Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PARIS1418
2009-10-21 16:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH NSA ON AF/PAK, CLIMATE CHANGE, EUROPEAN

Tags:  PREL EAID KCFE KGHG KMFO NATO AF PK CN RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHFR #1418/01 2941623
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211623Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7388
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0106
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2125
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0611
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1306
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1053
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0914
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0293
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 3272
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001418 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PREL EAID KCFE KGHG KMFO NATO AF PK CN RS
IS, KN, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH NSA ON AF/PAK, CLIMATE CHANGE, EUROPEAN
SECURITY, GOLDSTONE, AND MORE

REF: A. NATO 453

B. STATE 108183

Classified By: Ambassador Charles H. Rivkin, Reasons 1.4(b),(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001418

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PREL EAID KCFE KGHG KMFO NATO AF PK CN RS
IS, KN, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH NSA ON AF/PAK, CLIMATE CHANGE, EUROPEAN
SECURITY, GOLDSTONE, AND MORE

REF: A. NATO 453

B. STATE 108183

Classified By: Ambassador Charles H. Rivkin, Reasons 1.4(b),(d).

1.(C/NF) SUMMARY: In an October 21 meeting with Ambassador
Rivkin, Diplomatic Counselor to the President
(NSA-equivalent) Jean-David Levitte clarified GOF policy on a
number of key issues. Discussing next steps in Afghanistan's
political drama, Levitte also framed GOF opposition to
funding the NATO AWACS (ref a) as based on an assessment that
limited resources could be better used for other equipment.
He also undertook to try to hasten French aid to Pakistan
(ref b). On climate change, Levitte said France is anxious
to work with the United States to help bring the U.S. and
European positions closer together, and believes that an
interim summit could serve to bring major players together in
advance of Copenhagen. Levitte provided the clearest
explanation yet of evolving French thinking on how to use an
OSCE summit to engage the Russians on European security by
tying it to the Corfu process and the U.S. "reset" policy.
He also put the GOF's non-vote on the Goldstone report in the
context of French and UK efforts to encourage the Israelis to
set up their own credible investigation. Levitte said he had
spoken earlier in the day with NSA Jim Jones about the Vienna
talks with Iran and expressed optimism about the outcome.
Levitte also addressed the future of the French MFO air asset
in the Sinai and the mission of the new special envoy to
North Korea, Jack Lang.

--------------
IRAN
--------------


2. (C/NF) Levitte opened the conversation by saying he had
earlier that day spoken with NSA Jones about the Vienna talks
with Iran. He was comfortable that we had a common position
and was modestly hopeful about the outcome.

--------------

AFGHANISTAN: ELECTIONS AND AWACS
--------------


3. (C/NF) Remarking that Afghans "took to politics quickly,"
Levitte described Karzai's acceptance of a second electoral
round as a difficult situation well managed by international
players. He emphasized SFRC Chairman Kerry's role - bringing
in the French and UK ambassadors - in pushing Karzai on the
issue. Levitte said a deal on a unity government with
Abdullah was still possible, but that Abdullah was driving a
hard bargain. Asked about the French vote against using
common NATO funding for the deployment of an AWACS for use in
Afghanistan (ref a),Levitte argued that the AWACS seemed to
be a poor use of limited resources. He said when the AWACS
proposal first surfaced, France was reeling from the August
2008 ambush in Uzbin in Afghanistan that left 10 French
troops dead, a disaster Levitte said was intensified in part
by a lack of helicopters to bring reinforcements and to
provide close air cover. Further, the French understanding
was that the AWACS would be used primarily for air traffic
control to make up for weak infrastructure in Afghanistan.
Thus the GOF's opposition at the NATO Senior Resource Board
was based on a conviction that using common funding on the
AWACS would be wasteful as this would not address the most
pressing operational needs.

--------------
AID TO PAKISTAN: NO TIMELINE
--------------


4. (C) Delivering the Secretary's message contained in ref b,
Ambassador Rivkin emphasized the need for France to move
quickly on disbursing the 200 million euros the GOF pledged
at the Tokyo Conference. Levitte responded that, while
President Sarkozy reiterated French support for Pakistan to
President Zardari in New York during UNGA, France was still
just a "junior partner" in Pakistan. When the Ambassador
countered that French pledges for Pakistan were significant
and that the GOF was indeed an important partner, Levitte
acknowledged that it was important to disburse the French

PARIS 00001418 002 OF 004


pledge quickly, although he provided no specific timeline to
do so. (NOTE: Post will follow up with relevant GOF agencies
for more details about plans to disburse aid to Pakistan. END
NOTE.)

--------------
CLIMATE CHANGE: WE WANT TO HELP
--------------


5. (C/NF) Turning to climate change, Ambassador Rivkin asked
for Levitte's reaction to the recent discussion between
Presidents Obama and Sarkozy. Levitte said that the French
want to be of assistance to the United States as we all seek
a way forward. However, he worried that the U.S. was
handicapped by its relatively late start, noting that the
European Council had agreed on an EU position in December

2008. Ultimately, Levitte said, the United States had to
agree to emissions cuts comparable to those agreed by Europe.
However, France was willing to meet the USG half way,
suggesting that, for example, if the United States agreed to
overall emissions cuts of 80% by 2050, the Europeans could
agree to the United States extending to 2030 the reduction
targets which Europe would meet by 2020. Meanwhile, because
the GOF believed it would be difficult for the U.S. Senate to
approve a climate change bill by December, the French were
thinking that the Copenhagen Summit could be used to produce
a detailed but non-legally binding political commitment which
could be translated several months later into a treaty.
Levitte recognized President Obama's reluctance to entertain
an interim summit, but said there is growing support for one
that could be held, for example, on the margins of APEC on
November 15-16, prior to President Obama's trip to China, to
bring together all the major actors in a final pre-Copenhagen
push. According to Levitte, the time was ripe: the Indians
and Russians had indicated an interest and UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon
was actively supporting such a meeting. Levitte also said he
thought the Chinese might be making progress and be more
ready to talk about concrete numbers. He said France had
reason to believe that Chinese President Hu Jintao had two
speech texts before him in New York, one with numbers and one
without. He chose to use the one without numbers after
hearing President Obama's speech. Levitte cautioned that
this needs to be checked out, but, if true, would indicate
that the Chinese too are getting more serious.

-------------- --------------
EUROPEAN SECURITY: WE NEED A SUMMIT TO ENGAGE RUSSIA
-------------- --------------


6. (C/NF) Responding to the Ambassador's request for an
update on French thinking about Russia, Levitte said the
Russians remained unwilling to admit that they could not
maintain a sphere of influence over neighboring states.
Nevertheless, it was critical to engage Russia as a partner
in European security, not an adversary, and Western allies
needed to provide a counterproposal to the suggestions the
Russians made in 2008. The OSCE is the perfect forum for
such engagement, since it brings together not only European
and North American allies with Russia, but also includes
Central Asian states and non-NATO ally Russian neighbors such
as Ukraine and Georgia. Additionally, unlike NATO, the OSCE
is designed to deal with non-military aspects of security,
including democracy and human rights, as called for in the
Helsinki Final Act. An OSCE summit, perhaps at Vienna
following the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, would allow the
West to set the agenda for European security discussions, and
could include consensual topics, such as counterterrorism and
counternarcotics. Deputy Diplomatic Counselor Damien Loras
elaborated, saying an OSCE summit would also allow Western
allies to put frozen conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh and
Transnistria on the table, together with the Treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe. Further, such a summit would
fit well with the Obama administration's "reset" policy with
Russia. In an attempt to calm concerns about President
Sarkozy's public suggestion of an OSCE summit during his
recent visit to Kazakhstan, Levitte clarified that Kazakhstan
would not be an appropriate host, but that close links
between the Kazakh leadership and Medvedev meant that the
Kazakhs could be useful in encouraging Russian cooperation.


PARIS 00001418 003 OF 004



7. (C/NF) Asked whether the GOF felt the ongoing Corfu
process was insufficient, Levitte stressed that Russia could
not be allowed to slip away from the commitments it made at
the last OSCE summit in 1999, and specifically that the
Russians needed to reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki
Final Act. However, the OSCE ministerial in December would
provide an opportunity to probe further, and if Russia
evinces no political will to engage constructively, then
plans for a summit could be scrapped. Loras added that the
Russians seem to be backing away from the Corfu process and
that it will have largely run its course over the next two to
three months. Instead of letting it fade away, an OSCE
summit could represent an outcome of Corfu.

-------------- -
GOLDSTONE REPORT: WE ARE TRYING TO HELP ISRAEL
-------------- -


8. (C/NF) Levitte said the French decision to not vote on the
resolution on the Goldstone report was the result of a "tough
discussion" with Israeli authorities and was coordinated with
the UK. France's goal was to encourage the GOI to undertake
a credible investigation into the allegations in the report.
Such self-examination should be a source of Israeli pride in
their democratic values, and Levitte likened a potential
Israeli investigation to inquiries carried out by the USG in
the wake of Abu Ghraib and by France on questions related to
the massacre at Srebrenica and the genocide in Rwanda.
Additionally, France hoped to press Israel to allow greater
humanitarian access to Gaza. Levitte said that if Israel had
shown willingness to address these concerns, France would
have voted no. Ambassador Rivkin pointed out that we cannot
simply ignore the Goldstone report, which is all the more
unhelpful given efforts underway to relaunch peace
negotiations. Levitte agreed, and said the French had even
hoped to delay the vote to give the Israelis more time, but
were unsuccessful. In the end, the French decision to not
vote at all allows the GOF to remain in a position to be
helpful to the Israelis in the event the GOI decides to go
ahead with an investigation.

-------------- --------------
SINAI: UNIFIL A BETTER USE OF FRENCH RESOURCES THAN MFO
-------------- --------------


9. (C/NF) Ambassador Rivkin stressed to Levitte the
importance the USG places on France maintaining the plane it
has deployed to the Sinai peninsula as part of the
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). Levitte said the
GOF was looking to save money globally on its military
operations, and added that the French view was that, as the
Sinai peninsula was stable, there was little need to keep the
French plane there. Acknowledging that weapons and drug
smuggling were problems, Levitte said the French plane was
not able to address these issues, and was intended to monitor
troop movements, which France felt was not a pressing
concern. Levitte said France was much more concerned about
sufficiently resourcing its much larger deployment to UNIFIL
in southern Lebanon, where the chances for conflict - and the
need for monitoring resources - were much more significant.
Levitte suggested that another European nation could replace
the French plane in the Sinai, and offered to support the USG
in demarching potential candidates.

--------------
NORTH KOREA: SPECIAL ENVOY WILL COORDINATE
--------------


10. (C/NF) Levitte expressed his thanks for the State
Department's agreement to meetings "at the appropriate level"
in Washington for new French special envoy to North Korea
Jack Lang. He added that Lang's trip to Washington
demonstrated the GOF's commitment to coordinating with the
USG on North Korea, and that the French were not looking to
interfere in negotiations. Admitting that the North Koreans
had still not to his knowledge agreed to a meeting with Lang,
Levitte added that the French were especially interested in
consulting with the United States on how to most usefully
play their one card of diplomatic recognition.


PARIS 00001418 004 OF 004


--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C/NF) Hitting many of the current hot-button issues in
our bilateral relationship in a nearly hour-long meeting with
Ambassador Rivkin, Levitte provided critical context backed
up by the authority of a close relationship with President
Sarkozy. While deploying his considerable diplomatic skills
to deflect criticism on some questions, such as AWACS funding
and France's lack of coordination on the Goldstone vote, he
was able to frame other issues more constructively than other
GOF interlocutors have done recently, including France's
evolving plans for engaging Russia on European security.
RIVKIN