FRONTIER CORPS COMMANDER'S CONCERNS FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PESHAWAR 000142

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/7/2019
TAGS: MOPS PGOV EAID PTER PK
SUBJECT: FRONTIER CORPS COMMANDER'S CONCERNS FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY
STRATEGY

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
Summary
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1. (C) Frontier Corps (FC) Commander General Tariq Khan
expressed concerns in a July 1 conversation with Peshawar
Principal Officer (PO) about the competing and inefficient
authorities between the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that hampers prompt
action on issues such as IDPs. General Khan warned against
premature mainstreaming of FATA and said that the immediate/near
term focus should be on stabilization of tribal society and
existing institutions. He recommended focusing international
assistance on Bajaur to create a model and to avoid diluting the
political impact. The FC Commander's worries about the pace of
bringing in resources to rehabilitate and reconstruct are
well-founded. However, there are few easy or fast answers for
"hold" -- the most complicated aspect of counter-insurgency in
the NWFP and FATA. End Summary.

NWFP-FATA Leadership Troubles
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2. (C) PO met with General Khan on July 1 at his request. The
FC Commander opened the conversation on a positive note,
commenting that developments, particularly military operations
in the NWFP and FATA, finally appeared to be turning in the
government's favor. General Khan tempered that optimism,
however, by expressing concern over the lack of a single point
of civilian authority with cross-cutting jurisdiction over the
NWFP and FATA.


3. (C) The NWFP Governor's position, the FC Commander continued,
was a natural choice for this combined authority given the
Governor's constitutional oversight of the FATA and access to
the NWFP. (Note: The NWFP Governor's responsibilities on
provincial matters are largely ceremonial; real authority rests
with the Chief Minister and other members of the elected
government.) IDPs and other issues, requiring prompt action, he
said, were crossing political/administrative boundaries between
the NWFP and FATA and would continue to do so.


4. (C) PO noted reports of plans to replace current NWFP
Governor Ghani. General Khan believed those reports to be out
of date. Ghani had recently told the FC Commander that
President Zardari had decided against making a change in the
Governor's slot. General Khan viewed this as a sound move,
characterizing Ghani as familiar with the issues and commanding
the respect of the military. He derisively commented on one
prospective candidate -- a personality from Orakzai (NFI) -- who
was essentially "a taxi driver with no standing." General Khan
found it difficult to imagine working with someone of that
caliber and background.

Everyone Has a "Plan"
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5. (C) With the military's progress in Swat and operations in
South Waziristan, the FC Commander said that "all the worms have
come out of the woodwork." Every one has a "plan" for the
future of the FATA. Some voices (NFI),he continued, are
calling for the immediate absorption of the FATA into the NWFP
by converting the tribal areas into provincial districts. This
was a dangerous path that would be perceived among tribesmen as
a Punjabi imposed action at the behest of the United States -- a
surefire recipe for revolt in the FATA.


6. (C) The FC Commander advocated stabilization of existing
institutions and the tribal systems for the near to medium term.
At the same time, longer-term planning for mainstreaming FATA
could take place but in clear consultation with tribal
communities about the future governing arrangements, including
the Frontier Crimes Regulation. (Note: This is essentially the
view of Additional Chief Secretary of the FATA Secretariat
Habibullah Khan and a number of other Peshawar observers who
caution against repeating the mistake of Swat which was a tribal
area that was absorbed into the NWFP with no grassroots

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preparation.)


7. (C) PO asked the FC Commander about extension of the
Political Parties Act (PPA) in the near term. General Khan
feared that extension of the PPA in advance of stabilization
would create an immediate advantage for the Islamist parties
that have used the mosques and madrassas to cultivate supporters
in the FATA. Additional elected seats under the control of the
Islamist parties could complicate government objectives for the
FATA.

Focused Stabilization
--------------


8. (C) General Khan recommended focusing international
stabilization assistance on Bajaur to create a model. Trying to
do too much in too many places would dilute the political
impact. Spillover benefits, he said, could accrue to
neighboring Mohmand and Dir. Education, General Khan
emphasized, had to be one of the highest priorities. Without an
alternative to madrassas, FATA would remain isolated and
vulnerable.

Comment
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9. (C) General Khan's concerns about competing and stove-piped
NWFP and FATA authorities are well-founded. There is merit to a
single point of authority for NWFP/FATA civilian issues. Ghani,
however, is not favored by either the Awami National Party or
the PPP, and Zardari is unlikely to strengthen the Governor's
position while Ghani is there at the expense of presidential
political allies in the provincial government. And, while the
military may prefer a single point of authority on civilian
issues, General Khan did not envision a Governor with real
authority over the military. While we have seen some initial
planning from NWFP authorities aimed at dismantling and
streamlining the patchwork of political arrangements within the
province, weak and inefficient bureaucracies, particularly for
the FATA, remain a problem. The FC Commander is almost
certainly worried that the resources for "building" in an agency
like Bajaur are not following fast enough on the heels of
operations. This concern exposes the most complicated pillar in
counter-insurgency for the FATA and the NWFP -- a fast-track and
effective "hold" force.

Bio Note
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10. (C) General Khan told PO that his oldest son who recently
graduated from an Islamabad university with a business degree is
now working for a UN agency (NFI). Khan warned his son that his
UN employer should not expect any special favors or access
because of the family relationship. In a separate conversation
with PO, Khan blamed his son's decision not to enter the
military on entrance questions on religion that appeared aimed
at weeding out anyone with a secular orientation.
TRACY