Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PARIS260
2009-02-20 13:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH FEEDBACK ON NPT GOALS

Tags:  AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000260 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA
IAEA, NPT, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH FEEDBACK ON NPT GOALS

REF: STATE 06970

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young for reasons 1.4 b and d
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000260

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA
IAEA, NPT, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH FEEDBACK ON NPT GOALS

REF: STATE 06970

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young for reasons 1.4 b and d
.


1. (C) Summary. On February 18, MFA desk officer for
nuclear nonproliferation Celine Jurgensen said France's goal
for the third Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) PrepCom
is concrete progress in all three pillars of the
nonproliferation regime, looking ahead to the 2010 Review
Conference. As today's challenges and expectations are
weighty, France seeks to consolidate the NPT regime and
demonstrate the regime's ability to address issues like the
Iranian crisis and increasing interest in civil nuclear
energy. Jurgensen suggested concrete deliverables the U.S.
and France could work towards now for the third PrepCom in
May, such as a P5 statement, and suggested a P3 meeting occur
at the first opportunity. She also said France will prepare
a discussion paper that will serve as a written response to
reftel demarche, most likely in mid-March following
interagency coordination. End Summary.


2. (C) Jurgensen noted that the first two PrepComs were
successful, but many of the biggest challenges have yet to be
addressed. With the Iranian crisis not yet resolved,
producing consensus at the PrepCom will be very difficult.
Expectations for the 2010 Review Conference are even more
difficult to calibrate today given uncertainty in two major
issues, the Iranian crisis and the U.S.-Russia strategic
relationship. Jurgensen stated that the French are very
interested in the positive signals sent so far by Secretary
Clinton regarding a post-START arrangement, possible
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification, and
pursuance of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).


3. (C) Jurgensen said in order to strengthen the

nonproliferation regime, all three pillars must be addressed
with concrete building blocks. She said France's goal is to
be as pragmatic as possible to move beyond mere good
intentions; to do so will require advance consensus with key
allies on shared priorities for deliverables. On the
nonproliferation pillar, in addition to Iran, consequences
for noncompliance and withdrawal must be addressed,
especially on civilian nuclear cooperation. France will
continue to promote the EU's proposal from the first PrepCom,
in keeping with the EU's strategy document "New Lines for EU
Actions to Combat Proliferation" endorsed in December 2008.
Regarding peaceful uses of nuclear technology, France's goal
is to ensure that developing countries' interest in civil
nuclear energy is carried out in the best conditions for
nonproliferation, safety and security. She cited as an
example the NTI/IAEA fuel bank initiative to which the EU has
agreed to contribute "up to 25 million euros." On the
disarmament pillar, Jurgensen cited two key priorities, the
CTBT, to which she said the U.S. could make a major progress
by ratification, and opening negotiations on an FMCT. She
said France also sees post-START negotiations as key, and
would welcome any ongoing commentaries or reflections from us
on their status. Jurgensen also pointed to the EU's action
plan and the letter President Sarkozy sent to Ban Ki-Moon
during the French EU Presidency.


4. (C) Jurgensen suggested a few concrete ways the U.S. and
France could begin closer coordination. She noted a French
proposal presented at the first and second PrepComs that the
U.S. did not cosponsor, largely due to time restrictions.
France would still like to promote this proposal, and would
greatly appreciate U.S. co-sponsorship (she noted the UK
signed on at the time as a cosponsor). Second, Jurgensen
said even a short P5 declaration at the next PrepCom would
send a strong positive signal about the NPT regime's strength
even in the face of the Iran crisis. As an example, simply
confirming the intention of the U.S. and Russia to work on
post-START negotiations, with support from the other members,
would be useful, or announcing a conference on transparency,
verification and confidence-building measures per the UK's
standing proposal for the September 2009 timeframe.
Jurgensen noted that she has had no updates from the UK on
Russian or Chinese responses to their conference proposal,
but said that if the conference occurs, it should be
announced by the P5 as a show of unity. Any such declaration
would first need to be discussed among the P3, of course, and
Jurgensen said France would support a P3 meeting at the first
opportunity. Finally, she noted that ideally a more
substantive joint P5 declaration could be developed for the
2010 Review Conference.

PEKALA