Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PESHAWAR113
2009-05-27 10:18:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Consulate Peshawar
Cable title:  

EXPECTED SOUTH WAZIRISTAN OPERATION CREATES DISPLACEMENT,

Tags:  PREF PTER MOPS PGOV PK EAID 
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RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 5078
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PESHAWAR 000113 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/27/2019
TAGS: PREF PTER MOPS PGOV PK EAID
SUBJECT: EXPECTED SOUTH WAZIRISTAN OPERATION CREATES DISPLACEMENT,
CONFLICT

REF: PESHAWAR 110

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PESHAWAR 000113

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/27/2019
TAGS: PREF PTER MOPS PGOV PK EAID
SUBJECT: EXPECTED SOUTH WAZIRISTAN OPERATION CREATES DISPLACEMENT,
CONFLICT

REF: PESHAWAR 110

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c),(d)

1. (C) Summary: South Waziristan Agency (SWA) residents fear an
imminent attack by Pakistani armed forces and have begun to flee
the Mehsud areas of SWA into the Northwest Frontier Province
(NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas to their north
and east. The displacement is complicating the political
situation in an area which is already suffering from some
tension between and among local tribes, and which has been
relegated to the fringes of Pakistani government attention by
the ongoing operations in the Malakand division of the NWFP. As
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters reportedly move back to
SWA from other areas, a rival militia to the TTP has increased
its activity in and around Frontier Region Tank. While a
full-scale military operation appears to be at least a couple of
months away, clashes between TTP and local security forces as
well as rival militias are taking place and may accelerate
population outflows from South Waziristan. End summary.



IDP Outflow Significant, But Not Yet At Crisis Levels

-------------- --------------




2. (C) Over the period of the last several weeks, a steady
stream of people have exited SWA, as rumors have circulated
indicating that a full-scale military campaign in SWA would
follow the conclusion of the Pakistani armed forces' campaign in
the Malakand division. According to Consulate contacts, these
departures accelerated in recent weeks following a May 17
statement by President Asif Ali Zardari that the Pakistani armed
forces would target the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan Agency
"soon" and a responding statement by Baitullah Mahsud's
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) that the residents of the Chak
Malay, Spinkay Raghzay, and Kotkay Raghzay regions of SWA (all
areas populated primarily by the TTP-dominated Mehsud tribe)
should leave their homes by May 18.





3. (SBU) The ICRC's NWFP representative Benno Kocher estimated
the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) from SWA at
"thousands" and quoted press accounts of around 60-70,000. NWFP
Chief Economist Shakil Qadir acknowledged that "several
thousand" individuals had departed SWA via the North Waziristan
Agency (NWA). The government, Qadir said, had not yet begun to
register formally these outflows. Press reports that some NWA
residents, particularly from Mir Ali, are leaving their homes as
well. At present, they appear not to have significantly
impacted the social services net of the areas to which they have
fled; according to UNHCR representative Mohammed Adar, most who
have fled are in their own "winter homes" or homes of relatives
in Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, and Lakki Marwat districts. The
distribution of the approximately 200,000 (since then mostly
returned) IDPs created by the January-February 2008 Pakistani
military campaign in SWA also included large displacements to
Bannu district and North Waziristan and Orakzai Agencies, as
well as among the large Mehsud diaspora in Karachi and Hyderabad.




4. (C) Pakistani press reports that local administration has
been directed to set up two camps, in Tank district and inside
the city of Dera Ismail Khan, to receive a predicted mass exodus
of IDPs; according to the same reports, work to set up the Tank
camp has begun. However, neither ICRC's Kocher nor UNHCR's Adar
were aware of such activity by the provincial government. Adar
noted that UNHCR had not been permitted to operate in the
southern areas of NWFP; Qadir, however, told PO that the NWFP
government wanted UN participation in registration and feared
that the UN might decline because there would be stricter

PESHAWAR 00000113 002 OF 003


measures in checking men departing the Waziristans.



Expected Uptick in Local Conflict

--------------




5. (C) The expectations of conflict and consequent displacement
have the potential to exacerbate already-existing tensions in
the region near the Mehsud areas of SWA. Former North
Waziristan Additional Political Agent and Bannu District
Coordinating Officer Javed Marwat told post that the Gandapurs,
who make up a plurality of the population of Dera Ismail Khan,
have a long history of feuds with the Mehsuds. A sudden influx
of Mehsuds could exacerbate those tensions. He admitted,
however, that this had not created serious issues in the wake of
previous campaigns in the Waziristans.




6. (S/NF) A more imminent area of conflict is the immediate
eastern outskirts of the Mehsud area, where a militant faction
aligned with Qari Zainuddin (a close relative and successor of
the assassinated Baitullah Mehsud rival Abdullah Mehsud) has
been operating for several months. Tribal Journalists
Federation president Selab Mehsud told the Consulate that over
the past ten weeks, Qari Zainuddin's group has begun to
cooperate with Turkistan Bhittani, leader of a Bhittani tribal
militia that controls access into the Mehsud area of SWA with a
large presence in Frontier Region Tank. (Note: The Mehsuds and
Bhittanis also have a long history of rivalry because of
Bhittani control of road access into/out of Mehsud territory.
In the spring of 2008, Baitullah Mehsud instigated an attack on
Bhittani tribesmen that left approximately 27 Bhittanis dead.
There are indications that the Pakistani military behind the
scenes is supporting Qari Zainuddin and the Bhittanis against
the Mehsuds in a classic divide and rule strategy that the
military has also employed vis-`-vis Mullah Nazir and Baitullah
Mehsud.)




7. (C) Frontier Region Tank's Jandola city remains tense with
Pakistani security forces, Qari/Bhittani militias, and TTP
elements operating in the area. On May 21, a suicide attack
against a Frontier Corps (FC) installation near a local market
killed nine and injured dozens of others. On May 22 in what was
probably retaliation, the Pakistani military shelled Baitullah
Mehsud-controlled areas. (Note: Tank is the home area of
Frontier Corps Commander Major General Tariq Khan.) The bodies
of two men who according to Selab Mehsud were affiliated with
the TTP were left in the street on May 22. On May 25, Selab
Mehsud reported a firefight between TTP elements and the
Qari/Bhittani militias, whom he said were supported by FC, on
the Jandola-Wana road. According to local press reporting on
May 27 on the confrontation that killed six militants and one
soldier, FC forces had secured positions several miles east of
Jandola at Chegmalai. (Note: The Jandola-Chegmalai road is one
of two key routes of access to South Waziristan's capital Wana
where the 9th Division is located.)




8. (C) The Pakistani press reported that on May 21, SWA
Political Agent Syed Shahab Ali Shah convened a jirga of elders
from Mehsud subtribes in Wana, the SWA headquarters. The
ostensible purpose of the meeting was the reopening of the
Wana-Tank road, which had been closed for most traffic by
tensions between the TTP and the Qari/Turkestan militias.
According to Selab Mehsud, the jirga consisted primarily of

PESHAWAR 00000113 003 OF 003


religious leaders affiliated with Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F)
party and elders residing in areas under the control of
Baitullah Mehsud. (Note: This tracks with reftel description of
the intermediaries through which Baitullah has attempted to
"reach out" to the Pakistani government.) Representatives from
the jirga reportedly met with Baitullah Mehsud on May 23 to
attempt to mediate between him and the government, but without
conclusive result.




9. (C/NF) Selab Mehsud also reported rumors of TTP militants
moving south to the Waziristans from concentrations in Mohmand
and Orakzai agencies. According to Selab (and also reported by
another contact reftel),a large number of militants under
Baitullah Mehsud cousin and subordinate Hakimullah Mehsud,
concentrated primarily in Orakzai, had moved south over the past
week. A spokesman for the Pakistani armed forces explained a
series of May 24 airstrikes, on a Hakimullah Mehsud madrassa and
houses in Orakzai, as an attempt to kill a group of Hakimullah
Mehsud-linked militants preparing to transfer to SWA.
Separately, SOC-FWD Peshawar reports that FC is planning to
begin ground operations in Orakzai, though Hakimullah Mehsud is
not the target.



Comment

--------------




9. (C) Like the Swat operation, the South Waziristan operation
will come as a surprise to virtually no one; it has been
telegraphed by the Pakistani government for weeks and will not
likely begin on any substantial scale for at least a couple more
months. It is unclear, however, that an NWFP government
distracted by a massive present IDP crisis in the north will be
able to simultaneously adequately prepare for a future IDP
crisis in the south. In the meantime, anti-TTP activity in F.R.
Tank and surrounding areas by the Qari Zainuddin/Turkestan
Bhittani militias, empowered by the tacit and possibly active
support of the Pakistani military and the impending shift of
area power dynamics in their direction, can be expected to
increase. TTP can be expected to respond in kind. Significant
further displacement, therefore, is likely not only coming out
of Mehsud areas of SWA, but also from bordering areas such as
F.R. Tank. End comment.
TRACY