(U) Secretary Clinton's July 23, 2009 Meeting

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARTO 000013

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2034
TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY PREL PK
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's July 23, 2009 Meeting
with Pakistani Foreign Minister Makhdom Shah Mahmood
Qureshi, Phuket, Thailand


1. (U) Classified by: Paul Wohlers, Deputy Executive
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4.(d)


2. (U) July 23, 2009; Phuket, Thailand


3. (U) Participants:

U.S.
The Secretary
Deputy Chief of Staff Jacob Sullivan
Deputy Chief of Staff Huma Abedin
Lt. Gen. Paul Selva
DAS-D Robert Scher
Spokesperson Ian Kelly
Nejdat Mulla (Embassy Note taker)

Pakistan
Foreign Minister Makhdom Shah Mahmood Qureshi
Additional Foreign Secretary Masood Qhalid
DG Foreign Minister's Office Zaheer Berviaz Khan
Ambassador at Large Nasir Ali Khan
Director Foreign Minister's Office Ameer Khurram Rathore
Charge d'Affaires Embassy Bangkok Ahmed Amjad Ali



4. (C) Summary: On July 23, the Secretary met Makhdom
Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, on
the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Phuket,
Thailand. FM Qureshi expressed appreciation for the
Administration's approach to South Asia, claimed
Pakistan's fight with extremists was progressing, and
requested assistance with an energy crisis, police
training/funding, resettling displaced families, and
disrupting the flow of money and weapons to extremists.
On India, Pakistan wanted to move forward with a
dialogue to normalize relations. Regarding Afghanistan,
Pakistan saw signs of progress in the run-up to
presidential elections. The Secretary pledged continued
support for Pakistan's fight against extremists and
dialogue with India that could move the two countries
forward in normalizing relations. She emphasized that
Pakistan needed to deny extremists the ability to set
the agenda for the relationship with India, and
suggested Pakistan initiate a concerted media campaign
to publicize its efforts to cooperate with India, as
well as promote better cooperation between Indian and
Pakistani security elements to build needed confidence
and trust. End Summary.

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Taking the Fight to the Extremists
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5. (C) FM Qureshi described progress made in the fight
against extremists. He said the Pakistanis had finally
realized that the extremists were threatening their
values, economy, and way of life. The army now had the
will to fight, and the people affected by the extremist
agenda were no longer afraid to speak out. Qureshi
attributed this change, in part, to the U.S.
administration's policy of listening to local concerns.
Pakistan still faced many challenges, however, and these
could affect the current focus on the fight against the
militants. Pakistan was in the middle of an energy



crisis that could result in political unrest. This type
of distraction would be tragic for efforts against the
Taliban. Qureshi requested energy assistance and
support in disrupting the flow of money and arms that
allowed militant extremists to continue their fight.
Pakistan was prepared to expand the military offensive
into Waziristan. Pakistan also needed to disrupt the
extremists' supply of weapons.


6. (C) Qureshi spoke at length about internally
displaced persons (IDPs). Authorities had coped with
the large number of IDPs that resulted from the military
offensive, and over 56,000 families had already returned
to their homes. Pakistan needed more police to provide
security against further extremist incursions and to
rebuild infrastructure { it would cost some $2.5 billion
to restore the Swat valley alone to a functioning level.


7. (C) The Secretary congratulated Qureshi on Pakistan's
handling of the military offensive in Swat. The United
States had identified the source for some of the
militant funding, and a concerted effort by the United
States and Pakistan might disrupt the stream of money.
The Secretary agreed that continued security was
essential for IDPs to return home. The United States
was ready to assist, having already provided $300
million in short-term aid to IDPs. In the longer term,
Pakistan needed to extend governance to the region. The
Kerry /Lugar aid package was being finalized and the
World Bank's damage assessment report could be helpful
in outlining specific needs to the Friends of a
Democratic Pakistan group, which needed to find a
suitable coordinator.

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Setting the Agenda: India and Terrorism
--------------


8. (C) Regarding India, FM Qureshi said Pakistan wanted
to normalize relations. Despite political posturing,
Pakistanis were not interested in confrontation; they
wanted tangible improvements in their lives. He
emphasized Pakistan's willingness to resume the
comprehensive dialogue with India, which was the only
option for ensuring stability in South Asia. Pakistani
Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani and Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh had agreed earlier in July in Sharm el-
Sheikh that the Foreign Secretaries of each country
would meet as needed, and the Foreign Ministers would
meet in New York at the upcoming UNGA. The New York
meeting would be successful if both countries could
agree on a resumption of the dialogue.


9. (C) The Secretary pledged continued support to
Pakistan's renewed engagement with India. PM Singh had
been heavily criticized inside India for his meeting
with PM Gilani. Regardless, Singh was committed to
proceed with the dialogue. India had acted with
restraint after the Mumbai terrorist attacks, but such
restraint would not be possible if there were another
attack. Pakistan's tangible cooperation on terrorism
issues, such as bringing terrorists to trial, had helped
strengthen the arguments of those in India who advocated
restraint. While there would always be differences



between India and Pakistan, two democratically elected
governments offered the best opportunity to resolve
those differences.


10. (C) FM Qureshi told the Secretary that he felt PM
Singh was a leader of integrity, but he was frustrated
that Pakistan's relationship with India could be
determined by a small group of extremists. India and
Pakistan had a common interest in fighting terrorism,
but the terrorists were setting the agenda for conflict,
aided by negative, pessimistic commentary in the media
about the prospects for bilateral relations. The large
constituency supporting progress in relations with India
was not being heard. Pakistan was now taking the
initiative against the extremist threat. The United
States could help by sharing threat information in a
timely manner.


11. (C) The Secretary responded that Pakistan needed to
be explicit in not allowing terrorists to determine the
course of its relationship with India. There was
popular support for Pakistan's efforts to fight
extremism and normalize the relationship, but the
message was not being reflected in the media. The
Secretary told FM Qureshi that his message needed to get
out, particularly in India, as there needed to be a
concerted outreach effort to get moderate Pakistani and
Indian commentators to talk about the benefits that
would flow from normalization. More contact between
civilian and military security forces and better
intelligence sharing with India would build trust and
demonstrate Pakistan's commitment to working with India.
She committed to carrying the message to India about
more intelligence and security cooperation.



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Afghanistan
--------------


12. (C) FM Qureshi thought Afghanistan was moving in a
positive direction. Pakistan was closely monitoring the
run-up to elections and hoped that results would reflect
the will of the people. Pakistan was willing to launch
the next round of the Cross-Border Jirga peace process
and was moving forward with the transit trade agreement.


13. (C) The Secretary said the United States also hoped
that the election outcome would reflect the will of the
Afghan people, but was committed to working with the
elected government. She thanked Qureshi for his
cooperation on the transit trade agreement. Cross
border trade was in everyone's interests and providing
livelihoods was one of the best weapons against
extremism. While in India, the Secretary said she had
urged the Indian government to be transparent in its
work in Afghanistan. India's interest was in preventing
Afghanistan from becoming a failed state, not in
undermining Pakistan. It would be useful if India and
Pakistan could find ways to work together to prevent
Afghanistan from failing.
CLINTON