MADAGASCAR/COMOROS/ZIMBABWE: FRANCE TAKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000303

SIPDIS

ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/2/2019
TAGS: PREL PINS PHUM MA CN ZI FR
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR/COMOROS/ZIMBABWE: FRANCE TAKING
LOW-PROFILE POSITIONS

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor William Jordan, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA AF DAS-equivalent Francois Barateau on
February 27 said that France was taking a low-profile with
respect to Madagascar, Comoros, and Zimbabwe. On Madagascar,
the French are supporting the UN and the international
community's efforts to promote dialogue between President
Ravalomanana and former Antananarivo Mayor Rajoelina, but
have cut back on public statements and believe that
Ravalomanana must address his critics' concerns as part of
any reconciliation process. The French are concerned that
President Sambi's efforts to change the Comoran constitution
and prolong his mandate are potentially destabilizing. The
GOF is refraining from speaking directly to Sambi because of
Comoran sensitivities about France's intruding into Comoran
affairs. The French are consulting with others in the region
and asking that they express shared concerns to Comoran
authorities. Barateau said that France and EU partners were
relieved and encouraged by the formation of a government in
Zimbabwe but would watch attentively for actual changes on
the ground before carrying out any policy changes. END
SUMMARY.

Madagascar


2. (C) MFA AF/S DAS-equivalent Francois Barateau on
February 27 briefed on Madagascar, Comoros, and Zimbabwe.
Barateau had spent several days in Madagascar when the
current crisis arose. He said that the situation there was a
complete tragedy, resulting largely from the personal
animosity and rivalry between President Ravalomanana and
former Antananarivo Mayor Rajoelina, two politicians from the
same business and social milieu whose profiles were quite
similar. Barateau said that he was dismayed when
Ravalomanana failed to continue his talks with Rajoelina
earlier in the week. This did not bode well given the
optimism that had arisen when the two decided to hold
face-to-face talks. Barateau said that he was not sure if
the situation would take a turn for the worse, but he found
no comfort in the ending of the talks.


3. (C) Barateau said that France was trying to maintain a
low-profile in Madagascar, in part because of the way that
both sides tried to exploit phone calls FM Kouchner had made
to Ravalomanana and Rajoelina when the crisis first erupted;
both had tried to claim that Kouchner (and France) supported
one camp over the other. Moreover, Barateau explained, given
France's significant and historical presence in Madagascar,
anything France said or did, especially in times of crisis,
tended to be given more weight than it deserved. Barateau
indicated that France would try to stay out of the public
debate in order not to distract from the need to get the two
sides to resolve their differences, although he said the MFA
would issue a communique from time to time if events
warranted a French comment and if such a comment would help
move things in the right direction.


4. (C) Barateau said that France was fully supportive of UN
efforts to facilitate a resolution of Madagascar's crisis,
including UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon's efforts along with those of
A/UNSYG Menkerios and former Mali FM Tiebile Drame, the UN's
new Senior Mediator. France's priority remained an
agreed-upon political resolution acceptable to both sides.
Barateau stressed, however, that President Ravalomanana, a
flawed president, needed to recognize and address his
critics' concerns as a part of any such political
reconciliation. "In order to really settle this, we think
Ravalomanana needs to make concessions to his critics, who
have rightfully pointed out his mistakes. He cannot simply
expect that everything will go back to the way things were
before the crisis," Barateau remarked.

Comoros


5. (C) France was concerned about Comoran President Sambi's
attempts to revise the constitution and to add one-year to
his four-year mandate, Barateau said. These were potentially
destabilizing developments that risked upsetting the fragile
balance on which the Union of the Comoros depended. Barateau
noted signs that the residents of Moheli might not
participate in the referendum on Sambi's initiatives, an
early indication that Sambi's plan could lead to trouble.


6. (C) Barateau said that France was trying to play a
low-key role in the Comoros with respect to Sambi. He said
that even more so than the Malagasy, Comorans were acutely

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sensitive to any French "involvement" in Comoran affairs and
that sometimes it was best to keep quiet. However, Barateau
said that France was consulting with Comoros's neighbors and
sharing French concerns about Sambi's plans with them, and
asking the neighbors to convey whatever concerns they might
have to the Comoran leadership.


7. (C) Barateau quickly added that the present time was a
very sensitive moment for France and Comoros, given the March
29 vote in Mayotte on whether Mayotte would become a
full-fledged French Overseas Department, a step up from its
status as a "Departmental Collectivity." Barateau was very
direct in saying there should be no ambiguity about this
vote: "Everyone there is French. It's just a question of
what administrative label we put on the island." He had no
doubt that Mayotte would vote for full Overseas Department
status. Barateau conceded that the Mayotte vote was likely
fueling ever-present Comoran suspicions about France's role
in the islands and the alleged French desire to exert undue
influence over the Union via its presence in Mayotte, which
would likely now be strengthened.

Zimbabwe


8. (C) In a brief discussion of Zimbabwe, Barateau said
that France and its EU partners were relieved that at last a
government had been formed in Harare that included Morgan
Tsvangirai and others opposition figures. However, while
encouraging, this was a very fresh development; France and
the EU would monitor the situation very carefully and would
carry out any policy changes towards Zimbabwe (i.e., in a
warming direction) if and only if there were meaningful
developments on the ground. In the meantime the GOF and
other EU members would remain vigilant for any signs of
backsliding or recalcitrance on Mugabe's part.


PEKALA