Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PARIS553
2009-04-23 14:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
TOGO: FRENCH LACK INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE COUP
how-toVZCZCXRO7471 PP RUEHPA DE RUEHFR #0553 1131459 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 231459Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6069 INFO RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 1254 RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1699 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 2572 RHMFIUU/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000553
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR KDEM TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: FRENCH LACK INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE COUP
ATTEMPT
REF: A. LOME 115
B. LOME 119
C. LOME 120
D. LOME 126
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Greg D'Elia, 1.4 (b/d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000553
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR KDEM TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: FRENCH LACK INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE COUP
ATTEMPT
REF: A. LOME 115
B. LOME 119
C. LOME 120
D. LOME 126
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Greg D'Elia, 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: France shares the USG's uncertainty about
the nature of the action Togo President Faure Gnassingbe took
on April 12 against his half-brother Kpatcha Gnassingbe, MFA
Togo desk officer Daniel Westerink said on April 22. The
Faure-Kpatcha face-off has not changed GOF policy towards
Togo, which remains focused on ensuring the 2010 presidential
election is as free, fair, and transparent as possible.
Westerink was not confident that UFC opposition leader
Gilchrist Olimpio would run a successful presidential
campaign in 2010. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) We met with Daniel Westerink, MFA desk officer for
Togo, on April 22 to discuss President Faure Gnassingbe's
arrest of his half-brother Kpatcha (reftels). Westerink
immediately asked about Kpatcha's attempt to find sanctuary
at the U.S. Embassy in Lome; drawing from ref C, we briefed
Westerink on what transpired when Kpatcha arrived at the
Embassy.
3. (C) Westerink continued that the GOF had no special
insight on what Kpatcha's arrest meant. Westerink was aware
of the many coup rumors floating in Togo, but he said it was
not clear whether Kpatcha was about to execute a coup against
Faure and that Faure stopped him in a timely fashion, or
whether Faure decided that this was a good moment to
incapacitate a long-time rival. Westerink speculated Faure
could also have been looking ahead to the 2010 elections, and
sought to remove a potential rival candidate. While he may
have taken Kpatcha out of the electoral picture, Faure risked
alienating hard-line RPT members who viewed Kpatcha, rather
than Faure, as a more suitable successor to Eyadema.
Westerink noted that the GOT arrested about 20 of Kpatcha's
associates following Kpatcha's arrest.
4. (C) Westerink said that today's anti-coup climate in
Africa, with heightened sensitivities because of recent
irregular transfers of power in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Mauritania, and Madagascar, provided Faure with a bit of
cover. Given the widespread condemnation for recent coups in
Africa, it would be difficult to criticize the democratically
elected Faure when he took action against another potential
coup leader.
5. (C) Faure's arrest of Kpatcha would not, Westerink said,
change France's policies towards Togo, unless some new or
dramatic piece of information came to light. Westerink said
that France's priority was to help Togo achieve free, fair,
and transparent elections in 2010. The 2007 legislative
elections had been reasonably successful and France hoped
that the 2010 presidentials would follow suit.
6. (C) Westerink said that Faure had been cultivating the
military for several months by providing sacks of rice and
other small but meaningful benefits. This had been a
favorite tactic of Kpatcha when he had been Defense Minister
as a way to build support among the military. Faure had now
clearly adopted this method, which he had been using for the
past couple of years, Westerink said.
7. (C) Westerink did not express much confidence in
Gilchrist Olimpio and the 2010 presidential elections, in
which he believed without doubt that Olimpio would be a
candidate. Olimpio's UFC had taken seats in Togo's
legislature following the 2007 elections (even though,
because of clever GOT gerrymandering, the number of UFC seats
was not proportional to its percentage of the popular vote),
but Olimpio still refused any "lesser" ministerial posts.
Westerink regretted that Olimpio never seemed interested in
compromising or accepting small gains that might lead to
larger ones. "His all-or-nothing approach has often been
counterproductive," Westerink remarked. Westerink believed
that Faure would encourage as many opposition candidates as
possible so as to dilute Olimpio's prospects. At the same
time, Kpatcha's elimination would serve to protect Faure's
right flank, Westerink observed, with any disaffected Kpatcha
supporters more likely to vote for Faure than for Olimpio or
any of the other opposition candidates.
PEKALA
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR KDEM TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: FRENCH LACK INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE COUP
ATTEMPT
REF: A. LOME 115
B. LOME 119
C. LOME 120
D. LOME 126
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Greg D'Elia, 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: France shares the USG's uncertainty about
the nature of the action Togo President Faure Gnassingbe took
on April 12 against his half-brother Kpatcha Gnassingbe, MFA
Togo desk officer Daniel Westerink said on April 22. The
Faure-Kpatcha face-off has not changed GOF policy towards
Togo, which remains focused on ensuring the 2010 presidential
election is as free, fair, and transparent as possible.
Westerink was not confident that UFC opposition leader
Gilchrist Olimpio would run a successful presidential
campaign in 2010. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) We met with Daniel Westerink, MFA desk officer for
Togo, on April 22 to discuss President Faure Gnassingbe's
arrest of his half-brother Kpatcha (reftels). Westerink
immediately asked about Kpatcha's attempt to find sanctuary
at the U.S. Embassy in Lome; drawing from ref C, we briefed
Westerink on what transpired when Kpatcha arrived at the
Embassy.
3. (C) Westerink continued that the GOF had no special
insight on what Kpatcha's arrest meant. Westerink was aware
of the many coup rumors floating in Togo, but he said it was
not clear whether Kpatcha was about to execute a coup against
Faure and that Faure stopped him in a timely fashion, or
whether Faure decided that this was a good moment to
incapacitate a long-time rival. Westerink speculated Faure
could also have been looking ahead to the 2010 elections, and
sought to remove a potential rival candidate. While he may
have taken Kpatcha out of the electoral picture, Faure risked
alienating hard-line RPT members who viewed Kpatcha, rather
than Faure, as a more suitable successor to Eyadema.
Westerink noted that the GOT arrested about 20 of Kpatcha's
associates following Kpatcha's arrest.
4. (C) Westerink said that today's anti-coup climate in
Africa, with heightened sensitivities because of recent
irregular transfers of power in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Mauritania, and Madagascar, provided Faure with a bit of
cover. Given the widespread condemnation for recent coups in
Africa, it would be difficult to criticize the democratically
elected Faure when he took action against another potential
coup leader.
5. (C) Faure's arrest of Kpatcha would not, Westerink said,
change France's policies towards Togo, unless some new or
dramatic piece of information came to light. Westerink said
that France's priority was to help Togo achieve free, fair,
and transparent elections in 2010. The 2007 legislative
elections had been reasonably successful and France hoped
that the 2010 presidentials would follow suit.
6. (C) Westerink said that Faure had been cultivating the
military for several months by providing sacks of rice and
other small but meaningful benefits. This had been a
favorite tactic of Kpatcha when he had been Defense Minister
as a way to build support among the military. Faure had now
clearly adopted this method, which he had been using for the
past couple of years, Westerink said.
7. (C) Westerink did not express much confidence in
Gilchrist Olimpio and the 2010 presidential elections, in
which he believed without doubt that Olimpio would be a
candidate. Olimpio's UFC had taken seats in Togo's
legislature following the 2007 elections (even though,
because of clever GOT gerrymandering, the number of UFC seats
was not proportional to its percentage of the popular vote),
but Olimpio still refused any "lesser" ministerial posts.
Westerink regretted that Olimpio never seemed interested in
compromising or accepting small gains that might lead to
larger ones. "His all-or-nothing approach has often been
counterproductive," Westerink remarked. Westerink believed
that Faure would encourage as many opposition candidates as
possible so as to dilute Olimpio's prospects. At the same
time, Kpatcha's elimination would serve to protect Faure's
right flank, Westerink observed, with any disaffected Kpatcha
supporters more likely to vote for Faure than for Olimpio or
any of the other opposition candidates.
PEKALA