CHAD/C.A.R.: FRENCH BELIEVE INSECURITY RISING IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001592

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2019
TAGS: PREL PINS PINR KDEM CD CT FR
SUBJECT: CHAD/C.A.R.: FRENCH BELIEVE INSECURITY RISING IN
EASTERN BORDER AREAS, CONSIDER MINURCAT WEAK

REF: A. PARIS 1554

B. BANGUI 256

Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA Chad/C.A.R. desk officer Vincent
Alexandre, just returned from a week in Chad, told us on
November 25 that insecurity seemed to be rising in eastern
Chad and eastern C.A.R. He said that MINURCAT was much less
effective than it could be and was operating with serious
manpower and materiel deficiencies. In contrast, he said the
political situation in Chad was improving. Alexandre thought
that the C.A.R. should be encouraged to hold elections on
schedule in March/April 2010 and he thought former President
Ange Felix Patasse's return would only help President
Francois Bozize, by weakening Bozize's main rival, Martin
Ziguele. END SUMMARY.

Insecurity in Chad and the C.A.R.
--------------

2. (C) MFA Chad/C.A.R. desk officer Vincent Alexandre on
November 25 shared his impressions of Chad, from which he had
just returned after a week's visit. Alexandre said he was
troubled by the growing insecurity in the eastern border
regions of Chad and also the C.A.R. He acknowledged that
there was always a rise in banditry and general insecurity at
the onset of the dry season, but he said that the rise this
year seemed particularly bothersome. He noted the recent
seizures of NGO workers in Chad and in the C.A.R. He said
that both kidnappings seemed to be motivated by money and not
ideology, and said that dealing with hostage-takers seeking
ransoms would be easier than dealing with ideologues, He
said, however, that there had been no firm contact yet with
the kidnappers and he was thus uncertain as to how the cases
would proceed. He indicated that the GOF had put into motion
its various assets in the region to find and effect the
release of the hostages. He added that the kidnappers
operating in the C.A.R. when they carried out the kidnapping
had apparently gone to Sudan, where they were believed to be
based.

MINURCAT Not Effective
--------------

3. (C) Alexandre (who is a French Army Lieutenant Colonel
on detail to the MFA) was equally troubled by MINURCAT's
shortcomings. He believed that the operation was not being
well run or well supported. He said that it was manned only
at 52 percent of its authorized strength and further
cautioned that this figure was deceiving, for the rear area
headquarters and other rear area support units tended to be
more fully staffed than the units actually in the field. One
Ghanaian unit, for example, was at 25 percent of its
authorized strength and did not have enough vehicles to
venture out from its base. A Nepalese unit, intended to
serve as MINURCAT's rapid reaction force, had severe
ammunition shortages, making it incapable of carrying out its
intended function.


4. (C) Alexandre said that MINURCAT, moreover, was being
deployed in an overly cautious manner. Force protection was
too large a concern, and the forces deployed were not being
used creatively. The forces in the field were too rigid in
performing only escort functions; MINURCAT was capable of
doing much more in the way of patrolling and demonstrating a
presence, which would have a deterrent effect. In
Alexandre's view, MINURCAT's static and passive presence was
causing it to lose credibility. He hoped that all of this
would be taken into account when the UNSC considered renewing
its mandate in January 2010. Alexandre said that MINURCAT's
predecessor, EUFOR, which was widely criticized during its
tenure, was now considered by locals a model, in comparison
with MINURCAT.

Political Situation in Chad Improving
--------------

5. (C) MINURCAT's ineffective performance was unfortunate,
Alexandre believed, because the political situation within
Chad was improving. He was impressed by the apparent
cooperative attitude between government and opposition that
he witnessed, both in N'Djamena and in communities relatively
far from the capital. He attended several town-hall style
meetings where he observed that the opposition and government
representatives were able to discuss issues in a constructive
manner, rather than use such occasions to vilify each other.
Alexandre cautioned that democracy in Chad had a long way to
go but that there at least appeared to be these signs of
positive movement.

Chad-Sudan

PARIS 00001592 002 OF 002


--------------

6. (C) Alexandre said that Chad-Sudan rapprochement was
subject to fits and starts. There was movement, however,
which was encouraging, centered around Sudan Presidential
Advisor Ghazi Salaheddin's visit to Chad. (NOTE: Ghazi has
also recently visited Paris, ref A.) Alexandre said that in
Chad, Ghazi had indicated to the GOC that Sudan would get
Chadian rebels, ensconced on the Sudan side of the Chad-Sudan
border, to move eastward and away from Chad. Alexandre said
that this had not yet taken place, with Chad therefore
unwilling to send its own delegation to Khartoum to
reciprocate Ghazi's visit. Alexandre said that this sort of
obstacle did not surprise him and he recalled the many false
starts towards "normalization" that both sides had undertaken
in the past. Still, he was encouraged that Ghazi's visit to
N'Djamena provided a chance for the two sides to work
together. He hoped they would both take advantage of this
opportunity.

C.A.R.
--------------

7. (C) Although he did not visit the C.A.R. during his
travels, Alexandre said he was keeping a close eye on events
there, in part because of the recent kidnapping. He noted
the return of former President Patasse and, reflecting
thoughts similar to those expressed in ref B, acknowledged
that it was not completely clear why Patasse went back and
why Bozize allowed him to return without hassle. He
speculated that for reasons of ego Patasse probably grew
tired of exile in Togo and wanted to return to the world
stage. Alexandre also thought that Patasse, concerned about
possible ICC prosecution, thought he would be safer in the
C.A.R. than in a foreign land. In any case, Alexandre
thought that Patasse's presence would likely help Bozize,
because Patasse and the other leading opposition figure,
Martin Ziguele, hailed from the same general area in
northwest C.A.R. and would probably split the vote there,
affording Bozize a larger margin.


8. (C) On the elections, scheduled for March/April 2010,
Alexandre said that France firmly wanted them to go forward.
A delay would be bad, and as Cote d'Ivoire had demonstrated,
one delay made a second (and third, and fourth . . .) easier.
Of course the elections had to be acceptable, but Alexandre
said that it would not be wise to insist on "perfect
elections" ("impossible anyway") that would lead to an
endless cycle of delays. It would be better to hold
elections on time provided they were "respectable at best and
acceptable at worst" than to await something more nearly
perfect.


RIVKIN