GABON: PRESIDENT ALI BONGO'S VISIT TO FRANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001610

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV SENV GB FR
SUBJECT: GABON: PRESIDENT ALI BONGO'S VISIT TO FRANCE
(NOVEMBER 18-20)

REF: A. LIBREVILLE 467

B. YAOUNDE 961

PARIS 00001610 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Ali Bongo of Gabon enjoyed a
successful visit to France November 18-20, according to MFA
DAS-equivalent Stephane Gruenberg. The visit marked for both
sides Bongo's assumption of the presidency and his initial
steps to develop his own identity as national leader apart
from that of his father. Bongo met with a bevy of French
leaders, the high point being his lunch with President
Sarkozy on November 20. Bongo also reportedly discussed more
sensitive subjects such as the Gabon-France defense
agreement, good governance, the BEAC financial scandal (he
has proposed a new leader for BEAC) and Sarkozy's idea to
have a meeting in Paris among Gulf of Guinea/Congo Basin
states (tentatively scheduled for December 16) prior to the
Copenhagen conference on environmental matters. Gruenberg
said that while there would always likely be an element of
anti-French sentiment within the Gabonese public, he said
that such sentiment had cooled considerably since the
anti-French violence that took place during the August 30
presidential election. In sum, Bongo made a positive
impression on the French, with both sides indicating a
willingness to maintain the so-called "privileged
partnership" which has formed the basis of bilateral
relations since independence. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent Stephane Gruenberg on November 27
briefed on Gabonese President Ali Bongo's visit to Paris the
previous week. The visit had been relatively hastily
planned, he asserted, with Bongo visiting Paris after stops
at the FAO in Rome and in London. The highlight of the visit
was Bongo's November 20 lunch with President Sarkozy. He
also had separate meetings with PM Francois Fillon, Finance
Minister Christine Lagarde, Interior Minister Brice
Hortefeux, Environment and Sustainable Development Minister
Jean-Louis Borloo, State Secretary for Cooperation and
Francophonie Alain Joyandet, and the CEO of oil company
Total, among others. (NOTE: Bongo thus saw virtually
everybody worth seeing at the high end of the GOF, with the
exception of Defense Minister Herve Morin. END NOTE.)

"Privileged Partnership"
--------------

3. (C) Gruenberg acknowledged that Bongo's visit amounted
to a "coming out party" of sorts, with the overall aim of the
visit to clarify the direction Gabon would take under Ali
Bongo's leadership. Gruenberg said that both sides
understood that, because of Omar Bongo's long tenure in
office and the elder statesman's status and influence that
went with it, Gabon had "punched above its weight" for much
of Omar Bongo's presidency. The French and Gabonese
understood that Ali Bongo could not expect at the outset to
match his father's influence. Gruenberg said that the French
assured Bongo that France would continue to be a supportive
partner and that Gabon would continue to enjoy a "privileged
partnership" status with France. When French leaders,
including especially Sarkozy, made this clear to Bongo, he
had in effect gotten from France what he had come here to
obtain, Gruenberg suggested.

Key Issues
--------------

4. (C) DEFENSE AGREEMENT: Besides being personally
accepted by France's leadership, Bongo also discussed a
number of important substantive issues with the French,
Gruenberg stressed. First among these was the Gabon-France
defense agreement. (NOTE: Sarkozy's intention to revise
France's Africa policy involves renegotiating defense
agreements with eight African countries, including Gabon.
The agreements, products of the immediate post-independence
period, are deemed to be obsolete, as some of them contain
provisions that would allow, for example, one of the partner
countries to ask France to send security forces to maintain
internal security, something the France would not want to do
today. END NOTE.) Gruenberg said that the renegotiation
with Gabon was going smoothly, with a new accord likely to be
signed early in 2010. Without going into detail, Gruenberg
said that the agreement would focus on training and
professionalization programs the French would provide to
Gabon's military. Gruenberg did not mention the long-term
status of France's present military base in Gabon.


5. (C) GOOD GOVERNANCE: Bongo also discussed with the
French a range of good governance issues (a point the French
were keen to discuss with him). He made a commitment to

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improve governance and curtail corruption in Gabon.
Gruenberg found this commitment interesting because in
raising governance issues and acknowledging a range of
governance problems, Bongo was implicitly criticizing his
father and the way he ran things. As part of his reform
plans, Bongo said that Gabon would adopt policies for a more
rational exploitation of its natural resources and for
improving Gabon's infrastructure. Bongo asked France for its
support in helping him reform Gabon in these sectors;
Gruenberg said that France would support him, indicating that
French support could well consist of technical assistance.


6. (C) BEAC: Bongo discussed with the French the BEAC
(Central Bank of Central African States) banking scandal,
involving large-scale corruption and embezzlement by a number
of figures (reftels). Bongo stressed to the French that he
had taken decisive action by recalling the former BEAC head
in October and proposing new leadership when the dimensions
of the case became apparent. The French appreciated his
response but Gruenberg commented that Bongo had little choice
but to act as he did, given the circumstances. Gruenberg
said the case arose from a series of bad investments and then
the conversion of a significant amount of money, including
by, apparently, BEAC's Paris office. The French were
conducting a law enforcement investigation and Gruenberg
predicted that indictments (including probably against French
citizens) would eventually result. He noted that one
sensitive aspect of the case centered on the fact that the
head of the BEAC has traditionally been Gabonese, something
that Gabon's neighbors (particularly Equatorial Guinea)
increasingly resent. Gruenberg had the impression that the
fact that the bank has traditionally had a Gabonese in charge
put Bongo in a position where he had to respond, and he did
so.


7. (C) PRE-COPENHAGEN MEETING: Sarkozy raised with Bongo
his idea of holding a meeting prior to the upcoming
Copenhagen conference on environmental issues that would
include the Gulf of Guinea/Congo Basin states and possibly
Brazil. Sarkozy hoped to develop a shared view of
environmental issues, especially forestry issues, with the
states of the region, prior to the Copenhagen meeting. The
Paris meeting was tentatively scheduled for December 16 and
the invitations were in the process of being sent. Gruenberg
said that the invitations would be extended to member states
drawn from COMIFAC (Commission for the Forests of Central
Africa),the regional organization devoted to forestry issues
(http://www.comifac.org). Gruenberg was not sure whether all
of COMIFAC's member states would be invited or whether all
would be interested -- he noted that Chad, for example, might
not view forestry issues important enough to attend. Bongo,
in any case, expressed his support to Sarkozy for the meeting.

Anti-French Sentiment in Gabon
--------------

8. (C) Gruenberg downplayed the notion that anti-French
sentiment in Gabon would have a major effect on relations.
He noted that the anti-French demonstrations and vandalism at
the time of Bongo's election did not involve a large number
of Gabonese. A good number of the demonstrators were
professional hooligans ("casseurs") always looking for
excuses to loot and provoke violence. That said, Gruenberg
acknowledged that some Gabonese believed that French
influence in Gabon was excessive and that Ali Bongo was
"France's man." However, he noted that if the opposition had
been united, Bongo might well have lost the election.
Gruenberg added that a recent cause of Gabonese ire against
France centered on visas and the difficulties young Gabonese,
especially, had in obtaining them. This contributed to the
lingering ill-will directed at France, in Gruenberg's view.

"He's Ready"
--------------

9. (C) Summing up, Gruenberg said that Ali Bongo made a
favorable impression. He knew his subjects, signaled a
willingness to break, at least partially, with the past, and
was beginning to demonstrate leadership qualities. He
observed that one could always hope for a "more nearly
perfect" leader, and that it was too early to say how Bongo
would evolve, but for now, Gruenberg concluded, "he's ready
to be President of Gabon."



RIVKIN