GREAT LAKES; SE WOLPE'S AUGUST 28 CONSULTATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001198

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PINS PINR PHUM ZF RW CG FR
SUBJECT: GREAT LAKES; SE WOLPE'S AUGUST 28 CONSULTATIONS
WITH THE FRENCH

Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: French officials at the Presidency and MFA
were in general agreement with Great Lakes Special Envoy
Howard Wolpe during his August 28 meetings in Paris. The
French agreed on the need to encourage continued cooperation
between the DRC and Rwanda, and between Presidents Kabila and
Kagame personally, and described France's program to promote
small-scale development projects that would tend to bind
those living on both sides of the DRC and Rwandan borders in
an effort to reduce the possibility of renewed conflict.
They indicated a desire to continue working with the U.S. on
the region's problems, with SE Wolpe offering a similar
intention to work together. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Recently appointed Great Lakes Special Envoy
Howard Wolpe met, separately, with officials from the French
Presidency and MFA on August 28. Deputy Diplomatic Advisor
(and chief Africa Advisor) Bruno Joubert and his deputies
Romain Serman and Remi Marechaux hosted the meeting at the
Presidency, with AF-watcher and AF-assistant also attending.
SE Wolpe, along with AF-watcher, met later at the MFA with AF
A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz, GOF Special Envoy Christian
Connan, and other staff.

Meeting at the Presidency
--------------

3. (C) SE Wolpe began the meeting by reviewing his
Africa-related activities since he served in the same
position during the Clinton Administration. He focused on
various training programs that were intended to build trust
and cooperation among various actors in the Great Lakes
region. He believed that some of these activities and
programs were directly relevant to today's challenges. SE
Wolpe described his current mandate as centering on three
priorities. The first focused on political issues, including
the upcoming elections in Burundi and DRC, dealing with the
FDLR and LRA, and working to alleviate gender-based violence.
A second priority was the promotion of cohesion between the
states of the region and the development of a new security
architecture. The third priority was regional economic
integration.


4. (C) The French noted that the UN Security Council, in
mandating MONUC to assist the FARDC in going after the FDLR,
had given MONUC a potentially difficult and undesirable role,
mainly because of the questionable nature of the FARDC, the
possibility of harm to civilians, and the possibility that
MONUC's credibility could be weakened. That said, Joubert
said that the outcome had not been as negative as some had
feared, and he observed that there were few other means for
addressing the FDLR problem. The FARDC was capable of
playing a positive role, despite its well-known shortcomings.
SE Wolpe noted that some analysts had recently commented
that adding 3,000 forces to MONUC would not make much of a
difference. What was urged by some was a trained and
properly equipped battalion capable of surgical strikes to
capture FDLR leaders, whose whereabouts were known or could
be determined.


5. (C) The French agreed with SE Wolpe on the need to
sustain the cooperation between DRC and Rwanda. Joubert
thought that Kabila had agreed to work with Kagame because of
his election concerns and the need for some semblance of calm
heading into the elections, a calm that he could depict as
progress on his part. Serman agreed, saying that Kabila
faced a 15-month period before the elections during which he
needed to develop a good "balance sheet" to present to
voters. Serman said it was important to use the 15-months
also to build trust between DRC and Rwanda, with which SE
Wolpe agreed. Serman lamented the lack of forceful
leadership on Kabila's part, which led to a discussion of the
leadership void in Kinshasa, the opaque nature of
decision-making and influence within the DRC government, and
the roles of such figures as former Speaker of the National
Assembly Vital Kamerhe (who made a good impression on
President Sarkozy during his March visit to the DRC),Jean
Mbuyu. and Augustin Katumba Mwanke, whom Serman described as
Kabila's "Rasputin." Joubert concluded that the issue of who
really governs DRC was a "black box."


6. (C) Joubert and Serman described France's current
priority of focusing on small-scale development projects
(e.g., roads and small power stations) that would benefit
both Congolese and Rwandans on both sides of their shared
borders. The idea was to build trust and confidence and real
economic ties that would bind the two sides and reduce the
possibility of conflict. Serman thought the UK idea of
opening up the economies of the region and letting free
market principles prevail was unrealistic and could lead to
unfocused and unorganized results that would not build trust

and cooperation. The small-scale projects he described
would, he believe, be better for the region than would a
simple free market approach. Serman said the French hoped to
establish markers over the next 15 months (via conferences or
high-level visits) that could be used to apply pressure on
the parties to make actual progress. He said that the new
French Special Envoy, Christian Connan (with whom SE Wolpe
would meet later) would oversee the development projects the
GOF favored.


7. (C) SE Wolpe said he generally agreed with the French
approach at least insofar as its objectives were concerned.
He said he looked forward to working with the Presidency on
this and other related issues pertaining to the Great Lakes.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Joubert said that he would
soon become Ambassador to Morocco, to be replaced by Andre
Parant. He indicated that Serman and Marechaux would
continue in their present functions at the Presidency.

Meeting at the MFA
--------------

8. (C) In his subsequent meeting at the MFA, SE Wolpe had a
wide-ranging discussion with AF A/S-equivalent Stephane
Gompertz, GOF Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Christian
Connan, and Desk Officers for the DRC, Central Africa, East
Africa, and Rwanda-Burundi-Uganda. SE Wolpe highlighted his
mandate and his recent work with the Wilson Center and World
Bank on training efforts for confidence building in the
region. He underscored that in his new role, one of his
priorities was to help improve the contacts and cooperation
among all parties.


9. (C) SE Wolpe asked if France was concerned about the
current effort to confront the FDLR using FARDC troops and
noted that some had raised the idea that interventions by
special forces units might be more effective. Gompertz
replied that the behavior of FARDC troops in the field has
been "disastrous" and there were recent and growing examples
of inappropriate actions. Gompertz saw the need for the very
top of the DRC's defense ministry to impose better political
and operational cohesion among the FARDC. He questioned
whether the FDLR could be defeated militarily, and if Rwanda
needed to do more politically to help with the DDR process.
Gompertz asked whether Rwanda "needed the FDLR" as a
convenient pretext for continued operations in eastern DRC.
SE Wolpe replied that he believed Rwanda viewed the FDLR as a
problem and did not want them to continue. However, a
military defeat would be difficult since the FDLR could
follow the example of the LRA and become increasingly hidden
and mobile in the face of greater pressure. Therefore, new
military strategies should perhaps be considered. Also, the
Rwandans had recognized that 80% of the FDLR cannot be
considered "genocidaires" from 1994 because they are too
young. To help the repatriation process for these troops, it
is important to assure good treatment and establish a track
record of positive examples. Gompertz agreed and added that
Rwanda could help the process by publishing a new, concise
and accurate list of those it sought as perpetrators of the
genocide.


10. (C) SE Wolpe underscored the importance of improved
civilian protection, which should be part of the strategy
going forward in evaluating next steps to deal with the FDLR.
Gompertz agreed, but noted that it was not possible to say
publicly that the military effort has been a failure. He
suggested considering the establishment of "safe havens" as
part of MONUC's mission -- perhaps described as "Phase 2."
SE Wolpe added that greater civilian protection could be
written into MONUC's mandate. Gompertz said he had heard
that a MONUC camp was recently approached by civilians for
protection and the MONUC commander turned away all the women
and girls, stating that females were not allowed in the camp.
Gompertz agreed with SE Wolpe that enhanced civilian
protection was also imperative in the operations against the
LRA.

France's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes
--------------

11. (C) Christian Connan, France's recently appointed
Special Envoy to for the Great Lakes, explained that his role
would focus more on economic integration than political
reconciliation, citing the example of post-war efforts
between France and Germany. Unfortunately, DRC President
Kabila has not yet replied positively. Connan explained that
some of the economic development schemes under consideration
include expanding the regional electricity network and joint
production of proven natural gas fields. At this time, joint
exploitation of oil and mineral wealth appear to face too
many hurdles. France will also look for new opportunities
for grass roots economic assistance. SE Wolpe responded
positively to this approach. He suggested other possible

activities, including regional parliamentary training and
facilitating regional networking for professional groups.
Connan agreed with SE Wolpe that the proliferation of
different regional organizations could prove to be a
hindrance to effective economic integration and that an
effort to rationalize the roles and responsibilities of these
organizations would be quite helpful.


12. (C) Both sides agreed to continue close consultation
both bilaterally and perhaps within larger groupings.


13. (U) SE Wolpe has cleared this message.
RIVKIN