Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PRAGUE155
2009-03-19 17:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Prague
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR DPM VONDRA'S VISIT TO DC TO

Tags:  EUN EZ OVIP PGOV PREL 
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VZCZCXRO4232
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPG #0155/01 0781739
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191739Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1229
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000155 

SIPDIS

EUR/CE FOR ATRATENSEK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2014
TAGS: EUN EZ OVIP PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DPM VONDRA'S VISIT TO DC TO
DISCUSS POTUS VISIT AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Classified By: Charge Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000155

SIPDIS

EUR/CE FOR ATRATENSEK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2014
TAGS: EUN EZ OVIP PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DPM VONDRA'S VISIT TO DC TO
DISCUSS POTUS VISIT AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Classified By: Charge Mary Thompson-Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra will
visit Washington on March 23-24, at the same time that his
government faces a critical March 24 no-confidence vote, the
result of which is unclear. Despite this uncertainty,
Vondra's chief goal is to set the agenda and settle
outstanding issues in preparation for the upcoming POTUS
visit to Prague April 4-5. Of particular interest to the
United States are the Czech presidency's EU priorities
related to energy security, the Middle East, and Afghanistan.
Vondra will also seek to reaffirm his country's strong
bilateral ties with the United States. The Czech Republic
has been a committed ally, actively engaged in Afghanistan
and Kosovo, but also in advancing democracy and human rights
around world. For the Czech government, missile defense (MD)
is another key element of the country's partnership with the
United States, and Vondra will press for a clear statement of
the Obama administration's MD policy. Also of note, DPM
Vondra travels directly to Washington from the March 19-20
European Council meeting of the 27 EU heads of government.
END SUMMARY.

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A Valued Ally With Domestic Challenges
--------------


2. (C) Nearly 20 years after the 1989 "Velvet Revolution,"
the Czech Republic today is a democratic market economy and a
committed U.S. ally. The Czech Republic has been a member of
NATO since 1999 and the European Union since 2004. PM
Topolanek's government has been in power since January 2007,
but it is fractured and its shaky majority in the parliament
depends on the assistance of a few deputies who have crossed
party lines but whose support has been unreliable. Indeed,
the government will likely face a vote of no-confidence on
March 24, a fifth attempt by the opposition to unseat PM
Topolanek. It is unclear whether PM Topolanek will be able
to survive this challenge. If the parliamentary opposition
succeeds with the no-confidence motion, the current
government will probably continue to rule until June 2009, to

minimize disruptions to the country's EU presidency. The
opposition's effort to unseat the prime minister during the
country's EU presidency is unprecedented in the EU, but it
illustrates the Czech Republic's poisoned domestic politics,
in which matters of foreign and security policy -- from
foreign deployments to missile defense (MD) -- are used to
settle political scores, usually to the detriment of the
Czech Republic's international standing and national
interest.


3. (SBU) Despite the domestic political challenges, our
bilateral relations are excellent, with the Czech Republic's
November 2008 entry into the Visa Waiver Program having
removed the one long-standing irritant. Czech Prime Minister
Topolanek's commitment to strong transatlantic ties undergird
his government's support for the U.S.-proposed missile
defense radar site. The country also has been a steady
supporter of U.S. and NATO military operations and maintains
approximately 1000 troops on foreign missions. In
Afghanistan, the Czechs have about 500 military and civilian
officials. In 2008, they launched a provincial
reconstruction team (PRT) and deployed a Special Forces
troops. They also deployed a handful of experts to an
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in Afghanistan.
Over the past several years, they have also maintained an
infantry battalion of 450 troops in Kosovo. Domestic
political constraints, however, may make it difficult for the
Czechs to maintain, let alone increase, their foreign troop
deployment levels.


4. (C) Building on its own recent history, the Czech Republic
is our strongest partner in Europe on Cuba, and an active
supporter of Cuba's democratic opposition. Likewise in
Georgia, Belarus, Burma, Iraq and other countries in
transition, the Czech government and NGOs work to support
peaceful transformations. Prague has been home to the
U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty since 1995, and
has actively supported broadcasts to countries in Eastern
Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East.


5. (SBU) Following several years of strong economic
performance, the small, open, export-oriented Czech economy
is now struggling with the effects of the global economic
downturn. Nevertheless, the conservative, inward-looking
Czech financial system has remained relatively healthy. The
Czech Republic is one of only four OECD countries not to have
had to recapitalize its banks. The Czech real economy,

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however, is suffering from a significant decline in external
demand for Czech products. Over 80 percent of Czech
manufacturing is exported, mainly to Western Europe. The
Czech economy is expected to contract by as much as two to
three percent in 2009. Unemployment, which fell to a record
low of five percent in July, has now climbed to 7.4 percent.
The government has put forward an economic recovery program,
costing almost 2 percent of GDP, designed to maintain
employment and exports. Because most Czech goods are
exported, while most household goods are imported, however,
the government has done little to stimulate domestic demand.
In responding to the global economic crisis, the Czechs
stress themes in the EU and other public fora: 1) the need to
avoid protectionism and "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies; 2)
the importance of sustainable public finance; and 3) a
preference for "evolutionary, rather than revolutionary"
changes to regulations and oversight. While the Czechs
support increased coordination, they oppose supranational
regulation. The Czechs are also very concerned about the
consequences to their economy should international investors
put them in the same category as some of the more troubled
economies in the region. Thus, they have opposed any
initiatives that treat Central and Eastern Europe as a
unified region.

--------------
U.S.-EU Summit
--------------

6. (C) The Czechs view the upcoming U.S.-EU summit in Prague
as significant not only for the substance of the agenda, but
also because Czechs see this as a recognition of the truly
remarkable progress the Czech Republic and its Central
European neighbors have made since the fall of the Iron
Curtain in 1989. The Czech Republic joined the European
Union in May 2004, and assumed its first-ever rotating
six-month presidency on January 1, 2009. Traditionally the
Czech Republic has shared with the United States the same
broad goals and approaches to key foreign policy issues. As
EU president, the Czechs must seek EU consensus rather than
advance their national viewpoint. However, from Cuba to
Russia to the Balkans, we have worked with the Czech Republic
closely in the past, and this close cooperation has continued
during the Czech EU presidency. One key goal for the Czechs
is to establish even closer U.S.-Czech collaboration during
their EU Presidency on our transatlantic priorities. DPM
Vondra deliberately chose these dates following the European
Council for his U.S. visit in order to personally convey the
wishes of the EU leaders as well as to finalize and resolve
as many outstanding issues as possible before the summit.

--------------
Summit Agenda Fits Well with EU Presidency Priorities
--------------

7. (C) The proposed U.S.-EU summit agenda (climate change,
energy security, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iran and the
economy) dovetails well with the Czech presidency's
overarching theme of "Europe Without Borders" and its three
priority areas, the "3 Es." These are: 1) Economic
Competitiveness (including addressing the challenges of the
global financial crisis); 2) Energy Security and
Sustainability; and 3) Europe in the World (external
relations). During the first several weeks at the helm of
the EU, however, the Czechs quickly became consumed by the "2
G's": gas and Gaza (with Guantanamo referred to as a third
"G" in private conversations with Czech officials). The
Czechs' active shuttle diplomacy facilitated a solution to
the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. The bigger challenge,
however, lies ahead: uniting the EU behind an energy
security strategy that rests on further diversification of
suppliers and routes, including support for the Nabucco and
TGI (Turkey-Greece-Italy) pipelines, improved outreach to
Caspian producers, and increased interconnectivity of the
internal EU gas and electricity grids. (Note: The
unpredictability of Russian energy supplies had already hit
the Czech Republic in 2008, when Russian crude oil deliveries
to the Czech Republic declined sharply -- ostensibly for
technical reasons -- following the July 2008 signing of the
U.S.-Czech Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. End Note.)


8. (C) Since the USG proposed summit agenda highlights Iran,
rather than the Middle East (the EU suggestion),we can
anticipate that DPM Vondra, on behalf of EU leaders, may
highlight their interest in speaking more broadly about the
region. While the Czechs recognize the need for a serious
discussion about Iran and will welcome USG comments regarding
the current status of the USG policy review on Iran, the EU
has been heavily engaged over the last few months in Gaza and
in discussions with the region as a whole. The Czechs,

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particularly PM Topolanek and FM Schwarzenberg, have traveled
to the Middle East several times in the last few months, in
addition to hosting multiple separate events for EU MSs in
Brussels with key Middle East interlocutors.


9. (C) In Afghanistan, in addition to being an active
bilateral contributor (noted earlier),the Czech EU
Presidency has pressed for greater EU coordination and
contributions, particularly in the civilian sphere. At the
EU-Afghanistan Troika Ministerial on January 28, the EU
reaffirmed its long-standing commitment to Afghanistan
reconstruction (from 2002-2006 the EU contributed over 1.3B
euro to this effort and for 2007-2010 it has pledged 610M
euros). The Czechs are currently facilitating internal EU
discussions on how to strengthen the current EUPOL mission in
Afghanistan and how best to support upcoming Afghan
presidential elections.


10. (SBU) We have a ready and attentive ally in the Czechs
when it comes to advancing stability in the Balkans and EU
enlargement. Indeed, our willingness to put the Balkans on
the summit agenda makes it easier for the Czechs to advance
one of their key priorities. Unfortunately, Czech efforts
to date to advance EU enlargement with Balkan countries have
met with strong resistance from some EU member states. Name
issues and ICTY compliance, but also enlargement fatigue are
behind this resistance. We can anticipate that the Czechs
will strive to keep the Balkan nations oriented to the West,
but progress may be slow.

--------------
Not on the Summit Agenda, But Vondra is Likely to Raise...
--------------

11. (C) While not on the Summit agenda, we understand that
DPM Vondra plans to discuss Russia with USG interlocutors
during this March 23-24 visit. Moving the EU toward a more
united transatlantic approach to Russia remains a key goal
and challenge for the Czech Presidency. Given their negative
historical experience, the Czechs have been a valuable U.S.
ally with regard to Russia, within the EU as well as NATO.
Events including the Georgia conflict, the gas crisis, and
Russia's stance with regard to missile defense have
reinforced Czech skepticism toward Russia. They generally
agree with the U.S. approach of cooperating wherever
possible, but resisting Russia's economic and military
pressure against its neighbors. However, the Czechs are also
keenly aware that during their EU presidency they may be
required to temper their government's views on Russia to
achieve an EU consensus.


12. (C) The Czech EU Presidency has welcomed the U.S.
administration's executive orders related to the closure of
the Guantanamo detention facility. The Czechs have
facilitated internal EU discussion at the Foreign, Justice,
and Interior Ministerial levels. European Commissioner
Barrot and Czech Interior Minister Langer traveled to the
U.S. March 16-17 to discuss with Attorney General Holder and
other USG officials EU questions about the detainees. (Note:
We understand DPM Vondra may follow up on Langer's
discussions with USG officials. End Note.) While the EU
member states consider this to be a decision for each
individual member state to make, they have discussed
establishing an EU framework to address collective Schengen
travel security concerns. However, they have not taken
collective action yet. Czech officials have been clear that
the Czech Republic, while willing to facilitate EU
discussions on the resettlement of detainees, does not plan
to accept any of them due to domestic political reasons.

--------------
Missile Defense: Another Key Priority
--------------


13. (C) EU membership is one of two pillars of Czech foreign
policy. NATO and strong transatlantic ties form the second
pillar. Given the importance the Czechs assign to their
relationship with the United States, PM Topolanek and his
government have viewed missile defense as a natural next step
in the security partnership between our two countries. Since
the United States officially presented the MD proposal to the
Czech Republic in January 2007, the Czech government has been
unwavering in its support, despite significant public
opposition driven largely by the Czech historical experience
and concerns about foreign troop presence on the Czech
territory. Russian threats and intransigence with regard to
MD in many ways reinforced the Czech government's
determination to proceed with the project. The Czech
government moved quickly to negotiate and sign the Ballistic

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Missile Defense Agreement and the Status of Forces Agreement.
The Czech Senate ratified the agreements in November 2008.
Ratification of the two agreements in the Lower Chamber has
been suspended due to domestic political opposition, but also
due to outstanding questions about the Obama administration's
intentions.


14. (C) In his Washington meetings, Vondra will stress that
missile defense will be at the top of the bilateral agenda
for Czech officials but especially for the media during
President Obama's visit to Prague. Vondra will press for
advance coordination on the public message, but more
importantly, for ongoing consultations as the United States
proceeds with the discussions with Russia. Given the long
Czech history of great powers deciding their country's fate,
the Czechs do not want to be taken by surprise, especially
with regard to Russia. Vondra may also reiterate that the
Czech government would be interested in moving forward with
the proposed radar site even if the United States decides to
postpone its decision on the interceptors proposed for
Poland.

--------------
A Strong and Reliable Partnership
--------------


15. (C) DPM Vondra will have an extremely difficult task
ahead of him in Washington: he will be speaking on behalf of
a government that may lose a vote of no-confidence in the
coming days. At the same time, however, he will be speaking
on behalf of a country that has consistently proven to be a
reliable and active ally of the United States. The Czech
contributions to security, democracy, and freedom around the
globe have been considerable since 1989. Vondra, in various
positions of leadership over the years, has been responsible
for many of these contributions. He has also been the United
States' best friend on the Czech political scene and a
stalwart defender of the trans-Atlantic orientation in Czech
foreign and security policy. Supporting him and his
like-minded allies in the Czech Republic will be important as
the country moves through a period of political instability.
Thompson-Jones