POST CONVENES EAC MEETING ON MOTORWAY ATTACK

C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000087


DS/IP/SCA; DS/EX; DS/TIA/ITA; DS/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/2019
TAGS: ASEC PTER CASC PGOV MOPS PK
SUBJECT: POST CONVENES EAC MEETING ON MOTORWAY ATTACK

REF: A) PESHAWAR 86 B) PESHAWAR 77

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (C) PO convened an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting
on April 29 to review an attack on a Pakistani security forces
convoy on the Peshawar-Islamabad motorway. RSO, RAO, MGT, CONS,
PD, USAID, and ODRP attended the meeting.


2. (C) On April 29 at approximately 0400 (local) hours a
Frontier Corps (FC) convoy was traveling eastbound on the M1
Motorway when unknown attackers launched a rocket propelled
grenade. Confirmed reports indicate that at least one (1) RPG
was fired, possibly from a vehicle in the westbound lane of the
divided high-speed roadway, missing the FC convoy and striking a
stationary Motorway Police vehicle; injuring one officer. FC
reported that the convoy stopped and personnel conducted a
searched the area but were unable to identify the attackers.
The attack occurred in the vicinity of the Mardan interchange,
approximately 21 miles east of Peshawar along the 120 mile link
between Islamabad and Peshawar. (Note: Post understands that
security forces for operations in Buner have been assembling in
Mardan.) Post is gathering additional details of the attack.


3. (C) The Peshawar-Islamabad highway represents a critical
support link for the Consulate. While there has been no claim
of responsibility, militant activity in NWFP districts adjacent
to the highway, particularly Mardan, has been steadily creeping
up in recent months. Post understands that a curfew has been
imposed in Mardan areas adjacent to Buner. While there has been
no claim of responsibility, the attack may be retaliation for
military operations in Buner and Dir.


4. (C) Travel to Peshawar is on a mission essential basis. Post
policy has been to permit mission personnel travelling in fully
armored vehicles to move on the motorway without additional
security escort. The Consulate provides additional security
between the exit of the motorway (approximately 5 miles east of
the Consulate) and any destinations within Peshawar. The
motorway which opened in fall 2007 has only a handful of on/off
ramps and passes through primarily open field areas in the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).


5. (C) The EAC determined that the attack had crossed a
tripwire. The attack is the first known incident of this nature
associated with the motorway in the NWFP. RSO said that attacks
with weapons such as RPGs are extremely difficult to counter.
RSO explained that this attack would require a re-evaluation of
post's contingency plans for evacuation which to date rely
substantially on ground movements via the motorway. PO and RSO
noted that post's security and logistical resources are already
under severe stress to support existing mission requirements.
The rapidly growing complexities of post's movements (Ref A),
including matching up vehicle and security assets for travel
between Peshawar and Islamabad, requires a sophisticated and
substantial coordination capability that post does not possess.



6. (C) No travel was scheduled for April 30 and May 1 between
the Consulate and the Embassy. The EAC agreed to review the
volume, timing, routes, and means of transportation between
Peshawar and Islamabad. (Note: In addition to the Grand Trunk
road as an alternative route to reduce our presence on the
motorway, a commercial air link between Islamabad and Peshawar
is still in effect.) PO asked that Consular review current
public language regarding security and roads in the NWFP. The
EAC agreed to meet again on May 1.

TRACY