Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PESHAWAR28
2009-02-17 13:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Peshawar
Cable title:  

NFWP GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES IMPLEMENTATION PLAN OF SHARI'A LAW

Tags:  PGOV PTER MOPS EAID PK 
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O 171320Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7834
INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 
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CIA WASHDC
NSC WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000028 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS EAID PK
SUBJECT: NFWP GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES IMPLEMENTATION PLAN OF SHARI'A LAW
IN SWAT

REF: Islamabad 323

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000028


E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS EAID PK
SUBJECT: NFWP GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES IMPLEMENTATION PLAN OF SHARI'A LAW
IN SWAT

REF: Islamabad 323

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) On February 16, the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)
government announced a commitment to implement Shari'a law in
Swat following negotiations with the banned terrorist group
Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM). The provincial
government is forwarding proposed amendments to the "Shari'a
Nizam-i-Adl" regulation for President Zardari's approval. In
return, TNSM leader (and father-in-law of Mullah Fazlullah) Sufi
Mohammad has agreed to lead a delegation to Swat to persuade
militants to lay down arms permanently. While Fazlullah's
Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) was not explicitly linked to the deal,
the militant group announced a 10-day cease fire on February 15
on the heels of the release of a Chinese engineer and reports of
the release of 15 to 30 TTP sub-commanders from government
custody. UNHCR plans to take advantage of the ceasefire to
deliver humanitarian supplies into Swat.


2. (C) President Zardari called Ambassador February 16 to say he
had no intention of signing any executive orders until the
militants laid down their arms. Minister of Information Sherry
Rehman, Awami National Party (ANP) deputy leader Afrasiab
Khattak and other NWFP officials are emphasizing that
implementation of Shari'a law is contingent upon "complete
restoration of peace" in Swat. TTP is insisting that "once
Islamic law is imposed, there will be no problems in Swat."
These positions appear to represent the same collision course
that essentially led to the failure of the government's deals
and strategy in the spring of 2008 in Swat. There is no agreed
upon revised Shari'a regulation for signature by Zardari; he has
rejected several previous drafts and - particularly faced with
broad international condemnation - remains reluctant to sign off
on the amendments. The real immediate damage, however, is a
deal that is sending a signal of government weakness and that
provides space to militants to strengthen in Swat and adjacent
NWFP districts. See reftel for Ambassador's discussion with
Chief of Army Staff General Kayani on the Swat agreement. End

Summary.

Shari'a Announcement -- Only a "Pledge"
--------------


3. (C) ANP's Khattak briefed Principal Officer February 16
following Chief Minister Hoti's public announcement of the
provincial government's commitment to implement Shari'a law in
the NWFP's Malakand Division (Swat, Malakand, Dir, Buner,
Chitral districts) and Kohistan district. (Note: Khattak is
really running the party with the lack of leadership and health
issues of ANP leader Asfandyar Wali Khan.) The Chief Minister,
he said, had convened all NWFP political parties earlier in the
day and gained unanimous support for the government's decision.
Jamaat-i Islami (JI) which has traditionally had a strong base
in northern areas of the NWFP boycotted the meeting, Khattak
added. (Note: JI is chafing over the disputed results of a
recent by-election and probably did not want ANP to get the
political credit for this deal.)


4. (C) Khattak insisted that negotiations with TNSM's Sufi
Mohammad resulted only in a "pledge" by the NWFP government to
implement Shari'a. (Note: Sufi has had a "protest camp" set up
in Lower Dir since October 2008, demanding the implementation of
Shari'a law in the Malakand Divison.) Implementation would only
take place after a review and reform of the 1999 "Shari'a
Nizam-i-Adl" regulation -- and once there is "complete
restoration of peace" in Swat. In return for this pledge, Sufi
has agreed to play a role in establishing peace in Swat by
undertaking activities such as "leading police back to their
stations." Khattak promised to provide the Consulate with a
translated copy of the pledge and the proposed revisions to the
1999 Shari'a regulation.

Differences Between Now and Spring 2008?
--------------


5. (C) PO observed that there appeared to be no appreciable
differences between the government's deals in the spring of 2008
in Swat and the government's latest announcement. Given the
failure of that strategy, PO asked why should TTP militants
listen to Sufi now when they hadn't done so before? Khattak
maintained that the government had not made an explicit
commitment to Sufi to implement Shari'a in the earlier round of
deals. (Note: While technically that appears to be accurate,
the government's deal with Mullah Fazlullah did make that
commitment.) Khattak also commented that the Pakistani military
leadership and ISI had played a significant role in the latest
round of negotiations, bringing pressure to strike a deal. ISI,
he said, had very clearly acted as Sufi's "handler," coaching
and coaxing him during discussions, particularly when he became
difficult.

No Talks with TTP
--------------


6. (C) Khattak said that the government had neither negotiated
the 10-day ceasefire announced by TTP nor had any involvement in
reported prisoner releases. "This was not part of our deal."
PO queried what would happen if TTP launches further attacks on
the government. "The army will be free to act decisively and
will retaliate," he replied. (Note: Director General of
Military Operations MG Javed Iqbal told Office of Defense
Representative Pakistan Chief RADM Lefever February 16 much the
same thing - the army has no intention of leaving Swat in the
near term. However, it is not clear whether army forces in Swat
would remain at their present levels, particularly with other
operational demands in the northern tribal areas, including
Bajaur.) What would constitute "complete" restoration of peace,
PO probed. That atmosphere, Khattak said, would be "obvious."
An immediate period of some quiet though, Khattak continued,
would give the police in Swat some breathing space to regroup.
Tackling TTP's Fazlullah effectively, Khattak remarked, also
depended on cutting off his support from Baitullah Mehsud.

Broader Implications for NWFP
--------------


7. (C) PO asked about the broader implications of the pledge to
implement Shari'a in Malakand Division. Would Shari'a be
extended to other NWFP districts? The provincial government,
Khattak said, would oppose applying the Shari'a regulation
outside the Malakand Division. The Swat area had a different
legal history which made it possible to draw this line, he
asserted. (Note: We are hearing that the government's
announcement has set off calls for the implementation of Shari'a
in Bajaur which is home to militants with TNSM roots.) In his
press conference, NWFP Chief Minister Hoti insisted that the
proposal for Shari'a law was in accordance with Pakistan's
constitution, but legal experts already are disputing this
claim. There is no agreement in Pakistan on what "Shari'a" law
actually entails.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) With the defacto collapse of the police in Swat, the
army's inability to check the district's deteriorating security,
and the increasing signs of creeping militancy in neighboring
districts, Khattak made it clear that the government had chosen
this course out of fear of "losing the whole Malakand Division."
Past failed peace deals have tended to leave the militants with
the advantage, in part because the government used breathing
space to focus resources on other trouble spots. The
government's ability to use the "breathing space" this time
around to its advantage may depend on resources that the federal
government and the international community can bring to bear
quickly to strengthen the government's hand, particularly
regarding law enforcement institutions, internally displaced
persons, and the sagging morale of the military.


TRACY