TOGO: AMBASSADOR HAWKINS'S PARIS CONSULTATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001357

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM SNAR PINR TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: AMBASSADOR HAWKINS'S PARIS CONSULTATIONS
(SEPTEMBER 28)

Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: French officials at the MFA, Presidency,
and MOD generally agreed with U.S. Ambassador to Togo
Patricia Hawkins's assessment of the situation in Togo
concerning the importance of the presidential election in
2010, the weakness of the opposition, and the tensions that
might arise from a victory by President Faure Gnassingbe,
which seemed likely. While agreeing that Faure remained in
large measure an enigma, the French said they believe he did
intend to move Togo in a positive direction and that his
political instincts were essentially "moderate" in nature.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Togo Patricia Hawkins on September
28 met, separately, with MFA DAS-equivalent Laurent Bigot,
Presidential AF-advisor Remi Marechaux, and MOD Africa
Specialist Jerome Spinoza. Embassy AF-assistant attended the
Bigot and Marechaux meetings; AF-watcher attended the Spinoza
meeting.

MEETING WITH BIGOT (MFA)
--------------

3. (C) Ambassador Hawkins offered her overview of Togo,
centered on the upcoming presidential election. She noted
the lack of consensus between the government and opposition
on several key issues and the hesitancy of donors to release
election-support funds. Bigot, making the first of several
similar comments from himself and the other GOF
interlocutors, remarked that Faure was a "moderate" but had
to contend with very hard-line elements within the ruling
RPT, including influential ministers Gilbert Bawara and
Pascal Bodjona. Bigot and Ambassador Hawkins agreed that the
opposition had been outmaneuvered (once again) on a number of
election-related issues, such as the composition of the
Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). This
prompted a discussion of the opposition's weaknesses.


4. (C) These weaknesses included an aging and increasingly
out-of-touch leadership (e.g., Gilchrist Olympio),the lack
of a younger generation of leaders in Olympio's UFC party and
in other opposition parties, the sense of expectation that it
was, finally, the opposition's "turn" to hold power and a
consequent lack of tenacity in taking on or challenging the
opposition, and, most important, a failure by the opposition
to state clearly what it would do for Togo and its people
should it ever be voted into office. This lack of a coherent
platform, Ambassador Hawkins stressed at several points, was
the opposition's greatest shortcoming, making it hard for
voters to conclude that they should vote for the opposition.
She noted also the uncertainty that the opposition, lacking
real governing experience, had the skilled personnel that
could actually run a country. Bigot said that he had met
Olympio recently and that he had "no idea of governance,"
choosing instead to see the political struggle as a
continuation of the battle between the Olympio and Gnassingbe
families.


5. (C) Bigot expressed concern that the UFC would not accept
defeat even as the result of a relatively clean election and
he thought that opposition members would reflexively "blame
France," believing that France would naturally have had a
role in ensuring a Gnassingbe victory. Bigot said he was not
optimistic about how the election scenario would play out,
and he said it was important to stress to both sides the need
for both to do their best to hold a proper election.
Ambassador Hawkins observed that if Faure won, he might
remain a prisoner of the hard-line RPT faction; if the
opposition won, it might be incapable of governing and might
seek to avenge past perceived wrongs. Neither scenario boded
well for Togo's future. Togo would become even more
vulnerable to drug trafficking, which was becoming a serious
problem (although Faure, to his credit, recently expelled two
suspected Latin American traffickers),terrorists seeking new
bases, money launderers, and other hallmarks of a failed
state. Togo needed help, but that could prove difficult
following a tainted election. On the other hand, a good
election could lead to renewed support from France and the
EU.

MEETING WITH MARECHAUX (PRESIDENCY)
--------------

6. (C) Ambassador Hawkins's discussion with Presidential
AF-advisor Marechaux was along similar lines, with Ambassador
Hawkins noting the blockage and lack of consensus in Togo
centered on the elections. Marechaux remarked that the GOF
did not have contact with Faure in New York at the UNGA and
that new AF-advisor Andre Parant (replacing Bruno Joubert)
might visit Lome. In discussing Faure's advisors Bawara and

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Bodjona, Marechaux was less willing than Ambassador Hawkins
to put Bawara in the extreme hard-line camp. He said that
French officials had frequent contact with him and that he
was also useful in dealing with the DRC's President Kabila
("we used Bawara a lot"). Bawara was one of Faure's more
worldly advisors. Ambassador Hawkins noted that Bawara had
said that Togo "needed France and Germany but not the U.S."
when Faure was considering whether to attend the POTUS-hosted
lunch for African leaders at the UNGA (which Faure did
attend). Ambassador Hawkins said that corruption in Togo was
a very serious obstacle to Togo's quest to make progress on
MCC issues.


7. (C) Ambassador Hawkins detailed for Marechaux the Kpatcha
affair and Kpatcha's attempt to find refuge in the U.S.
Embassy after Faure moved against him for alleged coup
plotting. Ambassador Hawkins and Marechaux agreed that
several aspects of the coup plot remained unclear, and it was
not certain there was enough evidence to convict the plotters.


8. (C) Turning to Faure, Marechaux offered an assessment
that was more positive than Bigot's, saying that France had
known him "a long time," that Faure knew his dossiers, that
he could answer plausibly questions on where Togo would be in
10 years, and that he could accept defeat. Indicating that
Faure was therefore someone with whom the French could work,
Marechaux said it was "no accident" that Togo was the first
country to have successfully renegotiated its defense
agreement with France, a product of the very early days of
independence. (NOTE: France maintains "defense agreements"
that date to the independence era with eight African
countries and is in the process of renegotiating them to
bring them up to date as part of the Sarkozy Government's
policy of modernizing relations in Africa. The other
agreement that has been formally renegotiated is the one with
Cameroon. END NOTE.)


9. (C) Marechaux commented that the French arrest warrant
against Charles Debbasch, a longtime Gnassingbe advisor and
French legal expert, had been suspended in December 2008 and
that Debbasch was now free to travel to France. (NOTE: The
warrant had been issued after Debbasch fled France following
his conviction on embezzlement charges in connection with his
serving as director of an arts foundation in France. He
decamped to Togo where he enjoyed the protection of the
Gnassingbes. When the warrant was in effect, he was
supposedly subject to arrest if he returned to France. END
NOTE.) Marechaux indicated that the validity of the warrant
lapsed because an arrest of Debbasch had not taken place
during a specified time period.


10. (C) Marechaux agreed with Ambassador Hawkins on the need
to maintain pressure concerning the elections. He said that
the election in Gabon showed that a dynastic clan was not
necessarily invincible -- Ali Bongo won the election but the
opposition nonetheless captured about 60 percent of the vote.
Had the opposition in Gabon been unified, it could have won
there. Marechaux suggested that the opposition in Togo was
in a similar position -- Faure could be outvoted but still
win because of a lack of opposition unity.


11. (C) As Ambassador Hawkins was leaving the Presidency at
the conclusion of the meeting with Marechaux, she encountered
Marechaux's recently reassigned former boss, Bruno Joubert.
In a brief conversation, Joubert said that Faure "seemed to
have Togo on the right track," and repeated the view
expressed by Bigot and Marechaux that Faure was a
well-intentioned moderate. Joubert said that he was
preparing his departure for his next posting as Ambassador to
Morocco, a position he would assume at some point in October.

MEETING WITH SPINOZA (MOD)
--------------

12. (C) Jerome Spinoza, the West Africa analyst at the MOD's
Delegation for Strategic Affairs, admitted that he had not
been following Togo closely and was very interested in
Ambassador Hawkins's assessment of the current challenges to
the country, including the possible destabilizing influence
of drug trafficking (as well as increasing drug usage among
Togo's upper-class youth),and the presence of at least one
radical imam advocating Islamist views. Ambassador Hawkins
also noted some of Faure's successes, including progress on
security sector reform, and increased professionalism in
Togo's military, which has made Togo a better partner in
peacekeeping operations. In Spinoza's view, Faure has
provided a sense of stability in the country, while Burkina
Faso President Blaise Compaore has "played a useful role in
helping Togo move away from violence." In Spinoza's view,
Togo's priority was to find ways to increase income even

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though the country was lacking in natural resources.
Establishing some sort of middle class would help Togo's
stability and viability. He viewed ethnic tension decreasing
as business partnerships and inter-marriage increased among
groups. The fault lines of the future were likely to be
socio-economic, rather than ethnic. Regarding the political
opposition, Spinoza agreed that it was ineffective. Even
worse, Spinoza thought the opposition, broadly, was
comfortable in its role and essentially "shared the cake"
with the government, noting that there were many avenues of
informal dialog and cooperation between the government and
opposition figures.


13. (U) Ambassador Hawkins departed post before this message
was drafted.



RIVKIN