IDP CRISIS UPDATE: UN AGENCIES AND ICRC CONVEY IDP NEEDS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PESHAWAR 000103

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM EAID PGOV PTER PK
SUBJECT: IDP CRISIS UPDATE: UN AGENCIES AND ICRC CONVEY IDP NEEDS IN
PESHAWAR

REF: ISLAMABAD 1079

CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Peshawar, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1. (C) Summary: A group of four Peshawar-based
representatives from United Nations agencies and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) told the
Ambassador the rising number of internally displaced people
(IDPs) is swamping the capacity of the Pakistani government.
The group agreed that the Pakistani armed forces, the federal
government, and the NWFP government must provide a realistic
timeframe and scope for military operations so that relief
entities could properly plan for and meet IDP needs through the
remainder of the year. The group agreed that the security
situation in camps and host communities was deteriorating as the
Pakistani government was not providing adequate protection. The
UN and donor agencies are assisting with water, food, sanitation
facilities, health care, and education for children. The group
echoed reports that we have been hearing that IDPs are beginning
to return to Bajaur, facing challenges similar to the massive
challenge that the reintegration of the current group of IDPs
will pose; the UN and ICRC are also beginning to prepare for
possible operations in the Waziristans. End summary.


2. (SBU) On May 19, the Ambassador met with Benno Kocher,
International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) Peshawar
representative; Mohammed Adar, head of United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Peshawar; Ershad Karim,
from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); and Syed Fawad
Ali Shah, the United Nations cluster leader for education, to
discuss the needs of IDPs produced by recent military operations
in Pakistan.


3. (C) The group agreed that the Pakistani government lacks
sufficient capacity to meet the needs of increasing numbers of
IDPs. Adar compared the response by the Pakistani government
and people unfavorably to his experience in the 2005 Kashmir
earthquake, when "the roads were choked" with relief supplies
going to the affected zone; he also criticized the government's
failure to evacuate Swat residents earlier and in a more orderly
fashion. The federal and provincial governments have not
coordinated well; at the federal level, the team of officials
designated to deal with the crisis was spending its energy on
creating new organizational structures for dealing with the
problem rather than using those already in place. The UN and
NGOs continued to have issues at the federal level in obtaining
visas for their staff. Private relief organizations such as
al-Khidamat (Jamaat-i-Islami's charity wing) were stepping in to
fill the gap left by the government's disarray.


4. (C) All members of the group were concerned by the
security situation, particularly in the camps. Adar claimed
there was "growing anger in the camps," noting that aside from
unreliable local police, the Pakistani government and military
had deployed no forces on a permanent basis to secure the camps.
Already, the poor security and rising numbers have made food
distribution difficult, due to the "crush" of IDPs attempting to
secure rations for themselves. Adar added that a single violent
incident, such as an attack on an aid worker, could cause the UN
and NGOs to pull out of their roles in the camps.


5. (SBU) These issues aside, the UN and NGOs were able to
operate in the area and had begun to address the needs of the
IDP population in the area. The group identified water as the
primary issue facing the camps, particularly given the rising
heat; the IDPs from the most recent round of conflict used more
water than those from previous rounds, and UNICEF was scrambling
to keep up. It was trucking water in but planned to put
distribution systems in place over the next two months. The
camps urgently needed generators to run fans and water pumps.
UNICEF was also assisting the provision of education to the
estimated 800,000 IDP children; it was setting up schools in the
camps and employing displaced teachers to give "second shift"
classes at existing government school facilities for displaced
children living outside the camps. This would not be
sufficient, Karim predicted; UNICEF would need large tents with
fans, along with books and supplies, to maintain the classes in
the summer months. UNHCR was attempting to organize a food bank
to regularize distribution of food donations; now carried out in

PESHAWAR 00000103 002 OF 002


a "chaotic" fashion.


6. (C) The members of the group agreed that providing
accurate information to IDPs was critical, contrasting taliban
FM radio with the spotty communication from the government. The
group said that the armed forces, the federal government and
NWFP government must provide a realistic timeframe and scope for
military operations so that relief entities could properly plan
for and meet IDP needs through the remainder of the year.


7. (C) UNHCR's Adar noted that there had been a recent flow
of "old" IDPs back to Bajaur from the established camps of
Jalozai and Kachagari; ICRC added that IDPs were also beginning
to flow back to southern Buner and Lower Dir. The challenges
the Bajauris faced were an early sign of the massive
arrangements that would need to be made for the eventual
reintegration of "new" IDPs. While all of the IDPs had been
promised return packages by the NWFP government, those resources
had been diverted to the new IDP crisis; however, many of those
IDPs who could afford to do so had begun to return to their
homes. UNHCR is attempting to gather packages of food and
non-food items for 10,000 of the families who are expected to
move back to Bajaur in the near future. The group pointed to
the experience of Bajaur to underline the need for the
government of Pakistan to quickly reestablish a functioning
civil administration in Swat and surrounding affected areas
after combat operations have concluded, in order to ensure that
the militants do not return. The UN and ICRC are also preparing
for the outflow from the predicted operations in the
Waziristans, which Benno said would be "extremely challenging"
owing to the lack of infrastructure in the area and the heavy
damage that the area will likely sustain given the time that the
militants have had to prepare for a military assault.
TRACY