Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PARIS505
2009-04-07 10:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

MAURITANIA/MADAGASCAR: FRENCH VIEW ELECTIONS AS

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM FR MR MA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1413
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #0505/01 0971021
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071021Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6002
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1691
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 2569
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000505 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM FR MR MA
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA/MADAGASCAR: FRENCH VIEW ELECTIONS AS
THE WAY OUT

REF: A. PARIS 504

B. PARIS 483

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone, 1.4 (b/
d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000505

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM FR MR MA
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA/MADAGASCAR: FRENCH VIEW ELECTIONS AS
THE WAY OUT

REF: A. PARIS 504

B. PARIS 483

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone, 1.4 (b/
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Elections in Mauritania and Madagascar
could be the way to end the political impasses in both
countries, Presidential Deputy Diplomatic Advisor Bruno
Joubert said on April 3. He added that in both places, those
who organize the elections should not be candidates and those
who are candidates should not be the organizers. Joubert
acknowledged that French and U.S. approaches might diverge in
what remain fluid situations; he emphasized his keen interest
in consultations in the U.S. April 14-15. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) PolMinCouns on April 3 called on Bruno Joubert,
President Sarkozy's deputy diplomatic advisor and his lead
advisor on Africa, for a readout of Sarkozy's March 26-27
visits to DRC, ROC, and Niger (reported ref A). Joubert said
that he looked forward to consultations in the U.S. during
his planned April 14-15 visit, during which he hoped to meet
with AF A/S-Designate Carson, NSC AF Senior Director Gavin,
and UN PermRep Rice, among others. Following his briefing on
Sarkozy's trip, we asked Joubert to explain French policy on
Mauritania and Madagascar, noting that there seemed to be
some change in France's position concerning both. Joubert
acknowledged that French policy was evolving.

Mauritania
--------------


3. (C) Joubert said that as time passed, the situation in
Mauritania was worsening and not improving (see ref B for MFA
DAS-equivalent Christine Fages's comments in a similar vein).
The Sahel security issue, by which he meant the threat posed
by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, was an increasing concern
. He described the situation as a "morass," with opposition
leader Ahmed Ould Daddah "no better" than junta leader Aziz.
Deposed President Abadallahi wanted support but was doing
very little to move the process along. The political impasse
risked increased social tension and a possible fracturing of
society, he asserted. Joubert said that France had tried to
"steer events" in the right direction. The international
community needed to find an "acceptable way out." One such
scenario could involve elections, to be organized by someone
other than Aziz, such as the President of Mauritania's
Senate. Aziz would have no role in organizing the elections
or in governing, as he would have to resign in order to run
for office. Joubert said that France had asked Aziz to think
about such a scenario. Joubert indicated that France could
accept a postponement in the date of the elections if there
were some assurance that they would be held along the lines
he described.


4. (C) Joubert acknowledged that this scenario was "not
perfect" but that it offered a possibly acceptable solution
to break the impasse and return Mauritania to some semblance
of normality. If such a scenario were not implemented, Aziz
would continue in power anyway but become increasingly
isolated, which would have negative effects on Mauritania
itself and on the region as a whole.

Madagascar
--------------


5. (C) Joubert said that, while France officially viewed
Rajoelina's seizure of power as a "coup" and deplored the way
power was transferred, there was some justification in
viewing events as a "popular revolution" rather than as a
"coup" and that this "revolution" was more directed at
ousting deposed President Ravalomanana than in hoisting
Rajoelina into power. Rajoelina had indicated an intention
to hold elections "within two years," and France had already
said that this period was too long. (NOTE: Recent press
reports indicate Rajoelina has announced October 2010 as the
date for elections. END NOTE.) Joubert said that France had
told Rajoelina that he faced a choice: either to stand for
election but then have no role in organizing the elections or
else organize the elections but then not run. Joubert
indicated that the choice was similar to the one France had
placed before Aziz -- either organize elections or run for
office, but not do both.

Working with U.S.
--------------


6. (C) Joubert said that the GOF valued highly its dialogue
with the U.S. on these and other AF topics. He indicated

PARIS 00000505 002 OF 002


that the policies he had described toward Mauritania and
Madagascar might not align exactly with U.S. policy, but he
said that movement in our approaches was necessary to break
the impasses in both cases. He said he hoped to discuss
these and other issues in the U.S. when he travels there
April 14-15 for consultations with USG officials.

PEKALA