
4. (C) Xaba acknowledged the threat posed to the region if
the insurgents succeeded in toppling the TFG. She mentioned
al-Shabab leader Abu Mansoor's December 19, 2008 Islamist
pronouncement that, "We will establish Islamic rule from
Alaska and Chile to South Africa, Japan, Russia, the Solomon
Islands and all the way to Iceland, be warned, we are
coming." She believes al-Shabab may target South Africa
because of incidences of violence against Somalis in South
Africa even before the eruption of xenophobic attacks of May
2008. According to Xaba, Somalis own many businesses in the
Cape Town area and have formed strong associations in
Johannesburg. She went on to say that a leader of one of the
Johannesburg association of Somalis admitted that Somalis
have not integrated well into South African society, but keep
to themselves.
5. (C) Comment: Analysts, government officials, and Zuma
insiders agree that there will be no major foreign policy
changes in South Africa and that focus will turn to domestic
issues. The previous Mbeki administration never found a
formula for SAG intervention in Somalia, even though he
described it as appositive obligation in terms of African
solidarity. Observers think the current SAG government will
be less "aggresively internationalist" than Mbeki in its
approach to governing and foreign policy, which may result in
South Africa remaining aloof or only nominally engaged with
other African states on Somalia. It is therefore unlikely
that South Africa will go forward with high level engagement
to respond to the current violence in Mogadishu at least
until the new minister, Nkoana-Mashabane, has settled into
her position and assembled her team. End comment.
LA LIME