Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PRAGUE696
2009-11-25 16:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Prague
Cable title:  

CZECHS HOST NATIONAL SEMINAR ON NATO STRATEGIC

Tags:  NATO PREL MARR MOPS MCAP EZ RU 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPG #0696/01 3291618
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251618Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1962
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1996
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000696 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2014
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR MOPS MCAP EZ RU
SUBJECT: CZECHS HOST NATIONAL SEMINAR ON NATO STRATEGIC
CONCEPT -- ALL ABOUT RUSSIA

Classified By: CDA Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000696

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2014
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR MOPS MCAP EZ RU
SUBJECT: CZECHS HOST NATIONAL SEMINAR ON NATO STRATEGIC
CONCEPT -- ALL ABOUT RUSSIA

Classified By: CDA Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 24, the Czech MFA hosted a
seminar, "Seeking a New NATO Strategic Concept: The Czech
Perspective", attended by Group of Experts member Ambassador
Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz, NATO Assistant Secretary General
Jiri Sedivy, parliamentarians, MFA and MOD representatives,
think tank researchers, and journalists. Much of the Czech
focus was on the primacy of Article 5 and the negative role
-- or even the threat -- of Russia. Ambassador von Ploetz's
key themes were the importance of arms control and
non-proliferation as the best means of avoiding conflict, and
the need for what he viewed as a more constructive and
realistic assessment of Russia -- or, as he put it privately,
the need for some on the Czech side to focus more on being
part of the solution rather than the problem. End Summary.

The Big Picture
--------------


3. (SBU) Ambassador Sedivy began the seminar with his view
of the new Strategic Concept's three primary objectives. The
first of these is to explain "who we (NATO) are" in terms of
collective defense and security, and to elaborate NATO's
value added to the security of the international community.
Secondly, to determine the "level of NATO's ambition" by
establishing the scope of the Alliance's geographic focus and
the eventual extent of NATO's membership, bearing in mind
that greater size could ultimately translate to less
collective action. As his third point, he noted that the
Strategic Concept will have to incorporate new threats such
as cyber warfare and piracy within the context of Article 5.
Above all, however, Sedivy emphasized that the new Strategic
Concept must demonstrate NATO's enduring relevance. He
stressed a need for balance between continuity and change in
the final product. No hope should be held out for solving
the problems of NATO, he warned, simply by drafting a new
Strategic Concept. These will only be addressed by political
will and the investment of resources.



4. (SBU) Ambassador von Ploetz assessed the Strategic
Concept process and desirable outcomes. He identified
strategic objective number one as ensuring the security and
defense of Alliance members' countries and societies through
Article 5. This includes a reaffirmation of the
transatlantic link and the underlying promise of help from
U.S. forces in time of need, as well as an open door policy
for potential new members. Safety and protection of the
environment (e.g., against global warming) was his second
strategic objective, with defense against more geographically
distant threats being a third objective, if they pose a
direct danger to member states. In considering the balance
between territorial defense and expeditionary operations, von
Ploetz indicated that, in his personal opinion, "NATO will
have to act globally, but will not be a global actor."

The Czech Big Picture
--------------


5. (SBU) Czech MOD's Assistant Deputy Minister for
International Affairs and Defense Policy and Strategy
Director Ivan Dvorak painted a more modest Czech view of the
impact of the new Strategic Concept, observing that the final
shape and character of the document will affect the Czechs'
strategic vision for their armed forces. He said that
military deployment capabilities for territorial defense and
expeditionary operations are overlapping and complementary,
and he emphasized the Czech Republic's commitment to NATO
operations abroad, such as in Afghanistan.


6. (SBU) Saying he did not expect the Strategic Concept to
encompass climate change, but to focus on military
capabilities, Dvorak identified three primary audiences for
the document. The first of these is the public audience in
NATO countries who must be convinced that NATO is strong and
can respond to threats. The second audience is "outside
actors", some of whom share NATO's values, others who do not.
Finally, there is the "professional public" consisting of
members of the many organizations who will have to understand
and implement the Concept. Regarding Article 5, both Dvorak
and MFA's Security Policy Director Ivan Pocuch repeated the
messages delivered at recent high-level U.S.-Czech bilateral
meetings, during which they identified the Article as the
"key" element in the Czech outlook on formulating the new
Strategic Concept and urged maintaining the status quo, with
Pocuch arguing in favor of preserving the Article's
"constructive ambivalence and ambiguity".

Russia Polemics
--------------


7. (SBU) Ambassador von Ploetz explained how the Strategic
Concept process helps answer a pressing need for renewed
transatlantic dialogue and consultation among Alliance
partners and with other countries. He said the circle of
important interlocutors includes Russia, though he noted that
it will be necessary to find out to what extent "there will
be two to tango" in the NATO-Russia relationship. MOD's
Dvorak and MFA's Pocuch, echoing sentiments from other recent
bilateral encounters, were markedly skeptical about the
prospects for useful dialogue with Russia. Dvorak observed
that dialogue would be successful only so long as the
Russians act in mutual partnership with NATO. Pocuch took
things up a notch when he insisted that cooperation with
Russia is desirable only if Russia "does not behave like a
spoiled child who always has to have his way," but as a
"constructive player".


8. (SBU) After pausing to note that this view should not be
taken as "the definition of the Czech position" on
NATO-Russia dialogue, Pocuch moved on to assess what he
identified as Russia's greater relative military strength in
2009 compared with the situation in 1999 when the last
Strategic Concept was approved. He encouraged the retention
of nuclear deterrence as a NATO principle, because, "no one
really knows how many tactical and strategic nuclear weapons
the Russians have, not even the Russians themselves."
One-time Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky (also chief of
staff to former President Havel and Czech Ambassador in
Moscow from 1996-2000) scolded that those crafting the new
Strategic Concept were only fooling themselves if they did
not take what he considers the necessary step of actually
naming those who pose a threat and preparing to fight against
them, explaining that these potential enemies most especially
include countries such as Russia who possess deliverable
nuclear weapons.


9. (SBU) Lubos Palata, editor of the Czech daily "Lidove
noviny" and correspondent for the Polish daily "Gazeta
Wyborcza", claimed that citizens of NATO's new member
countries are losing faith in Article 5 as a safeguard of
defense, and that many see a situation similar to that of
Poland in 1939, with worthless assurances from the West. He
asserted that Central and Eastern Europeans view the
deployment of their soldiers abroad as an exchange for a
security guarantee and that the "lay public" thought of the
formerly planned radar as a type of "insurance policy." He
concluded that Central and Eastern Europeans will have to be
convinced by the new Strategic Concept that their taxes
should be spent on defense. He asserted that this will be an
even more difficult case to make after what happened in
Georgia, saying that NATO did nothing and the EU had to step
in. Palata told his audience that Czechs don't understand
why NATO is sending thousand of troops to Afghanistan or
fighting Somali pirates, yet not doing anything about Georgia
or the situation in Moldova, for example.


10. (SBU) Ambassador von Ploetz argued that any threat
assessment must include an evaluation of capabilities and
intentions. He painted what he called a more "sober" picture
than what he estimated his Czech interlocutors were imagining
about Russia, pointing out that the gap between U.S. and
Russian conventional military capabilities will be even more
disadvantageous for the Russians by 2017, and that currently
only 10 percent of Russian military hardware is of
non-Soviet-era provenance. He also claimed that what in fact
had been poor Russian military performance in Georgia is
being "kept secret" in Moscow. Thus, strictly from an
analysis of military capabilities he is reluctant to label
Russia a threat.


11. (SBU) More importantly, von Ploetz added, NATO should
not be defined in terms of its enemies, but united by the
values and the way of life for which the Alliance stands.
Later, Ambassador von Ploetz also called participants'
attention to the fact that Russia's proximity to the "arc of
instability" in Eurasia coupled with the decline of its
European population in the face of rising Muslim numbers
poses a demographic challenge that Yevgeny Primakov has
labeled the greatest threat to Russian security and stability.


12. (SBU) After supporting Ambassador von Ploetz's
assessment of Russia's true military capabilities, Ambassador
Sedivy stated that it is "irrational" to consider Russia a
direct threat in the sense of Article 5. He did allow that
Russian intelligence collection efforts against the West are
still very vigorous, and he agreed that NATO needs to do more
to "be visible" in places like the Baltics. Possibly turning
his attention to Dobrovsky (who was a signer of the Open
Letter to President Obama on July 16),Sedivy said that those
who say America is turning its back on Europe are displaying
"persistent immaturity".



13. (C) Privately, after the seminar, Ambassador von Ploetz
remarked on the anti-Russia tenor of some of the statements,
saying that when he encounters such attitudes in Central and
Eastern Europe he finds it useful to encourage those holding
them to focus on becoming "part of the solution" to
establishing a constructive NATO-Russia dialogue rather than
insisting on continuing to be "part of the problem" standing
in the way of doing so.

Afghanistan, NATO-EU, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control
-------------- --------------


14. (SBU) Ambassador von Ploetz warned that, in considering
the nature of NATO's future role, "we must resist the
temptation to view Afghanistan as the raison d'etre of the
Alliance," and he insisted that NATO is not a "democracy
exporter", but a provider of security and stability. He also
highlighted the role of NATO-EU cooperation to prevent
crises, identifying the EU as "the largest soft power player
in the world" and forecasting increased EU military
capabilities resulting from the Lisbon Treaty. MFA Political
Director Ivo Sramek noted that the Lisbon Treaty will also be
a force to be reckoned with in the shaping of future EU
foreign policy. In addition to possibilities for
comprehensive applications of civilian and military solutions
resulting from a NATO-EU partnership, von Ploetz held up
active non-proliferation and verifiable arms control policies
as among NATO's best keys to crisis prevention -- and, in
tough economic times, as solutions costing less than military
hardware.


15. (SBU) MOD's Dvorak and Parlimanetarian Michael Hrbata
(ODS party; Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee) doubted
the effectiveness and the likelihood of EU military action.
Ambassador von Ploetz, calling himself the "father of the
Eurocorps", insisted that, just as individuals are first and
foremost responsible for their own welfare, so EU countries
can and should spend more on defense rather than simply
relying on the U.S. to "bail them out". Hrbata lamented what
he described as the biggest cut in the Czech defense budget
since 1989 (12 percent),and he noted that such a reduction
does not help improve the country's military capabilities,
notwithstanding Defense Minister Bartak's commitment in a
recent ten-year planning analysis to make participation in
NATO operations the military's number one priority.

What Wasn't Discussed
--------------


16. (C) Comment: In addition to Russia's military
capabilities, Czechs could point to the negative effects of
Russian economic influence in such vital areas as energy
security. Much of the Czechs' fate is in their own hands in
these matters, including decisions about how to respond to
foreign moves to acquire assets, and whether or not to pass
anti-lobbying legislation and other transparency measures
that would reduce the risk of having the country's security
interests sold away to the highest bidder.


17. (C) In terms of the Czech Republic, jourmalist Palata's
claims about the "lay" public feeling insecure after the
cancellation of the radar do not account for the widespread
Czech public opposition to the project. The public he is
referring to is the "professional public" of politicians and
journalists who supported the radar site. Meanwhile, the
Czech public's concerns about its tax dollars being spent for
defense are more likely to stem from media allegations of the
military's mismanagement of acquisition funds, and from a
guns-versus-butter analysis amid an economic downturn in the
Czech Republic.


18. (C) Along with members of the old guard such as
Dobrovsky, there was no shortage of young people in the room,
many of whom were junior and mid-level MFA officials. Their
eye-rolling at Dobrovsky's opinions and their expressions of
consternation after the session are less an indication of
political ideology than of a diminishment of the Czech view
of Russia through the prism of former Soviet domination.
Some would say this is a sign of a rising and dangerous
naivite about the wider world. Younger Czechs whose
education about, experience in, and exposure to that wider
world twenty years after the Velvet Revolution might reply
that, as Ambassador Sedivy characterized it, it is a sign of
growing rationality. End Comment.
Thompson-Jones