MAURITIUS SENDS MIXED SIGNALS ON SOFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT LOUIS 000313

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PM/SNA
AF/E FOR MARIA BEYZEROV

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2029
TAGS: MARR PREL MASS MOPS MP
SUBJECT: MAURITIUS SENDS MIXED SIGNALS ON SOFA

REF: A. SECSTATE 81610 (JUL 08)

B. PORT LOUIS 271

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Virginia M. Blaser for reasons 1.4 (b
and d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Since receiving ref A Status of Forces
boilerplate to present to the GOM in July 2008, Emboffs of
all levels have engaged the Mauritians repeatedly for
comments or reactions. Over the past year, the issue has
been raised with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister,
the Minister of Tourism, the Attorney General, and their
respective staffs. Most recently, the lack of motion on our
diplomatic requests for comment was raised during a meeting
among the Prime Minister, visiting Africa Commander General
Ward, and CDA (see ref B). During this meeting, the Prime
Minister voiced his support for a SOFA with the United
States, and yet soon thereafter, the MFA forwarded a less
enthusiastic dipnote on the issue. Embassy contacts indicate
that the MFA forwarded these comments without proper
coordination with the Prime Minister's office, and that the
GOM would appreciate additional time to consider the SOFA
proposal. Embassy Port Louis will continue to work with
interested stakeholders to confirm GOM position. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Since receiving ref A request to pursue a Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the GOM, Embassy officers of all
levels have met with a variety of Mauritian stakeholders
(from the Prime Minister on down) to discuss and hear views
on the proposed SOFA. Along the road, the Embassy received a
variety of reactions. One extreme was the enthusiastic
support by the Attorney General, who upon receiving the
points called the issue to cabinet and saw through an
official "Cabinet Statement" in support of US military ships
in the Mauritian EEZ and ports. The other extreme is the
oft-noted skepticism by the Mauritian Chief of Protocol, who
on June 11 chaired a USG/GOM roundtable discussion of the
issue.


3. (C) The decision rests, however, with the Prime Minister,
who appeared positive about signing a SOFA with the US. He
most recently discussed it during an August 2009 meeting with
Africa Command's General Ward and CDA (see ref B). At the
end of those discussions, the PM tasked his chief of staff,
Kailash Ruhee, to ensure the SOFA was moved forward quickly.
Unfortunately, according to Ruhee, his instructions to the
Chief of Protocol to bring the discussion to a positive close
led to a less than enthusiastic (and Ruhee claims, completely
uncleared) diplomatic note (Dipnote 119/2009 (1130/39/14T)
dated September 8, 2009). The text of that note reads as
follows:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and
International Trade of the Republic of Mauritius presents its
compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America
and, further to its own Note Verbale ref. No. 100/2009
(50/38/12) dated 12 August 2009, has the honour to inform the
Embassy, that having carefully considered its Note Verbale
dated 16 October 2008, the Ministry is not in a position to
sign the proposed Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

The Ministry proposes instead that an agreement be formalised
between the Government of the Republic of Mauritius and the
Government of the United States of America setting out the
procedure for the grant of necessary clearances for US
vessels calling at the Port Louis Harbour with a view to
expediting matters. The following procedure could form the
basis of the memorandum of understanding:

(i) On requesting for necessary clearances, the Embassy of
the USA will submit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Regional Integration and International Trade information
relating to the name of the vessel; the name of the
Commanding Officer, the dates of arrival and departure of the
vessel; the crew members on board; and the specifications of
the vessel.

(ii) On receipt of such request from the Embassy of the USA,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and
International Trade will refer the request to the Prime
Minister's Office (Home Affairs Division),which will, in
turn seek the necessary clearances from the appropriate
authorities -

- for security,
- for the use of radio frequencies indicated whilst the
vessel will be in the Port, and
- for services of pilot, tugs and allocation of berth
alongside quay.

(iii) On obtaining the necessary clearances from the
appropriate authorities, the Prime Minister's Office (Home
Affairs Division) will inform the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Regional Integration and International Trade that
clearance has been obtained for the US vessel to call Port
Louis Harbour and the conditions attached thereto.

(iv) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration
and International Trade will convey the necessary clearance
to the Embassy of the USA.

(v) On receipt of the diplomatic clearance from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International
Trade, the Embassy of the USA will liaise directly with the
Mauritius Ports Authority for services of pilot, tugs and
berthing alongside the Quay. The charges in respect of these
facilities are waived for all foreign warships having
received diplomatic clearance and calling at the Port Louis
Harbour.

(vi) The procedure will be completed within a reasonable
delay.

(complimentary closing.)

End Text.


4. (C) On 18 September, CDA raised the content of the
dipnote with Ruhee, saying she was surprise by the note given
that it differed so greatly in both tone and intent from
statements expressed a few weeks earlier (ref B) by the Prime
Minister. Ruhee, who had attended the PM/Ward/CDA meeting,
quickly concurred that the GOM response was not what he
expected nor was it what he had instructed as a reply. On 21
September, Ruhee reported back to CDA that he had discussed
the issue with the MFA, and that they were under instructions
to "fix" the problem. On 24 September, Chief of Protocol Lam
called CDA to discuss the diplomatic note and eventually
agreed to take the matter of GOM's response to the July 2008
SOFA request back under review.

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COMMENT
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5. (C) This type of confusion within the GOM is not,
unfortunately, unusual. Lam specifically, and the MFA in
general, tend to be less cooperative and less positive in
dealing on US issues than much of the rest of the Government.
The real authority for action rests with the PM's office,
and so Post remains optimistic that we will -- in time --
receive a more positive, coordinated response to our SOFA
proposal. With regard to the non-SOFA-like counter-proposal
encompassed in the diplomatic note above, Post believes that
setting up such an agreement which is so narrow in focus is
not in the USG's interest. Furthermore, the procedures and
benefits of the agreement merely reiterate cooperation we
already enjoy whenever a US military ship is visiting. There
is no USG gain with the current GOM proposal. Post will
continue to bring in the proper stakeholders to seek a more
positive outcome to the discussions. END COMMENT.
WHITE