BOLD TTP-CLAIMED ATTACKS SIGNAL A TEST OF WILLS WITH THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PESHAWAR 000130

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/16/2019
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV KISL PK
SUBJECT: BOLD TTP-CLAIMED ATTACKS SIGNAL A TEST OF WILLS WITH THE
GOVERNMENT

REF: A) LAHORE 115; B) PESHAWAR 127; C) PESHAWAR 126; D) LAHORE 100; E) 2008 ISLAMABAD 3074; F) 2007 PESHAWAR 608

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1. (C) Summary: Baitullah Mehsud's Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP) has claimed a series of bold attacks undertaken over June
9-12. These attacks highlight the TTP's increasing willingness
to attack and claim credit for violence within military
cantonments, in the Punjab, and against politically popular
figures. While the TTP has in the past regularly hit government
targets and public places, the recent attacks, particularly the
assassination of highly respected Lahore cleric Dr. Naeemi,
appear to be a raising of stakes in a contest of wills with the
government of Pakistan in the run-up to the expected Pakistani
government campaign in the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan
Agency (SWA). It is unclear as yet whether this strategy will
prove successful in sapping public support for the government's
policy of confrontation or whether it will create a sustained
reaction against the TTP; initial indicators point both
directions. End summary.

TTP Acknowledges Its Work
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2. (SBU) On June 13, TTP spokesman Qari Hussain claimed
responsibility for three attacks over June 11-12: the two-stage
suicide attack on a police checkpost outside of Peshawar (ref
B); a suicide bombing attack on the Supply Depot mosque in the
cantonment of Nowshera in the Northwest Frontier Province
(NWFP),and the suicide bombing attack on the madrassa of
respected Barelvi leader Dr. Allama Sarfraz Naeemi in Lahore
(ref A). These were the latest in a series of high-profile
militant attacks that had also included the June 9 attack on the
Pearl Continental Hotel (ref C).


3. (C) None of these attacks are different in type from
actions undertaken in the past by the TTP. The TTP has
destroyed major hotels before; most recently the Islamabad
Marriott in September 2008 (ref E). It has attacked security
forces targets before - notably the May 26 attack on the ISI
Punjab headquarters in Lahore (ref D). Taken together, however,
these attacks have features that point in some new directions.

Hitting cantonments...
--------------


4. (C) One clear feature has been TTP's increased ability and
brazenness in penetrating Pakistan's cantonments. (Note:
Cantonments are neighborhoods occupied primarily by military
housing and installations where security is at a relatively
higher level.) The Nowshera mosque bombing happened well within
the military cantonment in that city (containing the
headquarters of the Punjab Regiment). The bombing of the Pearl
Continental Hotel similarly took place within the Peshawar
cantonment, though closer to the edge. (Note: The June 12
violence outside the 11th Corps Commander's house now seems to
have been largely a friendly fire incident resulting from nerves
and poor coordination.)


5. (C) As most government offices and prominent officials'
residences tend to be located within cantonments because of
perceived security, this trend is one that directly affects much
of the civil government as well. The Additional Chief Secretary
(ACS) for the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) told
PO on June 11 that he had become unpopular with his colleagues
due to his repeated warnings that all of their facilities are
vulnerable.

...the Punjab...
--------------


6. (C) Another trend, which has been apparent well before the
past week, has been the TTP's willingness to strike within the
Punjab. The TTP has traditionally limited most of its activity
to the FATA and NWFP, along with occasional strikes on
high-profile targets in Islamabad/Rawalpindi (e.g., the December
2007 Benazir Bhutto assassination in Rawalpindi and the
Islamabad Marriott bombing). Since its March 2009 attack on the
Sri Lankan cricket team and police training center in Lahore,

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however, the TTP appears to be growing bolder in its attacks in
Punjab, most likely in cooperation with local Lashkar-i-Jhangvi
elements who have provided the manpower. The attacks provide
the TTP with the potential leverage that arises from bringing
home the costs of the government's anti-TTP campaign directly to
Pakistan's political center of gravity. While Punjab residents
had previously been largely shielded from the militant violence
as compared to other parts of the country, the attacks in Lahore
have made the anti-Taliban operations more relevant to daily
life in the country's second-largest city.

...and Politically Controversial Targets
--------------


7. (C) Finally, the attack on Dr. Naeemi marks a departure from
past TTP practice. Dr. Naeemi is the first cleric with a major
following whose killing the TTP has claimed. This action was
unlike the earlier case of NWFP cleric Maulana Hassan Jan, who,
like Naeemi, had spoken out against suicide bombings as
"un-Islamic." After Maulana Hassan Jan was gunned down in his
home in September 2007 (ref F),there was never any claim of
responsibility. TTP, however, has quickly claimed
responsibility for the killing of Dr. Naeemi. In part, the
difference in TTP's willingness to claim the new assassination
may lie in the lesser likelihood that the backlash from the
killing will directly affect the organization. Maulana Hassan
Jan was a respected Deobandi figure with a large following
within Waziristan as well as outside of it, and too close an
association with his death could have undercut TTP support
within its core recruiting population. Naeemi's Barelvi
followers, by contrast, were unlikely under any circumstances to
find themselves joining up with the TTP. Even so, TTP's claim
to have killed Naeemi marks the first time that the organization
has publicly admitted to its involvement in a death of a popular
public figure carrying the possibility of backlash.

Comment: Will TTP's Actions Crush or Bolster Public Resolve?
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8. (C) The TTP has not historically shied away from
confrontation, but the pattern of the past week seems to
indicate that such inhibitions as it may have previously held
are receding as military operations in South Waziristan loom.
The attacks on cantonment targets, into the Punjab, and on a
politically popular target who had rhetorically opposed TTP's
actions represent a clear challenge to the government and to the
popular forces supporting it. It is difficult to predict
whether these actions will strengthen TTP's hand in its test of
wills against the government or weaken it. On one hand, its
attacks in and around the Peshawar area, in other parts of the
NWFP, and into Punjab have made both the federal government and
especially the NWFP provincial government appear weak and
ineffective. Parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI),Imran
Khan's Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf (PTI),and increasingly the
Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam - Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) have vocally
opposed the military operation against extremists in Malakand,
and these voices show no signs of becoming muted.


9. (C) On the other hand, the TTP's apparent strategy has yet to
produce a sustained ebbing of public support for operations
against it, and at least in some circles, it seems to be having
the opposite effect. A major June 13 demonstration in Lahore
following the Naeemi madrassa bombing and the TTP claim of
responsibility for it chanted anti-TTP slogans while shopkeepers
observed a day of mourning. Political and religious leaders
rushed to condemn the attack as well. The popular anger
displayed here may be a sign that the TTP has finally crossed
enough lines to turn the popular mood from fear or apathy to
anger at the TTP's excesses. If the latter is indeed the case,
it bodes well for the Pakistani government's resolve as it
extends its anti-militant campaign into the forbidding territory
of South Waziristan.
TRACY