(U) Secretary Clinton's July 22, 2009

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARTO 000012

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019
TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY PREL JA KN CH
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's July 22, 2009
Conversation with Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi
Nakasone


1. (U) Classified by: Paul Wohlers, Deputy Executive
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4.(d)


2. (U) July 22, 2009; 3:10 PM Phuket, Thailand


3. (U) Participants:

U.S.
The Secretary
EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell
NSC Senior Director Jeff Bader
Deputy Chief of Staff Jacob Sullivan
Ambassador Sung Kim
Lieutenant General Paul Selva
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Robert Scher
Nejdat Mulla(Embassy Notetaker)

JAPAN
Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone
Deputy Vice-Minister Bessho Koro
Press Secretary Kodama Kazua
Director General Saiki Akitaka
Director General Umemoto Kazuyoshi
Director General Inomata Hiroshi
Director Yoshida Tomoyuki
Private Secretary to Foreign Minister Takizaki Shigeki


4. (C)In a bilateral meeting on July 22 at the ASEAN
Regional Forum in Phuket, Thailand, the Secretary and
Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone discussed a
broad range of issues relating to the U.S. { Japan
bilateral security relationship. The Secretary told FM
Nakasone that U.S. security commitments to Japan were
unwavering and that the United States was committed to
working closely with Japan on the range of global
security issues, and particularly on the irreversible
denuclearization of North Korea. Nakasone echoed the
affirmation of the security relationship; both sides
agreed to continuing close multilateral cooperation on
North Korea. Nakasone said recently passed United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 should be given
time to have an effect on the DPRK, and expressed
concern about recent North Korean overtures for
Ambassador Bosworth to travel there. He requested the
United States consult with Japan and South Korea about
North Korean issues before approaching China and Russia.
On other issues, Nakasone said Japan was concerned about
the opaque nature of China's military spending, and
stood ready to assist with establishing a dialogue
between the United States and Burma or Iran. END
SUMMARY.

Bilateral Commitment Unwavering
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5. (C) The Secretary told FM Nakasone that U.S. security
commitments to Japan were unwavering and that the United
States is committed to working closely with Japan on a
range of global security issues, and particularly the
irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. Nakasone
said Japan looked forward to continuing our strong
alliance "in a multilateral fashion" and appreciated the
proposal for a presidential visit.

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North Korea: Continued Cooperation and Close
Consultation



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6. (C) The Secretary expressed appreciation for Japan's
response in the United Nations to North Korea's missile
launch, and support for UNSCR 1874. She underscored the
importance of working closely to respond to North Korean
provocations, and said the United States would not be
provoked. She urged Japan to continue to work with
China towards a concrete strategy for a denuclearized
North Korea.


7. (C)FM Nakasone advocated putting real pressure on the
DPRK regime, while allowing UNSCR 1874 time to have an
effect. He expressed concern regarding a North Korean
invitation to Ambassador Bosworth to travel to North
Korea and said such a visit would be premature before
1874 sanctions had some effect. It was important to
proceed cautiously and consult with Japan and South
Korea before moving forward on any decision about
engaging North Korea bilaterally. Such a visit would
undercut the collective will to allow the sanctions to
put real pressure on the regime. External cooperation
must be visible to dissuade North Korea from taking
escalatory steps; the United States, Japan, and South
Korea must work together to set the pace for
reengagement. Although Five Party consultations are one
way to move forward, they must be conducted in a way
that would be conducive to re-starting Six Party talks.


8. (C)FM Nakasone said the Six Party talks needed a new
approach. Japan would no longer make "double payments"
nor let North Korea use "salami tactics" to slice-up
proposals and incentives. Any new approach must
convince North Korea of the necessity of taking
verifiable, irreversible action to denuclearize. Japan
wanted close coordination between the United States,
Japan, and South Korea prior to consultations with China
or Russia. He also underscored, however, the important
role China can play in modifying North Korean behavior.
Japan would like to have regular bilateral discussions
on China's role in this issue. He had spoken earlier to
Chinese FM Yang regarding the future of the Six Party
talks and the need to be cautious with China's military
engagement with North Korea. Nakasone said he was
concerned that Thailand's move to introduce North Korean
language for the Chair's statement would undermine a
robust ARF message.


9. (C) The Secretary emphasized we must do all we can to
enforce UNSC 1874 and find specific ways to impose
consequences; the United States had established a
specific unit to coordinate our efforts. The United
States intended to continue close consultations with
Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia and avoid double
payments or "salami tactics." China's role was
critical, and five party talks were relevant to get
North Korea back to Six Party talks about permanent,
irreversible denuclearization. The Secretary praised
Japan's work on contingency planning for North Korea.

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Engaging Burma
--------------


10. (C) The Secretary expressed appreciation for Japan's
assistance and support on Burma. The United States was
primarily concerned with the state of democratic reform



in the country and its growing relationship with North
Korea. The Junta continued to pursue advanced and
offensive weapons; the possibility that North Korea
might transfer nuclear technology to Burma was real. It
was critical for the regime to release Aung San Suu Kyi
(ASSK),as such a move would open up real opportunities
for engagement with the United States, including
investment.


11. (C) FM Nakasone said Japan was disturbed by the
legal action against ASSK. Japan had placed a high
value on the visit by UNSYG Ban to Burma and was
dismayed when the regime would not allow him to meet
ASSK. Nakasone had told his Burmese counterpart that he
should seriously consider the U.S. offer for dialogue.

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China: Need for More Transparency
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12. (C) Japan was concerned with China's military
opaqueness and apparent interest in expanding its
influence eastward to the sea, and China's nuclear
disclosures, Nakasone stressed. The Secretary agreed on
the need for more transparency in China's defense
spending and planning. The United States hoped to move
forward with a U.S.-Japan-Chinese trilateral at the
policy planning level; we must continue to include China
in a multilateral dialogue to ensure its peaceful rise,
but we need to see more transparency as well.

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Iran
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13. (C) Iran's continued violation of international
nuclear obligations concerned the United States. The
Secretary asked FM Nakasone to convey to Iran that it
had an opportunity it could not miss, and raised
Japanese export credits. The FM replied that while the
post- election situation in Iran was deplorable, Japan
planned to make the most of its unique position by
maintaining a high level dialogue with the regime while
taking into account U.S. and EU initiatives and concerns
on the nuclear issue. Iran must take measures to
address uranium enrichment activities. Nakasone had
encouraged Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to
engage the United States. Japan was prepared to assist
in laying down the foundations for a dialogue. Nakasone
asserted that Japanese export credits were decreasing
and were not larger than those issued by European
countries.

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Other Issues: India and Russia
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14. (C) Nakasone said the United States and Japan needed
to continue strengthening relationships with India.
Japan held a strategic dialogue with India earlier in
July. Japan also would like to hold a conference for
intellectuals from Japan, Russia, and the United States
on security in the Asia Pacific region; he requested
U.S. support for the conference, as well as for Japan's
efforts to deal with its territorial dispute with
Russia.
CLINTON