Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PRAGUE722
2009-12-15 12:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Prague
Cable title:  

CZECH VIEWS ON THE VISEGRAD FOUR (C-RE9-02125)

Tags:  PINR PGOV PREL EZ PL HU LO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7226
RR RUEHSL
DE RUEHPG #0722 3491258
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151258Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2005
INFO RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA 0008
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0622
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3351
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000722 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2034
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL EZ PL HU LO
SUBJECT: CZECH VIEWS ON THE VISEGRAD FOUR (C-RE9-02125)

REF: STATE 125736

Classified By: Acting Political and Economic Counselor Michael Dixon fo
r reason 1.4(C).

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000722

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2034
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL EZ PL HU LO
SUBJECT: CZECH VIEWS ON THE VISEGRAD FOUR (C-RE9-02125)

REF: STATE 125736

Classified By: Acting Political and Economic Counselor Michael Dixon fo
r reason 1.4(C).


1. (SBU) In response to reftel, Poloff met on December 14
with Jiri Cistecky, Director of the Czech MFA's Central
European Department, and Petr Maryska, a member of the
Central European Department's Visegrad 4 (V-4) working group,
to discuss Czech perceptions of the current state of V-4
cooperation, and particularly Poland's approach to V-4
involvement.


2. (C) Cistecky indicated that, while V-4 cooperation is
probably generally viewed positively by those looking at the
V-4 "brand" from the outside, the internal view in Prague is
that much of the V-4's activity lacks practical results, and
is instead limited to declarations of support or statements
of intent by the V-4. Cistecky said that the Visegrad Fund
continues to be used successfully to finance activities in
pursuit of common V-4 positions on an ad hoc basis, usually
through NGOs. However, formal V-4 cooperation with the
governments of non-V-4 countries more often ends up taking a
bilateral form, because the mechanisms for implementing and
sustaining a relationship with the V-4 as a group are
undefined.


3. (C) In part for this reason, Cistecky stated that the V-4
had embarked in the spring on an in-depth analysis of its
goals, organization and capacities to determine if there is a
desire for more purposeful cooperation, both within the V-4
and with potential external partners, and how best to develop
the necessary structures and procedures to support such
objectives. This process of self-examination is also aimed
at determining the most effective ways in which the V-4 can
leverage its positions in other international bodies,
especially the EU. While the response thus far to this
analysis has been muted, Cistecky expects that the
back-to-back Hungarian and Polish EU presidencies in 2011 may
prompt more effort to define and focus V-4 activity.


4. (C) Cistecky described Poland's level of cooperation with
other V-4 members as "broad, but not deep." He said the
process of finding the best ways for the V-4 to work together
in a more coordinated way will continue to be hampered by
Poland's desire to "be in charge instead of being an equal
partner." Cistecky feels Poland's wider agenda to be "the
biggest of the little ones" and to lead a Central/Eastern
European coalition in the EU further complicates its role in
the V-4. Nevertheless, he noted that the Czech Republic and
Poland share very similar foreign policy views, especially
about Eastern Europe and the Balkans, while it is sometimes
more difficult for the Czechs to find common positions with
Hungary and Slovakia.


5. (C) Without addressing any particular potential
arrangement, Cistecky speculated that the V-4 might, in the
future, become "the platform" onto which other relationships
could be attached to expand the V-4's international
influence. However, he believes that the V-4 has enough to
do for now to solidify itself internally.
Thompson-Jones