MFA AFRICA DIRECTOR'S JULY 21 DISCUSSION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000997

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PINS PGOV KDEM NG MA MR IV FR
SUBJECT: MFA AFRICA DIRECTOR'S JULY 21 DISCUSSION OF
MADAGASCAR, MAURITANIA, NIGER, COTE D'IVOIRE

Classified By: Kathleen Allegrone, Political Minister-Counselor, 1.4 (b
/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA AF A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz on
July 21 expressed frustration with the political impasse in
Madagascar; relief that elections had transpired relatively
well in Mauritania, offering a possible conclusion to the
long political crisis there; exasperation with Niger
President Tandja's efforts to retain power, about which
President Sarkozy "is furious;" and, unlike most GOF
officials, optimism that elections will take place in Cote
d'Ivoire on November 29 as planned. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) PolMinCouns and acting AF-watcher met with MFA
Africa Director (A/S) Stephane Gompertz for a review of
current issues. Discussion focused on Madagascar,
Mauritania, Niger and Cote d'Ivoire. We have reported
separately by e-mail Gompertz's comments on Somalia.

Madagascar
--------------

3. (C) Gompertz delivered his remarks on Madagascar with a
clear tone of frustration that the political impasse and lack
of consensus on a way forward to elections continued to
prevail. He said there was no apparent easy way to resolve
the crisis. Presidential Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno
Joubert had met on July 20 with newly appointed SADC mediator
Joaquim Chissano. Gompertz was disappointed that Chissano
told the French that he would go slowly and take a deliberate
approach. In Gompertz's opinion, Chissano, as well as the
Malgache generally, were not operating with a sense of
urgency. The GOF would welcome clear signs that all parties
wanted to settle the crisis as soon as possible. Instead,
neither Chissano nor the other parties seemed in a hurry.
Gompertz noted the weakening of Madagascar's economy and the
deteriorating security climate.


4. (C) Chissano apparently wanted the four principals
(Ravalomanana, Rajoelina, Ratsiraka, and Zafy) to meet in
Angola, which Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka were willing to do.
Rajoelina, however refused. Gompertz, who was preparing to
go to Addis Ababa (with Presidential AF Advisor Remi
Marechaux) for the July 22 Contact Group meeting, said that
Rajoelina was "committing a grave error" by not being present
in Addis Ababa himself, especially since Gompertz understood
that Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka would either be present or
would be well represented. Rajoelina's refusal to go to
Addis Ababa seemed to puzzle Gompertz, who noted Rajoelina's
recent visit to Brussels. Gompertz surmised that Rajoelina
was receiving bad advice from, among others, Franco-Malgache
businessman Patrick Leloup, "who is always pursuing his own
business interests first."


5. (C) Gompertz said that Rajoelina seemed to believe that
he could force his way to elections on his own terms, much as
Aziz had thought in Mauritania until he learned that a
compromise solution was the best way forward. Rajoelina had
not come to that conclusion, despite French entreaties that
he seek a broad-based consensus. Could Chissano achieve what
Wade had achieved in Mauritania? -- Gompertz said he was "not
optimistic." Ravalomanana was not helping either -- Gompertz
repeated what French Presidency officials had told us earlier
-- that Ravalomanana was recruiting mercenaries in France
(and in South Africa) in an effort to create a para-military
force that could help him seize power.


6. (C) There were, however, encouraging signs. SADC had
moderated its position and was now more in line with the
international community, having abandoned an earlier call for
military action against Rajoelina in order to re-install
Ravalomanana. Gompertz lauded South African president Zuma's
very positive role in shifting SADC's position. When asked
whether elections could take place in 2010, Gompertz stressed
the need for an accord. He said that it would be better if
legislative elections preceded the presidential contest, if
only to have a legislature in place rather than a
post-presidential legislative election that a newly-installed
president could manipulate. An even better scenario would
involve not having any of the principals (Ravalomanana,
Rajoelina Ratsiraka, and Zafy) run, but Gompertz conceded
that such a scenario was impossible.

Mauritania
--------------

7. (C) In contrast, Gompertz was considerably more upbeat
(and relieved) about Mauritania -- "so far so good" were his
first words when asked. He said that France became
relatively comfortable as soon as the Wade-brokered deal took
form. He noted that France was at first very strongly
anti-coup but then moderated its position because of the need
to cooperate with Mauritania over regional anti-terrorism, a

PARIS 00000997 002 OF 002


policy shift that involved President Sarkozy. Aziz seemed
committed to cooperate with France on terrorism issues.
Gompertz praised Wade ("we didn't think he could do it") and
also AU Peace and Security Commissioner Lamamra for their
roles in hammering out the accord. Gompertz indicated he had
no problem with the international community's taking its time
before resuming normal treatment of Mauritania.


8. (C) On regional terrorism and AQIM, Gompertz repeated
that Aziz would be helpful. The international community
needed to help Mauritania as well as Mali and Niger.
Gompertz descried Mali as the most serious problem, noting
that a Malian military unit had recently been attacked and
taken heavy casualties. The Tuareg feared AQIM as well, but
needed to be handled carefully. Some Tuareg seemed willing
to take a more active role in countering regional terrorism,
but Gompertz cautioned that such a role would have to be
carefully arranged, in order to avoid potential Tuareg-Arab
conflict.

Niger
--------------

9. (C) Gompertz's mood soured when we asked about Niger
President Tandja's quest for a third term. His first
response was to note that "Sarkozy is furious. When he went
there a few months ago, he came away thinking that Tandja
would not seek a third term." Gompertz said that "France
cannot support a third term." He recited Tandja's several
unconstitutional and irregular acts -- dissolving the
constitutional court, invoking Article 53 of the constitution
to give himself extraordinary powers, and seeking a
referendum that would validate his seeking a third term.
Gompertz noted the serious harm Tandja had already done to
Niger's democracy and its institutions; he did not rule out
public unrest or even a coup. Gompertz was aware of ECOWAS,
UN, and AU efforts to pressure Tandja but he thought the only
actor Tandja would respect was Nigeria. However, he
suspected that Nigeria would not take decisive action.


10. (C) After the August 4 referendum, which Gompertz
believed Tandja would win, the EU would have to examine the
scheduled legislative elections. They seemed to be flawed
even at this stage -- the GON had already published a list of
26 individuals who would be banned from seeking office.
Asked why Tandja was behaving this way, Gompertz said he was
receiving bad advice from his Minister of Security. There
was also the problem of a presumed successor's being
imprisoned and Tandja's need to scramble until the succession
issue is settled. Gompertz also did not rule out the
possibility that Tandja was following the path taken by
innumerable dictators over the years -- he may perceive
himself as the savior of his people, on some sort of divine
mission.

Cote d'Ivoire
--------------

11. (C) Gompertz, exuding a slight air of whimsy, said that
he stood virtually alone within the GOF in believing that the
November 29 elections in Cote d'Ivoire would take place as
scheduled. He admitted that colleagues considered him naive.
He stated, however, that there was progress on several
fronts. Voter registration seemed to be moving forward. The
government had restructured its financing (at a lower price)
with French firm SAGEM for its information and communications
management support. SRSG Choi was "pessimistic" but Gompertz
thought that President Gbagbo now believed he could win, and
such a belief could allow the elections to take place as
scheduled. Gompertz observed that the security situation
seemed to be improving as well.


PEKALA