SCENESETTER FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY TALKS IN PARIS

S E C R E T PARIS 000637

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR FR AF PA KN MN SR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY TALKS IN PARIS
MAY 14, 2009

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark Pekala, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. French officials view the upcoming
continuation of the 2 plus 2 political-military talks,
initially launched in November of last year, as an important
affirmation of the new administration's desire for increased
bilateral cooperation and coordination with France on major
global challenges. This cable provides an overview of French
positions on key issues on the proposed agenda. The planned
May 14 discussions give us an opportunity to press France for
increased engagement in Afghanistan, including in civil
reconstruction, and caution against a too precipitous
drawdown in KFOR and EUFOR in the Balkans. Further, we
should push for French support in the Macedonia name dispute
with Greece and be prepared for another French push for an
OSCE summit to discuss European security issues with Russia.
French officials may again request improving our bilateral
intelligence cooperation in operational areas and support as
French reintegration into the military command of NATO is
implemented over the course of the next few months. Both of
your interlocutors are well-established in their current
positions and anxious for regular contact with new
administration officials, both having already traveled to
Washington in recent weeks. End summary.

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AFGHANISTAN
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2. (C/NF) French officials openly acknowledge that they must
do more to explain to publics the importance of our mission
in Afghanistan. In recent months, GOF officials downplayed
the possibility of additional French deployments in
Afghanistan in an effort to de-link that conflict (which the
public continues to view as an "American war") with the
controversial return to NATO's integrated military command.
In opinion polls, French citizens consistently disapprove of
military deployments to Afghanistan while conversely
expressing overwhelmingly support for civil initiatives aimed
at institution-building and reconstruction. Rhetorically,
French officials, particularly FM Kouchner, fervently support
the view that there is "no purely military solution to
Afghanistan" and place a great emphasis on a comprehensive
approach. However, due to the current economic crisis, the
fact is that France is more able to deploy military assets
than financial or other assistance this year. Elysee and
military sources have confirmed to us that current French
planning is to turn over RC-Capital to Afghan and other other
allied forces this year, and then to rotate their RC-Capital
troops to RC-East to join their maneuver battalion in Kapisa
(which would further be quietly supplemented with the
necessary enablers). The goal is to make more French forces
available for combat operations, without violating high-level
public declarations by both the French Foreign and Defense
Ministers that no "new" troops would be deployed to
Afghanistan this year.


3. (C/NF) On the civil side, the GOF expects to provide
approximately USD 40 million this year (an amount which was
increased from the previously allotted USD 10 million for
2009). In addition, current plans call for 150 French
gendarmes to be deployed to Afghanistan by June as part of a
300-man European Gendarmerie Force, to be placed under the
authority of the recently approved NATO Training Mission for
Afghanistan (NTM-A). The French plan is to initially deploy
these civil forces in the Kabul region to ensure stability
and then backfill when French troops rotate from the capital
to deploy to RC-East. The Elysee is also starting to look at
the possibility of deploying additional OMLTs in response to
President Sarkozy's unexpected offer to President Obama on
the margins of the NATO summit. Your meeting could be a good
opportunity to push for a progress report and reiterate the
standing need for additional OMLTs to mentor Afghan National
Army units.


4. (C/NF) Given the French support for a more comprehensive
approach to Afghanistan, your visit is a good opportunity to
urge the French to think more creatively about how to bolster
their civilian commitment, perhaps using military resources
if that is where they have greater flexibility and capacity.
France has consistently declined to stand up a PRT with their
other troops because of ideological resistance to having
civilians subordinate to military command. However, post

understands that this policy has lately been under review
within the MFA. France has a long history of incorporating
development and reconstruction into its military missions in
Africa, and these resources could be equally useful in
Afghanistan. A description of the U.S. Agri-business
Development Team (ADT) model might help the French find
creative ways to ramp up civilian assistance in Afghanistan.

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BALKANS
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5. (C/NF) In a January speech to parliament, PM Fillon
identified deployments in the Balkans as areas for potential
drawdowns in military forces as part of an overall French
defense re-structuring mandated by the 2008 White Paper on
Defense and National Security. GOF officials are targeting
KFOR on the grounds that Kosovo is now more stable and the
situation no longer justifies maintaining such a large
presence on the ground. Given French concerns about
overstretched forces, officials are eager to shift KFOR
troops to other greater needs -- in one recent meeting
implying that resistance to downsizing efforts was coming
more from some bureaucrats at NATO who do not want to reduce
the KFOR presence for institutional reasons. At the same
time, GOF officials are sensitive to our arguments against
"unilateral" recall of troops and your visit can help
reinforce the message that France should engage in extensive
consultations with NATO before any decision is taken. France
shares our concerns about recent violence against EULEX in
Kosovo, but French officials have emphasized the difficulty
of pressuring Belgrade further on Kosovo-related matters
given the need for balance with reinforcing Serbia's EU
orientation. France is deeply unhappy with the Netherlands,
insistent, "shortsighted" position of blocking Serbia,s
Stabilization and Accession Agreement (SAA) absent the arrest
of Radko Mladic.


6. (C/NF) On Bosnia, France is eager to close down the
Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and
transform it into an EU mission headed by the EU Special
Representative (EUSR),based on the BiH government progress.
Although the GOF continues to acknowledge the importance of
Bosnia fulfilling the requirements laid out in the 5 plus 2
agenda, France may seek to avoid a negative Peace and
Implementation Council assessment of Bosnia,s stability and
implementation of Dayton in order to support a quicker
transition to a EUSR. Although receptive to U.S. arguments
against unilateral drawdowns of EUFOR to a training mission,
GOF officials have recently warned us that current deployment
levels are unsustainable and that delays in moving to the
smaller training mission threaten European unity. French
officials view Bosnia as the best model of a transition from
peacekeeping to nation-building, so are anxious to
demonstrate visible progress.


7. (C/NF) On Macedonia, France has been unwilling to
pressure its fellow EU member Greece to show greater
flexibility on the name issue. France is also interested in
sales of military aircraft (Rafale fighters) to Greece, which
makes them even less likely to intervene in this dispute. FM
Kouchner said publicly in 2008 that the burden lies on
Macedonia, as the NATO aspirant, to display more flexibility
than in the past to find a solution. Our concern is that
recent nationalist trends in Macedonia underscore the
importance of reinforcing Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic
orientation and the need for both states to show genuine will
to resolve the issue and bring Macedonia into the NATO family.

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INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION
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8. (S/NF) A constant refrain in our high-level meetings with
French officials is their request for increased intelligence
cooperation, particularly in operational areas such as
Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden. While their requests for
access to "four-eyes" information have been problematic, we
may want to consider addressing French concerns with a more
targeted approach. Our understanding is that the French
objective is twofold: to increase their situational awareness
of opposing forces in the numerous operations that we
undertake together; and to enhance the integration of French

forces and individual staff officers within U.S. commands to
a level that permits greater sharing of "friendly"
operational information. Access to U.S. intelligence,
otherwise reserved for a small group of English-speaking
countries, is only part of their aim. They also seek the
ability to integrate French officers into the staffs of U.S.
commands (i.e. CENTCOM, AFRICOM, EUCOM, NAVCENT, CJTF-101) in
a manner similar to the integration of Australian, Canadian,
and British officers. A top-down effort to review our
bilateral intelligence cooperation, starting at the policy
level with elaboration of their objectives and working
downward toward the details of implementation, could help us
better leverage French cooperation and intelligence capacity
into a closer partnership with the U.S.

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CFE AND NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
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9. (C/NF) French officials at the highest levels are
interested in the Obama administration's proposals to breathe
new life into disarmament and security efforts. Last year,
President Sarkozy launched a proposal for an OSCE summit
meeting to discuss a new European security architecture, and
he remains very committed to the idea. French officials
argue that the summit proposal, which was developed on the
margins of the EU-Russia summit last year without input from
allies, was a necessary response to the original proposal by
Russian President Medvedev for a meeting among Europeans to
discuss security cooperation. By anchoring the discussion
within the OSCE, the French intent was to safeguard existing
institutions and the importance of the transatlantic
relationship in European security, while still acknowledging
room for progress in other security instruments, such as CFE.
Paris strongly supported the Parallel Actions Package
pursued since July 2007 to help overcome the impasse on the
A/CFE treaty. However, Russia's failure to implement the
"Istanbul Commitments" of 1999 remains the key stumbling
block, compounded now by its suspension of its treaty
obligations for 16 months and its occupation of Abkhaz and
South Ossetian parts of Georgia. French officials are
interested whether recent overtures to Russia, such as
President Obama's announcement in Prague of plans to complete
a new START treaty, are expected to positively impact
security cooperation in other areas.

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NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND TRANSFORMATION
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10. (S/NF) Now that the formal debate over French
reintegration into NATO has been concluded, French officials
are focusing on the next steps in NATO -- including filling
the command posts in the Allied Command Transformation in
Norfolk and the regional Lisbon command. The French military
is expecting to increase its participation in NATO structures
tenfold, including contributing an extra 20 million euros per
year to the NATO budget and augmenting their presence by some
1000 additional staff. Rumors have floated (most appear to
originate from internet sources) of possible French interest
in transferring the Norfolk command to French territory. To
date, no French official has raised this possibility with
post. French support for NATO SYG-designate Rasmussen is
high and they hope he will lead the continued reform of NATO
into a more stream-lined, less bureaucratic, and more
flexible alliance.

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MISSILE DEFENSE
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11. (C/NF) GOF officials are looking forward to hearing the
Obama administration's plans for missile defense. In the
past, Paris supported bilateral U.S. efforts to conclude
missile defense agreements with Poland and the Czech
Republic, but was reluctant to extend the system to all NATO
members, largely on cost concerns. France remains
concentrated on its internal military restructuring reforms,
laid out in the White Paper published last year and now
incorporated into a draft budgetary law for 2009-2015. That
plan did not envisage a large cost outlay for missile defense
and the frequent refrain that there is "not one euro"
allocated to pay for missile defense is not expected to

change in the current French budgetary environment. That
said, Paris remains interested in our plans and technology
development and continues to evaluate the need for missile
defense as we do, through the lens of concerns over Iranian
proliferation.

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DPRK
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12. (S/NF) In general, GOF officials strongly support U.S.
non-proliferation initiatives, including using the Six-Party
framework to hold North Korea to its commitment to verifiably
eliminate all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs. The April 5 DPRK missile test and expulsion of
IAEA inspectors and the U.S. disablement team were equally
worrisome to Paris, which supported the UN Security
Council,s Presidential Statement condemning the launch and
subsequent agreement by the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee to
designate additional banned weapons-related goods and to
designate entities for an asset freeze.

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COMMENT
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13. (C/NF) The fact that the new administration is willing
to continue the bilateral political-military discussions
launched last year is an important signal to Paris that
France is a valued partner with a global reach. Although the
current budgetary environment and military constraints may
limit France's willingness to commit to resource-heavy
initiatives in the short-term, GOF officials are able to take
the hard political decisions when necessary. We saw this
last year when President Sarkozy chose to deploy a French
OMLT with Dutch troops in Uruzgan, despite the dire warnings
against such a move based on military and force protection
concerns. This year, the Elysee is working quietly to try to
move French troops based in Kabul doing security operations
to a more critical combat role in RC-East, while still
balancing previous political commitments. The French want to
be major players and your interlocutors on Thursday are
pragmatic and results-oriented. We look forward to seeing
you later this week.
PEKALA