Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PORTLOUIS378
2009-11-24 06:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Louis
Cable title:  

MAURITIUS SOFA DISCUSSION: SMALL STEPS

Tags:  PREL MARR PGOV MP SE 
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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPL #0378/01 3280652
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 240652Z NOV 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4849
INFO RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 0864
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0373
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT LOUIS 000378 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PM/SNA, L
AF/E FOR MARIA BEYZEROV

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV MP SE
SUBJECT: MAURITIUS SOFA DISCUSSION: SMALL STEPS

REF: A. PORT LOUIS 313

B. PORT LOUIS 366

Classified By: CDA R. Barrie Walkley, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT LOUIS 000378

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PM/SNA, L
AF/E FOR MARIA BEYZEROV

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV MP SE
SUBJECT: MAURITIUS SOFA DISCUSSION: SMALL STEPS

REF: A. PORT LOUIS 313

B. PORT LOUIS 366

Classified By: CDA R. Barrie Walkley, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) This is an action message. Please see para 10 below.


2. SUMMARY: On November 17, in a meeting arranged at the
Prime Minister's request, Embassy officials met with the
Mauritian Foreign Minister and officials from his ministry,
the Prime Minister's office, and the State Law Office. The
GOM officials raised a series of concerns regarding the
boilerplate SOFA text, which they have had for circa one
year. Emboffs answered objections and stressed the benefits
of a SOFA in an insecure world. The Foreign Minister noted
his government's willingness to dialogue with the USG on
signing a SOFA, while the assembled group had a series of
questions and requests to aid the GOM consideration of the
proposed language. Post requests Africa Command assistance in
the next phase of discussions with GOM. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) On November 17, a meeting took place between Emboffs
and an ad hoc committee led by Minister of Foreign Affairs
Arvin Boolell to discuss steps forward on a possible Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. Government and
the Government of Mauritius (GOM). The Embassy team was led
by Charge d'Affaires (CDA) Virginia Blaser, while the
Minister was accompanied by Mrs. Doreen Fong-Weng Poorun, the
acting Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's office,
Aruna Narain of the State Law Office, and several officials
from the MFA. After a previous series of meetings seemed to
lead to little progress (ref A),this meeting was called at
the invitation of the ForMin after the Charge's recent
meeting with the PM (ref B).


4. (C) The ForMin noted in opening the meeting that there
were "sensitive, difficult issues" that, if sorted out, would
allow a SOFA to be signed, emphasizing that a SOFA would have
to be in accord with "existing legislation" in Mauritius. He
noted with a smile that signing a SOFA would have to be
handled so as not to "send signals of a 'big U.S. military
buildup in the region.'"


5. (C) Mrs. Fong-Weng Poorun of the PM's office listed points

for discussion, either noting difficulties or requesting
clarification:

(1) The granting of "privileges and immunities" to military
personnel, which is not normal Mauritian practice.
(2) Examples were requested of "mutually agreed activities."
(Note: these were provided by Embassy team and this point
seemed addressed by the end of the meeting.)
(3) The carrying of arms is "very sensitive," as it is "not
in accord with local law or practice" for non-citizens to
bear arms in Mauritius. Would it be possible to see what
other countries, with similar laws, had in their USG-host
nation SOFAs?
(4) The USG exercise of "criminal jurisdiction of United
States personnel while in Mauritius" could be problematic.
(5) The authorization to "wear uniforms while performing
official duties" needed to be explained. (Note: Emboffs made
this explanation and host nation appeared satisfied.)
(6) Clarification was requested on whether the US would give
notice that any of its visiting ships would be carrying
nuclear weapons, or would be nuclear powered. (Note: Embassy
noted that current USG-Mauritius forms and declarations would
not change under a SOFA. GOM counterparts seemed to accept
this and consider the question resolved.)



6. (C) An additional point was later raised by Mrs. Narain.
Due to Mauritian sensitivities over Diego Garcia and the
Chagos Archipelago, she said, the GOM could not consider
entering into a SOFA without understanding how the U.S. SOFA
with the UK refers to that disputed territory. She asked for
a copy of the agreement with the UK. The FoRmin agreed that
the GOM would like to see a copy of the agreement, noting the
sensitivities surrounding the UK proposal, recently in the
news, for a protected marine park in the Chagos Archipelago.
He asked for a copy of the latest SOFA agreement with the
Seychelles as well, and "others, if possible." Charge noted
that the Seychelles agreement was, in essence, nearly
identical to the boilerplate proposal made to Mauritius the
previous year.


7. (C) When Mrs. Narain was told that the strict nature of
the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) should
assuage Mauritian concerns about allowing the U.S. to
prosecute U.S. military personnel over offenses committed in
Mauritian territory, she noted a possible counter-proposal to
the draft SOFA language, stating that instead Mauritius might
be able to accept language that would allow the GOM to make a
choice, such that the Mauritian "Department of Public
Prosecution would retain the right to prosecute in Mauritian
courts." She called this "a parallel mechanism."

8. (C) Emboffs led by the CDA explained carefully that a SOFA
would not involve a loss of sovereignty for the GOM any more
than it did for the 100 plus countries which have such
agreements with the U.S. Emboffs explained the issues on
which the Mauritian officials were unclear. Among other
points, Emboffs emphasized the severity of the UCMJ, and
stressed the importance of a SOFA in the context of the
creation of Africa Command and the increasing security
threats in the region. The middle of a crisis, the CDA
noted, was not the best time to negotiate a SOFA. The CDA
asked for a counterproposal from the GOM, but Mrs. Narain
said the time was not ripe for a formal GOM counterproposal,
as GOM would like to understand the SOFA and SOFA options
better; she recommended a SOFA team come to Mauritius for
direct discussions on points raised.

--------------
COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST
--------------


9. (C) While the PM appears positive about a SOFA in person,
his office appears to have concerns that are difficult for
the Embassy team to assuage. The same is true for the State
Law Office. This provides cover for the ForMin, whose
biggest concern seemed to be how such an agreement would play
out politically in the context of the Mauritian claim on the
Chagos Archipelago and on upcoming elections, due to be
declared for sometime between December and July.. Perhaps
the biggest issue is simply inertia in an election year: as
long as the GOM sees the threat of piracy as a Seychellois
and African coast problem, overcoming GOM concerns with a
proposed SOFA will take focused effort from DOS and DOD
stakeholders.


10. (C) Given recent success in gaining a SOFA with
Seychelles, Post considers it worth a focused effort to see
if we can collectively move forward on a Mauritius SOFA as
well. Post believes the next step would be to take up the
GOM's request/offer for a face-to-face informational exchange
with SOFA experts. If possible, Post requests the same
Africa Command team that worked our Seychelles SOFA efforts
to also visit Post to assist with GOM discussions. At that
time, we could also provide any cleared SOFA examples from
other countries, per GOM request. At the conclusion of these
discussions, the collective USG stakeholders could determine
whether future efforts on a Mauritian SOFA continue to merit
the effort/resources, and, if so, determine forward plans to
see a SOFA to conclusion.
WALKLEY