AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FRONTIER CORPS COMMANDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PESHAWAR 000109

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/23/2019
TAGS: MOPS PTER PGOV PREF EAID PK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FRONTIER CORPS COMMANDER

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Frontier Corps Commander General Tariq Khan sees
operations in Dir and Buner winding down although Sultanwas in
northern Buner is targeted for an operation o/a May 20. People
are returning, particularly to lower Buner, and Khan cautioned
that the IDP emergency should not obscure the need to take care
of those residents who remained behind or are going back now.
The FC Commander viewed the police as weak. Strong field
leadership, he said, was just as important if not more so than
training and equipment. Khan will leave a wing in Buner to help
secure the passes. Federal level follow-through on funding
promises is a continuing source of frustration. The FC
Commander estimated the cost of raising one wing at $500,000 and
put his additional force requirements at four wings to provide a
float for training and rest. Khan did not see a role for FC
forces in Swat beyond its present three wing commitment to
support the 37th Division. He noted the need to "sort out"
madrassas in Swat and Swabi. Mohmand, he said, has become a
"primary" conduit for militants. Kurram and the Waziristans are
on the operational horizon, but he offered no timeline. End
Summary.


2. (U) Ambassador participated in the first graduation ceremony
of master trainers at the Warsak Training Center on May 19.
Peshawar PO, Office of Defense Representative
Pakistan Chief Rear Admiral LeFever, Special Operations
Command-Forward Commander, Polcouns, and UK Embassy Defense
Representative Sherry also attended. Ambassador met with
General Khan prior to the ceremony.

Post-Operations Plans for Dir and Buner
--------------


2. (C) General Khan told Ambassador that operations are still
taking place in lower Dir and northern Buner where Frontier
Corps forces have had the lead. (Note: ICRC's Peshawar
representative told us separately that fighting around
Chakdarra, the intersection that controls access to Dir and
Swat, was preventing ICRC access to the area.) In northern
Buner, Frontier Corps was planning to tackle Sultanwas o/a May
20 where militants have managed to maintain a substantial
presence. Some militants, Khan noted, are managing to escape
via smaller valleys and are likely making their way to the
Waziristans. Khan expected operations in Dir and Buner to be
completed "soon."


3. (C) Khan cautioned that in the flurry of concern for the IDP
emergency it was also important to line up resources to assist
those who stayed behind in their communities or are already
returning. He opposed cash payments to individual families,
preferring to use community leaders as a check against fraud.
Lower Buner is secure up to the Daggar, the district capital,
Khan said, and people are returning. The area, however, was
without power because operations in Swat had knocked out key
infrastructure. Electricity was critical, Khan emphasized, for
maintaining the water supply. Ambassador offered to procure
generators for the area to meet this need.


4. (C) Frontier Corps, Khan continued, will establish a new fort
in Dir and will re-organize its forces there. In Buner which is
well inside the Northwest Frontier Province, Frontier Corps has
not had a presence. However, the weakness of the police and the
need to hold gains in Buner had led Khan to the decision to
leave one FC wing (approximately 650 soldiers) in the district
to help secure the passes and work jointly with the police on
key roads.
Rather than waiting for the Ministry of Interior to fund a wing
which Khan commented could take at least six months, he will
pull men from existing wings to form the force for Buner.

Frontier Corps Funding Frustrations
--------------


5. (C) As a rule, Khan observed, he could count on the Pakistani
military to keep resource commitments promptly. The civilian

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government, he said, not only failed to keep new funding
promises but did not have a good track record of paying standing
obligations. Much of the difficulty in funding could be traced
to the Frontier Corps' hybrid nature as a paramilitary force
with the Ministry of Interior retaining budget responsibility
for FC while the military had operational control. Responding
to Ambassador's question on the cost of standing up a wing, Khan
estimated $500,000 without infrastructure such as barracks.
Ideally, Khan said he could needed four additional wings to give
him the float he needs to rotate troops for training and rest.


Role for the Police
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador outlined U.S. plans to support law enforcement
and asked for Khan's views on implementation. Khan emphasized
that the most important element that the police needed was solid
field leadership at the district and station house levels. Khan
recounted his role in having Dir's District Police Officer (DPO
- the senior police officer at the district level) removed
recently for incompetence. Within 48 hours of the arrival of
the new DPO whom Khan had worked with in the past, the police
were back out on the roads in large numbers working with
Frontier Corps forces. Khan recommended forming a panel of
senior police officers to provide suggestions for recruiting and
retaining leaders in the police force.

No Significant FC Role in Swat
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador asked whether Frontier Corps forces would
assume a lead role in Swat in the future. Three FC wings would
remain in Swat in support of the 37th Division, Khan said, but
he did not foresee further FC expansion. Swat, he noted, was
"too far into the settled areas" and outside FC's legal mandate.
(Comment: FC has had a presence in Dir and Chitral, but these
districts border on the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
Given Khan's commitment to put a wing in Buner which like Swat
is also considered a "settled area," his reluctance to commit
to Swat may be driven by the substantial force requirements as
much as the issue of legal mandate.)

"Sorting Out" Madrassas
--------------


8. (C) Khan cryptically commented that the madrassas in Swat and
Swabi will need to be "sorted out." In Bajaur, he continued,
madrassas can be inspected at will by the Political Agent based
on the February 28-point "undertaking" local elders gave the
government. The PA, Khan said, also has the authority to vet
Friday sermons. (Comment: Other local officials have told us
that "laying hands" on religious leaders is a step that will be
difficult for the government to take. Khan's reference to Swabi
is likely aimed at Swabi's Panj Pir madrassa which as a
reputation for espousing Wahhabism and which may serve as a
networking hub for militants in the northern NWFP and
Bajaur/Mohmand.) Khan also recommended instituting radio
call-in programs in other areas along the lines of one the FC
radio station in Bajaur is running. The call-in format, he
said, gives people an immediate ability to provide feedback to
the government.

Other Operations
--------------


9. (C) Turning to other areas in the FATA, Khan said that
Mohmand has become a "primary" conduit for militants. New
leaders (NFI) and a few "mass attacks" that led to some FC
casualties. While he offered no timeline, Khan characterized
Kurram as the "next" operation. He viewed Kurram as largely a
sectarian problem that could be managed with the addition of a
wing from North Waziristan. Altogether, North and South
Waziristan have 22 Frontier Corps wings under Pakistani army
operational control. That may be enough FC contribution for any
future Waziristan operations. If not, he would be reluctant to
pull forces from the north given the need to be able to address

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hot spots there.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) The meeting with General Khan on the margins of the
graduation ceremony was a reminder of how far cooperation and
this project have come since 2006. While an important milestone
has been met, Khan's description of the operational landscape
ahead and concerns about holding territory underscore the
challenges that remain for the Frontier Corps and the civilian
government in the NWFP and FATA.
TRACY