CZECH GOVERNMENT DELEGATION REACTS CONSTRUCTIVELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 000564

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019
TAGS: MARR PREL EZ PL RS
SUBJECT: CZECH GOVERNMENT DELEGATION REACTS CONSTRUCTIVELY
TO U.S. DECISION ON MD, BUT NOTES CONCERNS

REF: 17 SEPTEMBER 2009 CARNIE/KARAGIANNIS ET AL. E-MAIL

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mary Thompson-Jones, reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a September 17 meeting with Czech
officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of
Defense, and Prime Minister's Office, a USG delegation headed
by USD/P Flournoy briefed on President Obama's decision
regarding missile defense (MD) in Europe. Overall the Czech
officials reacted constructively to the U.S. decision but
noted some concerns. The Czech delegation expressed
particular concern that the absence of efforts to establish a
Czech radar site would leave a void in bilateral security
relations. The Czechs sought concrete details on how they
could participate in the new architecture, especially command
and control. They proposed several ideas for keeping
bilateral relations strong, including a paper entitled
"Beyond Missile Defense" (ref) laying out ideas for security
cooperation. The U.S. delegation expressed willingness to
consider the Czechs' ideas and find new avenues for
strengthening bilateral relations. End Summary.


2. (U) Czech FM Kohout opened the meeting expressing
gratitude for President Obama's call to FM Fischer informing
him of his decision on missile defense (MD).

U.S. Delegation Explains Policy Review Conclusions
-------------- --------------


3. (C) USD/P Flournoy said the administration had hoped to
consult with the Czech government before making a decision.
However, after recent media speculation about the decision,
the President determined to reach a decision earlier in order
to put an end to erroneous speculation. The MD policy review
had come to two broad conclusions. First, the Iranian
long-range missile threat to the U.S. has not advanced as
substantially since 2006 as had been predicted. However,
Iran had developed hundreds of short and medium-range
missiles capable of reaching southern Europe. Second, new
technology was available to answer the current threat, and
that technology could eventually cover all of Europe. The
U.S. was committed to defending Europe, Secretary Gates was
convinced this new architecture would better answer the
threat and be more cost-effective, and the President followed
by Secretary Gates would announce the MD decision later in
the day.


4. (C) USD/P told the Czech delegation that the Czech
Republic remains one of our closest allies. She acknowledged
the courage the Czech government had shown in supporting MD
and the political capital the government had spent in that
effort. The U.S. government hoped the Czechs would continue
to be a partner in the new MD architecture, which still
offered a number of possibilities for Czech participation.


5. (C) USD/P explained that given the revised threat
assessment and available new technology, the radar site in
the Czech Republic was no longer necessary. However, the
Czechs were still a partner on MD, including in NATO. The
USG hoped that our bilateral defense relations would lead to
broader and deeper cooperation.


6. (C) FM Kohout began by asking how the Czechs could
participate in the new architecture. Both he and European
Minister Fule noted that bilateral relations had recently
been focused on the radar site, and there would now be a
vacuum in relations that needed to be filled with new
concrete initiatives. Kohout presented a list entitled
"Beyond the Missile Defense Review" (ref) that he said the
Czech government hoped would be implemented.

A Sensor Network Instead of Czech Radar Site
--------------


7. (C) LTG O'Reilly emphasized that the new proposal
actually enhanced MD in Europe and for the Czech Republic.
Our assessment was that the current threat to Europe was from
hundreds of Iranian short and medium range missiles that
could reach southern Europe; the long range threat had not
developed as quickly. The interceptors that could counter
these would rely on a network comprising multiple sensors,
including UAVs, satellites and forward-based radar. These
multiple sources would provide better tracking, without the
risks attending failure of a single tracking site. LTG

PRAGUE 00000564 002 OF 003


O'Reilly told the Czech delegation that command and control
of the new MD architecture could be one avenue for Czech
participation.


8. (C) FM Kohout asked whether this was purely a
threat-based reassessment, or whether Czech public opinion
had played a role. U/S Tauscher replied that this was based
solely on the threat assessment. Iranian long range missile
development had not progressed as quickly as previously
anticipated, short and medium range missiles were the current
threat, and newer technology used different tracking.
Moreover, Russian objections to MD played no role in the
decision. This new system represented a huge commitment to
the defense of Europe.

Bilateral Relations
--------------


9. (C) U/S Tauscher stressed that strong bilateral relations
would continue and the USG would seek to visibly demonstrate
this. The U/S also stated that we would aim to hold a
high-level defense group (HLDG) meeting before the end of the
year.


10. (C) Minister for European Affairs (and ex-ambassador to
NATO) Stefan Fule said the Czech government wanted to avoid a
"switch on, switch off" effect in bilateral relations and
that we needed to fill the radar void with a positive agenda.
He asked for specific details on how the Czechs could
participate in the new MD architecture, including in command
and control. Noting that Russia would be a big issue, Fule
also asked whether the USG had a strategy to counter the
impression that the U.S. was forgetting Central and Eastern
Europe in the interest of better relations with Russia. Fule
said the Czechs would want to know more details about the
future of the proposed system. He asked about Poland's
future role in MD and expressed doubt that the new system, as
described, would be cost effective.


11. (C) USD/P pointed to the 2008 U.S.-Czech Strategic
Defense Cooperation Declaration as one possible roadmap for
future bilateral cooperation. She stated that the USG was
interested in understanding how it might assist the Czechs in
developing their defense capabilities. The U.S. was aware of
Czech efforts to provide trainers and Mi17s, and we would
seek to expand work with the Czechs in Afghanistan. Media
reports that claimed MD was being scrapped were inaccurate;
the system was being reinvigorated. The proposed new
architecture also included the possibility of SM-3 sites in
northern Europe, possibly in Poland.


12. (C) FM Kohout said the two sides needed to avoid
negative impact on bilateral relations. He urged a clear
public message that relations were not weakening, followed by
concrete bilateral projects that would be highly visible and
easily understood by the Czech public. For example, the U.S.
could consider establishing an academy similar to West Point
in the Czech Republic to train military officers from Central
and Eastern Europe, or could agree to send a Czech scientist
on a space shuttle trip to the International Space Station.
Kohout suggested high-level bilateral visits, including a
meeting between President Obama and PM Fischer in Washington.



13. (C) DFM Pojar said in perhaps the most dramatic moment
in the meeting that "while I understand the conclusion" the
policy review decision placed Czech Atlanticists in a "deep,
difficult situation." Poland had received something
"face-saving," but the Czechs had received nothing. Pojar
said that during MD negotiations, the Czechs had acted "more
responsibly" than the Poles. However, the Framework
Agreement had not been put into effect; joint research
projects were small and there were no further ones on the
horizon; the HLDG was not a "sell" for the Czech public. He
went on to stress that Czech Atlanticists would be
"devastated." The decision would inevitably affect bilateral
relations. Better bilateral relations needed something
visible, robust, and serious. Minister Fule suggested the
U.S. locate a joint NATO/Russia information center in Prague
instead of Moscow or Brussels. "Why not in Prague? he asked.
"Be bold." Pojar suggested a facility "beyond the Rhine."



14. (C) LTG O'Reilly countered that the Framework Agreement
was in effect, two joint projects were complete, and a third

PRAGUE 00000564 003 OF 003


was ongoing. Pojar said such projects needed to be better
funded and publicized and the USG needed to commit to
continued research projects with the Czech Republic.


15. (C) U/S Tauscher replied that the U.S. was open to Czech
suggestions. USD/P pointed out that Defense Minister
Bartak's September 18 appointments with Secretary Gates and
NSA Jones could be opportunities for public statements
underscoring our joint continued commitment to strong
bilateral relations and to U.S. commitment to Europe.


16. (C) U/S Tauscher asked how interested the Czechs were in
future participation in MD discussions and architecture.
Pojar said the Czechs did not want to be left out and wished
to be considered "privileged partners." NSC Senior Director
Sherwood-Randall urged the Czechs to help drive MD forward in
NATO; Pojar affirmed that the Czechs wished to participate
both bilaterally and within NATO. FM Kohout concluded the
meeting by noting "we will pay a political price. Let's make
it as small as possible."
Thompson-Jones