Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PESHAWAR211
2009-10-23 03:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Peshawar
Cable title:  

ANP LIKELY TO ABSTAIN ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION ORDINANCE

Tags:  PGOV MOPS PTER PREL 
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O 230328Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8267
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 
NSC WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000211 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PTER PREL
SUBJECT: ANP LIKELY TO ABSTAIN ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION ORDINANCE

CLASSIFIED BY: Candace Putnam, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000211


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PTER PREL
SUBJECT: ANP LIKELY TO ABSTAIN ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION ORDINANCE

CLASSIFIED BY: Candace Putnam, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



1. (C) Summary. Awami National Party leader Asfundyar Wali
Khan indicated to PO October 22 that his party likely will
abstain in the upcoming parliamentary vote on the National
Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that provides President Zardari
and other politicians immunity from prosecution on corruption
charges. The previous day, Asfundyar's deputy, Afrasiab
Khattak, reported that ISI had approached the party to urge it
to oppose the NRO, a step he warned would mean fracturing the
coalition government. Khattak believed ISI lobbying signaled
the start of a long-rumored campaign by the Pakistani Army to
oust President Zardari. The "softening up" phase of the attack,
said Khattak, included the media campaign against the
Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, the short-lived threat by FATA
parliamentarians to support the opposition, and the latest
corruption allegations against the Attorney General. The Army
was using Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhy to launch the "pincer"
phase of the attack, claimed Khattak, by forcing a parliamentary
vote on the NRO.


2. (C) Asfundyar indicated he had been trying to convince Chief
of Army Staff General Kayani not to go down this road, because
replacing Zardari would solve nothing and the Pakistani People's
Party (PPP) had no one of stature in the wings to take over.
Further, it was not clear how Zardari would react; Asfundyar
claimed to have had long discussions urging Zardari not take
precipitous action, presumably meaning an attempt to fire Kayani
as has been rumored. Of the names being circulated to replace
Zardari, which included Aitzaz Ahsan and Amin Fahim, Khattak
felt that PPP Senator Reza Rabbani was the most likely choice.
Prime Minister Gilani would go along with anyone the Army chose,
claimed Khattak. There would be no violence and no coup,
predicted Khattak, just the appropriate whisper in Zardari's ear
that it was time to go.


3. (C) Asfundyar reported that the Army was making "a proper
campaign" in South Waziristan. The long advance warning,
however, had allowed TTP leaders like Hakimullah and Qari
Hussain to flee to Mir Ali, North Wazirstan. Khattak, who is

well-known for his anti-Army/ISI views, questioned the true
intent of the Pakistani Army and speculated that the plan might
be to eliminate TTP leader Waliur Rehman, leaving Siraj
Haqqani's man Hakimullah in charge. However, Asfundyar believed
that sooner or later the Pakistani military would have to take
the battle to North Waziristan.


4. (C) On the Afghan election, Khattak predicted that President
Karzai would win and lamented what he called unnecessary efforts
to fix the first round of voting. Asfundyar commented that the
USG position was causing confusion among the Pashtuns-we were
urging the Uzbeks be wiped out in Waziristan but were perceived
to be backing Abdullah Abdullah, the alleged Northern Alliance
candidate in the Afghan election. End summary.


Army Campaign to Oust Zardari
--------------


5. (C) PO met October 22 with Awami National Party (ANP) leader
Asfundyar Wali Khan and on October 21 with ANP deputy Afrasiab
Khattak to brief him on USG efforts to provide equipment and
training for the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) police and
assure them that the ongoing USAID restructuring would not
reduce USG support for development work in NWFP or FATA .


Army Campaign Against Zardari
--------------


6. (C) Asfundyar indicated that ANP would hold meetings to
consider its decision but likely would abstain from voting on
the NRO. He said there would be many missing parliamentarians
on voting day and predicted that Zardari would pass the measure
by buying what he needed from the PPP, Muttahida Quami Movement,
and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam parties. However, he admitted that
Zardari faced problems in the Senate.


7. (C) Khattak, who dramatically asked to move to the garden
away from "ISI ears," reported that ISI had approached ANP
Senator Zahid Khan last week to urge that the party vote against
the NRO. In his view, this was proof the long-rumored Amry
campaign to oust Zardari with the help of Chief Justice Iftikhar
Chaudhry had begun; Chaudhry's Supreme Court recently ruled that
the parliament must vote on the NRO.


8. (C) Khattak believed that the "softening up" stage of the
attack included the well-orchestrated campaign against the
Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, recent corruption allegations against
Attorney General Khosa, and the FATA parliamentarian's
short-lived threat to move to the opposition benches. The
"pincer" move would be the NRO vote. Khattak also indicated the
party would abstain; "otherwise, we are in direct opposition to
the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and we break the coalition."


9. (C) According to Khattak, there were several names being
circulated as possible replacements for Zardari. He dismissed
chances for Aitzaz Ahsan or Amin Fahim but suggested that the
Army would support PPP Senator Reza Rabbani. He was not sure if
Rabbani would agree to take the position, however. Khattak
predicted that PM Gilani would support whoever the Army chose.
The transition would not be violent, said Khattak; all the Army
will have to do is whisper in Zardari's ear that it is time to
go.


10. (C) Asfundyar indicated he had tried to dissuade Chief of
Army Staff Kayani from going down this road arguing that
removing Zardari would solve nothing and create more problems.
"The PPP has no one of stature who can take Zardari's place."
Further, Zardari might fight back by making a unwise,
precipitous decision (presumably to fire Kayani as as been
rumored). Asfundyar claimed he had had long conversations with
Zardari warning him against such action.


A "Proper Campaign" or "Nothing New"?
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Asfundyar said he believed the Army was making a
"proper campaign" in South Waziristan like it had in Swat. At a
recent meeting with the Army and key political leaders,
Asfundyar said he argued that the presumption the Army could not
fight in the snow should be turned around; deep snows would
force the militants to hole up for the winter while the military
made use of helicopters to find and destroy their positions.
Today's good news was that the Army finally destroyed the homes
of Hakimullah and Qari Hussain in Kotkai. He cautioned,
however, that arrangements for neutrality with the Wazirs of
North Waziristan would not hold and worried that the Army's
arrangement did not address the Pakhtunwali code of offering
refuge. The advance warning of the campaign already had allowed
militants like Hakimullah and Qari Hussain to flee.


12. (C) Khattak, who is well-known for his anti-military/ISI
views, gave events a more sinister interpretation. He
questioned whether the ISI had abandoned its strategy of doing
deals with militants and speculated that the Army's plan might
be to surround and kill TTP leader Waliur Rehman, thus
eliminating Hakimullah's rival and leaving Siraj Haqqani with
even greater power. Khattak repeated his views that the West
has been hoodwinked by the Pakistani military. "You need to
understand that their determination to control the government in
Kabul is equal to their determination to build and keep nuclear
weapons. They acquired nuclear weapons despite international
opposition, and they believe they can beat you on establishing
their hegemony in Afghanistan too."


Karzai Will Win
--------------


13. (C) Khattak claimed to have urged President Karzai over
lunch last month to stick with the U.S. despite his frustration,
as the U.S. was the only friend Pashtuns have in the region.
Karzai will win the election run-off, predicted Khattak. Like
Zulfakir Ali Bhutto in Pakistan, said Khattak, Karzai blew what
was a sure victory by stupid meddling in the first round of
voting. Asfundyar commented that the USG position was causing
confusion among the Pashtuns-we were urging the Uzbeks be wiped
out in Waziristan but were perceived to be backing Abdullah
Abdullah, the alleged Northern Alliance candidate in the Afghan
election.


14. (C) Comment: This is far from the first rumor about a
possible Army conspiracy against Zardari, and it is no surprise
that Pakistani politicians are seeking ways to avoid a vote on
the controversial NRO. The (unconfirmed) report that
Hakimullah and Qari Hussain have moved to safer ground under the
protection of Siraj Haqqani reflects ongoing concern about the
Army's shaky neutrality agreements with the Wazirs of North
Waziristan. End comment.


PUTNAM