CHARGE'S QUARTERLY CALL ON MAURITIAN PRIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT LOUIS 000366

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/RSA, AND L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MP
SUBJECT: CHARGE'S QUARTERLY CALL ON MAURITIAN PRIME
MINISTER RAMGOOLAM

REF: PORT LOUIS 066

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Virginia M. Blaser for reasons 1.4 (b
and d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 11, Charge d'Affaires (CDA)
enjoyed a cordial one and a half hour meeting with Mauritian
Prime Minister Ramgoolam to discuss a variety of issues,
including the PM's position on counter-piracy cooperation,
peacekeeping deployments, the pending Status of Forces
Agreement between the US and the GOM, the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Madagascar, lagging administrative
and diplomatic reciprocity issues, and the overall
US/Mauritius bilateral relationship. Charge noted that
long-standing, unresolved issues between the two countries
did not appear to properly represent the positive relations
we shared. The PM concurred and agreed to move forward with
more positive action on our requests, and to insist his
ministers do the same. END SUMMARY.

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THE PM OPENS WITH IRE ABOUT CHAGOS
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2. (C) After opening pleasantries, PM Ramgoolam started the
meeting voicing his frustration over the UK handling of the
announcement regarding the proposed Marine Protected Area in
the Chagos Archipelago. The PM said that his government had
been given very little time to review the proposed
announcement and plan, noting that the first news he had was
a phone call from British Foreign Secretary David Miliband a
few days prior. The PM had to drop a number of high priority
issues (such as review of the upcoming GOM budget) to quickly
review the proposal and make a few adjustments. Although he
was pleased that HMG accepted input and changes made by the
GOM, he felt inappropriately rushed. Ramgoolam speculated
that the idea of the Marine Protected Area was one that
Miliband was pushing either for UK election purposes or, more
likely in the PM's view, to place Miliband in a strong
position to leverage for a senior EU spot. The PM finished
by saying that the GOM does not support this plan or the way
it has been rolled out.

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THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
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3. (C) In preparation for the incoming Ambassador, CDA
noted, she had spent a good bit of time reviewing our
"record" with Mauritius, and had been surprised by how many
issues remain outstanding and/or were resolved without
agreement between the US and Mauritius. The relationship
between the two countries is positive and strong, which is
why having long-standing, unresolved issues on the table
seems to undermine the true spirit of the bilateral
relationship our two countries enjoy, she explained. The PM
invited CDA to provide examples of such issues, and the two
discussed positive ways forward on points raised below.

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COUNTER-PIRACY COOPERATION
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4. (C) CDA asked the PM for his thoughts on the role his
country could or would play regarding counter-piracy efforts
in the Indian Ocean region. The PM noted his country's
reluctance to get involved in piracy trials, and specifically
noted that the MFA and State Law Office were disinclined to
support any GOM involvement at this time. CDA pointed out
that many meetings among a variety of partners, to include
the UK, French, EU, and UNODC, with his government had taken
place over the past several months. Stakeholders felt that at
this stage it would be useful for the Prime Minister to hear
directly from the UNODC on the issue of counter-piracy
cooperation and, more specifically, the manner in which
piracy trials and infrastructure support for such trials
could be supported via the UN. The PM agreed to meet with
UNODC representatives the first week in December. (NOTE: CDA
subsequently spoke to the UKHC, who noted that while the
French Ambassador as sitting EU chair would be best placed to
arrange that meeting, the French Ambassador declined to do so
until he had "specific orders" from Brussels. In light of
this unwillingness, the UK agreed to take the lead to set up
the UNODC briefing on point.)

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RECOGNITION OF KOSOVO
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5. (C) CDA noted that the message the USG received from the
GOM on Kosovo recognition has been very mixed, from an
outright "no" delivered repeatedly by the MFA to the
unsolicited June 2009 phone call to CDA from the PM in which
he said he would recognize Kosovo in July despite his MFA's
strong urgings to the contrary. After the PM's statement
that he would trump the MFA decision, no recognition
announcement was ever made, and CDA wondered about GOM's
current plans. The PM acknowledged his call and decision to
recognize Kosovo, but said action by him then was delayed due
to extreme pressure put on him by the MFA career diplomats
(such as Secretary of Foreign Affairs Neewoor) who strongly
feel that recognizing Kosovo undermines the GOM position on
the Chagos Archipelago. CDA requested the PM to reconsider
the GOM's position on recognition of Kosovo.

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STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT
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6. (C) The GOM has had a draft SOFA for review for over a
year, the CDA noted. Based on earlier discussions among
visiting Africa Command General Kip Ward, the PM, and the
CDA, it had been the USG's impression that the GOM was
interested in pursuing a SOFA with the United States.
Subsequent to that meeting, however, a number of diplomatic
notes from the MFA indicated a hardline unwillingness even to
discuss a SOFA. CDA remarked upon what appeared again to be
a reversal of the GOM stance on such an agreement. The PM
said that he supported positive discussions toward a SOFA and
that he would speak to the Foreign Minister to ensure that
the GOM tone and stance on discussions changed immediately.
(NOTE: In a meeting the following day between CDA and the
ForMin, the ForMin noted he had received a call from the PM
who told him to change "the impression the USG has on such
points." The ForMin scheduled a meeting the following week
with all SOFA stakeholders with the idea of opening up more
pleasant and productive discussions with the US on that
point. More SEPTEL.) CDA thanked the PM for being willing to
open up discussions again and for his personal support of US
military activities in Mauritius and the region.

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POLICE PEACEKEEPERS
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7. (C) The PM and CDA discussed ways in which Mauritius can
demonstrate leadership in the region, and agreed that the
long awaited Mauritian police peacekeepers are a positive
step in this direction. CDA asked for an update on where and
when Mauritians would contribute in this fashion, noting that
it had been some months since the Embassy received
information that the peacekeepers were "a go." The PM
expressed surprise that nothing had been done since that
time, and agreed to follow up with his security and police
leadership to press them for final decisions on the
deployment.

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AGOA AND MADAGASCAR
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8. (C) With regard to the Mauritian position on Madagascar's
possible loss of AGOA entitlement, CDA noted that the USG had
not officially heard from the GOM on its position. She urged
the PM to ensure that the GOM voice was heard in the review
of AGOA. Subsequent to the meeting with the PM, the Embassy
received a diplomatic note and letter from the Foreign
Minister to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce which pushed for
U.S. continuation of AGOA for Madagascar. The letter
underscores the GOM alignment with the AU position on the
need to restore "constitutional legality" in Madagascar,
adding that the loss of AGOA eligibility for Madagascar would
undermine efforts at reconciliation. Furthermore, investment
from Mauritius in the Malagasy textile and apparel section
comes to circa $27.3 million and Mauritian companies in
Madagascar employ 8,000 workers there. (NOTE: Full note to be
forwarded to AF/EX septel. END NOTE.)

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DIPLOMATIC RECIPROCITY
--------------


9. (SBU) Finally, CDA raised the long-standing issue of
diplomatic reciprocity, noting that despite regulations in
the Vienna Convention, bilateral agreements with the USG
(such as on work permits for spouses),and GOM regulations

PORT LOUIS 00000366 003 OF 003


and handbooks which actively underscore GOM intentions to
support foreign missions based on reciprocity, the GOM falls
well short of its support to the US Embassy in Port Louis
compared to the reverse in Washington. From spousal
employment, to paying taxes on purchases and utilities, to de
facto high car duties and taxes for imported vehicles, the
spirit and fact of reciprocity are not being sustained. CDA
asked for the PM's support in multi-ministry review of
policies which undermine reciprocity for US diplomats in
Mauritius. As this issue is first the role of the protocol
office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the PM said he
would speak to the ForMin to ask for quick action on
responding to these reciprocity problems. Such a lack of
support is not, he said, the message he wants the U.S.
receiving from his government. (NOTE: During CDA's subsequent
meeting with the ForMin the next day, he agreed to arrange a
multi-ministry meeting to resolve outstanding problems for
the Mission. The meeting date, however, has not yet been
set. END NOTE.)

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DELIBERATE UNDERMINING BY MFA?
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10. (C) Never overly foreign affairs focused, the PM is even
more in "internal affairs" mode due to the upcoming budget
announcement and pre-election maneuvering in advance of the
likely Spring 2010 election. Even so, the PM appeared
genuinely uncomfortable that his government hasn't delivered
on a good number of bilateral requests from the USG. He
blamed, in large part, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
particularly the "career diplomats" there who, he alleges,
may be attempting to deliberately undermine the US/Mauritius
relationship in order to make the PM "look bad prior to the
elections." He told CDA that he believed many of them would
be "standing with the opposition" during the upcoming
elections.

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COMMENT
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11. (C) Post relations with the PM and key ministers --
including the Foreign Minister -- are positive. Of all the
ministries with whom we work, however, the MFA tends to be
the most difficult and least supportive of US requests at the
below-minister level. Unfortunately, this means that to move
a position or even receive a hearing on a position (i.e. in
the UN or other political issues such as Zimbabwe),Post must
gain the direct support of the PM. Without active support
from the PM, much simply does not get decided, or is not
decided in our favor. Because of this, Post will continue to
push for regular meetings between the PM and COM, above and
beyond courtesy calls and VIP events. To the best of our
knowledge, the US Embassy is the only mission here to
organize such quarterly meetings with the PM.
BLASER