MALAKAND UPDATE AND WAZIRISTAN PLANNING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PESHAWAR 000110

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/25/2019
TAGS: MOPS, PTER, PREF, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: MALAKAND UPDATE AND WAZIRISTAN PLANNING

REF: ISLAMABAD 947

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
Summary
--------------

1. (C) According to Awami National Party (ANP) Senator Afrasiab
Khattak, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) officials expect to
secure Mingora by June 1 and complete Swat operations in 4-6
weeks. Militant presence in Dir and Buner still pose some
challenges for security forces although rehabilitation issues
such as electricity in Buner appear to be looming larger as
obstacles to the return of displaced populations to cleared
areas. Post-conflict planning for Malakand Division may include
a "state of emergency" order to help keep detained militants in
custody. The NWFP government intends to recruit early retires
from the army to accelerate the build up of the police as a
credible back up force for the military.
Khattak said that an operation in South Waziristan may be
accelerated to June because of counter-measures that
Tehrik-i-Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud is already putting in
place to impede military action. The government estimates that
the operation could create another 500,000 IDPs and is looking
at establishing a logistical hub in Punjab's Mianwali. While
some IDPs will go to families, suitable camp sites have been
difficult to find for those who do not have this option. ANP
continues to oppose Anwar Saifullah as a candidate to replace
NWFP Governor Ghani and have threatened to walk out of the
coalition if President Zardari names him.

2. (C) ANP's post-conflict transition proposals create a number
of legal and constitutional questions. It is not clear that the
NWFP government has thought through how to reconcile these
issues. The projected timelines for operations in Swat and
South Waziristan conveyed by Khattak are ambitious and perhaps
overly optimistic -- pressure from Baitullah notwithstanding.
Other military contacts characterize Swat as a "hard fight" of
3-6 months. Even with additional military resources, it is
unclear whether the army can take on two major operations in the
area simultaneously. While NWFP plans for post-conflict
planning are welcome, civilian capacity to execute at the
district level and lower is a missing key ingredient to
successful IDP re-integration and rehabilitation of
conflict-damaged areas. End Summary.

"Apex Committee" Meeting
--------------

3. (C) Khattak provided Peshawar PO with a readout of the May 23
meeting of the "Apex Committee" attended by NWFP Governor Ghani,
11th Corps Commander General Masood, 1st Corps Commander General
Nadeem, Frontier Corps Commander General Khan, NWFP Chief
Secretary Iqbal, and Khattak (representing NWFP Chief Minister
Hoti). Topics discussed included operations post-conflict
transition in the Malakand Division as well as future operations
in South Waziristan.

Swat
--------------

4. (C) The military, Khattak said, expects to secure Mingora by
June 1, and the entire district within the next 4-6 weeks.
(Comment: Military contacts in the Special Services Group are
characterizing Swat as a "hard fight" and estimating 3-6
months.) Army forces, he said, had launched operations in
Mingora on May 23 after encircling the city and securing several
key points near the city where militant presence had been a
problem (Qambar, Takhtaband, and Angoraday). Mopping up
operations were continuing in the Peochar valley. Some
militants had managed to escape from Peochar into Upper Dir.
Mullah Fazlullah and other Tehrik-i-Taliban (Swat) leaders were
still on the run and had stopped using their phones about two
weeks ago.

5. (C) Some relief supplies had arrived on May 23 in northern
areas of Swat that had been cut off because of fighting in
central parts of the district. (Note: Communities in northern
Swat had successfully kept militants at bay since late 2007.
These communities had come under increasing pressure because of

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growing shortages and had agreed to a "truce" within the past
week to allow supplies into the area.)

Dir and Buner
--------------

6. (C) Operations in Lower Dir, Khattak said, are largely
completed although some pockets (NFI) of militants remain.
Southern Buner, he continued, had been cleared. The militant
presence in northern Buner, particularly the road from Sultanwas
to Barikot (Swat),still posed a challenge. Electricity in
Buner, Khattak noted, was the key obstacle to bringing back
displaced residents to cleared areas. (Note: Buner's power
supply originates in Swat and was damaged as operations in Swat
commenced. SOC-FWD reports that the generator that NAS procured
is supplying electricity to Daggar, Buner's capital.)

Post-Conflict Planning
--------------

7. (C) The NWFP government, Khattak said, is developing plans
for transition to a post-conflict stage in Malakand Division
(NWFP Chief Secretary Iqbal has the lead). One aspect of the
plan would be to impose a "state of emergency" order on
Malakand. A key effect would be to suspend some constitutional
rights, particularly the ability of the High Court to hear
petitions for bail. The government, Khattak explained, is
worried that without this measure many who have been detained
will be back on the streets. (Comment: Separately, we hear
from other Peshawar contacts that the issue of bail is a problem
for the government. One senior local official commented to PO
that he had no confidence that judges could withstand targeted
violence by militant groups to gain bail for their comrades.)

8. (C) To build up the police as a credible back up force for
the military, Khattak continued, the police will take in
recruits who are retiring early from the army. These recruits
will receive a basic re-orientation course and then go directly
into their postings. PO asked whether these recruits would fill
key leadership positions such as Station House Officers (SHO).
"No," Khattak replied, the army recruits would be fill rank and
file police positions. (Comment: While this move may be
helpful in shoring up the police, we are increasingly hearing
that leadership, especially at the SHO level, is sorely
lacking.) Members of the Provincial Assembly will be tasked to
organize committees at the village level to coordinate with
police.

South Waziristan Operation
--------------

9. (C) Khattak commented that the military may not wait for the
Swat operation to be completed before taking on South Waziristan
and that military action there could commence as early as June.
11th Corps Commander General Masood had made it clear that
Baitullah Mehsud will be the focus of the campaign in the
Waziristans rather than Mullah Nazir, the Haqqanis, or Gul
Bahadur.

10. (C) There was deep concern, Khattak explained, because of
counter-measures that Baitullah already appeared to be taking to
impede military action. Baitullah, Khattak said, has called a
jirga of the Mehsud tribe to rally support from tribal elders.
Support, Khattak observed, that Baitullah has not felt he has
needed in the past. Hakimullah Mehsud, one of Baitullah's key
commander, has been recalled from Orakzai with 800 fighters.
Baitullah had contacted South Waziristan's Political Agent "to
talk to" Islamabad. He had also approached Fazlur Rehman
through Merajuddin Qureshi for help in stalling the impending
operation. Baitullah was putting in place "defensive measures"
in North Waziristan to stop military movements into South
Waziristan and was building bunkers and tunnels.

11. (C) The government, Khattak said, intends to tell the Mehsud
tribe to either hand over Baitullah or be declared a "mutinous"
tribe. Under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, Khattak continued,
the government has the authority to impose a blockade and even

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pursue Mehsud businessmen in Karachi under collective
responsibility. The government, he said, has banned the
shipment of cement and fertilizer into South Waziristan.
Security has been beefed up around the Gomalzam dam where
several hundred Chinese workers are based.

12. (C) The government, Khattak said, was also expecting further
attacks in the larger cities of the settled areas. There was a
report, he noted, that 18 vehicles loaded with explosives had
been organized by Mohmand militant Abdul Wali Shah and militants
in the Darra Adam Khel area south of Peshawar.

13. (C) Khattak estimated that the South Waziristan operation
could displace approximately 500,000 people. Baitullah, he
noted, has told Mehsud families send out the elderly, women, and
children. (Note: We continue to see press reports that Mehsuds
are leaving the area, but numbers remain unclear. Mehsud
tribesmen own substantial properties in the adjacent Dera Ismail
Khan district and many spend the winters there. When the
military blockaded the Mehsud territory in late 2007, there were
approximately 200,000 displaced residents. About half stayed
with family, and half were in camps in the Tank area.)

14. (C) Mianwali in Punjab province just across the Indus from
Dera Ismail Khan, Khattak said, is under consideration as a
logistical hub for moving relief supplies into the area.
However, the government was having difficulty identifying
suitable camp sites close to South Waziristan-Dera Ismail Khan
border. The Tank area was like a desert, and the summer heat
was brutal. Possible sites further east were being
investigated.

ANP-JUI-F Dust Up
--------------

15. (C) Turning topics outside of the Apex Committee meeting,
Khattak commented on a recent acrimonious meeting hosted by
President Zardari between representatives from ANP and Fazlur
Rehman's Jamaat-i Ulema-i Islam. The meeting descended into a
shouting match, he said, when ANP representatives from Swat
became incensed over JUI-F comments opposing military action.
Khattak termed the presence of only ANP and JUI-F at the meeting
as a "mistake." JUI-F, he pointed out, while in coalition at
the federal level is in the opposition at the NWFP provincial
level. All parties should have present, Khattak said. JUI-F is
dangerous because it is good at "deceit." At least Jamaat-I
Islami, he observed, is consistent in its support for militants.

Governor's Replacement?
--------------

16. (C) PO asked if there was any update on plans to replace
NWFP Governor Ghani. ANP, Khattak said, is still advocating for
former NWFP Chief Secretary Azam Khan. ANP leader Asfandyar
Wali Khan, Khattak said, had told Zardari that ANP will leave
the coalition at the federal level if alternate candidate Anwar
Saifullah was named as Governor (reftel). Saifullah, Khattak
continued, had been the author of a plan to form an NWFP
government in February 2008 of PPP and independents, leaving ANP
out.

17. (C) Khattak expressed dissatisfaction with Zardari's
leadership. He singled out Interior Minister Rehman Malik for
criticism and complained that Zardari had failed to surround
himself with "good political people." Zardari, he said, had
also not learned from "past mistakes" and was continuing to
amass assets through pressure tactics on Karachi businessmen.
While relations with Zardari had become more strained and the
PPP leadership in the NWFP was relatively weak, ANP and PPP,
Khattak said, continued to enjoy good relations at the
provincial level.

Comment
--------------

18. (C) ANP's post-conflict transition proposals create a number
of legal and constitutional questions. It is not clear that the

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NWFP government has thought through how to reconcile these
issues. The projected timelines for operations in Swat and
South Waziristan conveyed by Khattak are ambitious and perhaps
overly optimistic -- pressure from Baitullah notwithstanding.
Other military contacts characterize Swat as a "hard fight" of
3-6 months. Even with additional military resources, it is
unclear whether the army can take on two major operations in the
area simultaneously. While NWFP plans for post-conflict
planning are welcome, civilian capacity to execute at the
district level and lower is a missing key ingredient to
successful IDP re-integration and rehabilitation of
conflict-damaged areas.
TRACY