Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09PARIS1183
2009-08-28 16:45:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRANCE AND THE NPT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Tags:  AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA 
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RR RUEHDBU RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #1183/01 2401645
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 281645Z AUG 09 ZDS ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7048
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHYY/GENEVA CD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001183 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (NAME PARA
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001183

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (NAME PARA 1)

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA
GENEVA FOR CD
UNVIE FOR IAEA
USUN FOR POL
USNATO FOR POL
USEU FOR POL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2019
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA
IAEA, NPT, UK, EG, FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND THE NPT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

REF: A. STATE 83600

B. PARIS 1039

PARIS 00001183 001.3 OF 004


Classified By: Political Minister/Counselor Kathy Allegrone for Reasons
1.4(b),(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In the run-up to the 2010 Review Conference
of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT RevCon),France
will continue to be a critical P3 ally while on certain
issues also maintaining tactics or positions different from
our own. Post deals extensively with the GOF on nuclear
issues, and reftel B contains much of the information
requested in reftel A. However, post welcomes this
opportunity to fill in the gaps with supplemental
information, and questions from reftel A will be answered
individually below, making reference as appropriate to
previous reporting. END SUMMARY.

2.(S/NF)-- What is the host government's general attitude
towards CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control
efforts? What factors influence its attitudes and positions?

The GOF's attitude towards these issues are dealt with in
detail in reftel B. France's positions are influenced by a
recognition of nuclear proliferation as a significant threat
to French national security, as well as by a strong political
attachment to a nuclear deterrent force as the ultimate
guarantee of national sovereignty.


-- What position on CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms
control efforts is the host government likely to take in
upcoming fora, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the

UNGA First (Disarmament) Committee, and the NPT Review
Conference in 2010?

France strongly supports CTBT in all relevant fora. France
also supports negotiations towards an FMCT at the Conference
on Disarmament, but is unwilling to consider any formulation
that addresses existing stockpiles. France plans to
coordinate its strategy at the 2010 NPT RevCon closely with
the United States, but currently seems at odds with U.S.
policy on specific issues, including the French desire to
focus on nonproliferation and specific proliferators as
opposed to a strong push on disarmament. Although France
considers itself a global leader on disarmament after having
cut its nuclear arsenal to around 300 weapons and halted
production of fissile material, French officials have warned
that they see U.S. and UK public statements on disarmament
efforts as offering an excuse to non-aligned nations to shift
the focus at the 2010 RevCon from nonproliferation to actual
progress on disarmament. See reftel B for further details.


-- With which countries does the host country work most
closely on these issues?

France is first and foremost interested in working with the
United States to influence our policies on the above issues,
as well as for the P3 to present a united front to China and
Russia and to key non-aligned movement (NAM) nations. The
GOF also regularly engages the UK, whose strong commitment to
disarmament concerns the French, especially given the similar
size of the French and British nuclear arsenals. Within the
P5, France has voiced concerns about China's lack of
transparency, especially regarding its production of fissile
materials (the GOF supports a moratorium),and supports P5
engagement in the run-up to the 2010 RevCon. French
officials have also pointed out the need to reach out to key
NAM countries, especially Brazil and Indonesia, to prevent
spoilers at the 2010 RevCon. Finally, Egypt is of special
concern to France in light of what French officials see as
increasingly inflexible Egyptian diplomacy on Middle East
issues, both at the IAEA and in the NPT review process.


-- Who are key government personnel involved in nuclear arms
control and nonproliferation decision-making in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, related ministries (such as defense and
energy),and their diplomatic missions to arms control fora?


PARIS 00001183 002.2 OF 004


Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

1. Jacques Audibert, U/S (P)-equivalent

2. Martin Briens, DAS-equivalent for Disarmament and
Nuclear Nonproliferation


Elysee (Office of President Sarkozy):

1. Francois Richier - Presidential Advisor for Strategic
Affairs

2. Admiral Edouard Guillaud - Chief Military Advisor to
the President

3. Antoine Beaussant - Deputy Military Advisor to the
President

Ministry of Defense:

1. Michel Miraillet, Director of Strategic Affairs
(USDP-equivalent)

Atomic Energy Commission:

1. Daniel Verwaerde, Director of Military Applications

2. Olivier Caron, Director for Strategy and External
Relations

New York (UN):

1. Gerard Araud, PermRep (appointed, but as of August 26,
has not yet replaced Jean-Maurice Ripert)

2. Xavier Chatel, First Committee Affairs (Disarmament and
Non-proliferation)

Vienna (UN Agencies, including IAEA):

1. Philippe Merlin, Deputy PermRep

2. Marc-Gerard Albert, Counselor for Nuclear Issues

Geneva (CD):

1. Eric Danon, PermRep

2. Sophie Moal-Makame, Deputy PermRep


-- What role do you play in arms control and nonproliferation
organizations? Do you take a leadership role on any issues?

France plays a very active role in all major arms control and
nonproliferation organizations, including the UN, the IAEA,
and the Conference on Disarmament and often takes a
leadership role - preferably in coordination with the United
States and the UK - with the aim of advancing French
interests.


-- How does the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation
policymaking process work, and what is the interplay among
government officials and agencies?

Overall policy direction is established by the President,
with Elysee (presidency) advisors playing a significant role.
The MFA has the lead on international negotiations, though
other agencies have roles to play on specific issues. Thus,
the Ministry of Defense is concerned with nuclear deterrent
policy. The Atomic Energy Commission, which includes an
international relations branch and a military applications
branch, is responsible for maintaining France's nuclear
arsenal and thus weighs in on FMCT issues, nuclear security,
and civilian nuclear use, with the Ministry of Environment
also sometimes involved in discussions of the latter issue.
The Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale has an
interest in all security affairs, but is less involved in
nuclear issues than the Elysee staff, according to MFA
contacts. Due to the relatively small size of the
interagency group dealing with nuclear issues and the clear
priorities established by the presidency, messaging is
consistent. Bureaucratic rivalry does not seem to be a major
obstacle on nuclear issues. Close and long-standing personal
and professional relations create tight bureaucratic bonds
between officials with extensive experience with nuclear
issues. For example, former MFA Political Director Gerard
Araud will now become France's UN PermRep, and has already
worked closely with the MOD's Director of Strategic Affairs,
Michel Miraillet, at numerous posts throughout his career.
Araud has been replaced at the MFA by the former
A/S-equivalent for Strategic Affairs Jacques Audibert.
Meanwhile, Presidential Advisor Francois Richier's last

PARIS 00001183 003.2 OF 004


position was as deputy to the A/S-equivalent for Strategic
Affairs at the MFA.


-- Which people and agencies carry the most weight, and on
which issues?

President Sarkozy has taken a personal interest in nuclear
issues, and the Elysee has clearly established France's
priorities. Agency interests and responsibilities are
outlined above, but since much of France's effort is
currently focused on gaining U.S. and UK validation of its
"redlines" in the run-up to the 2010 NPT RevCon, the MFA's
diplomatic push is now central to the GOF's overall effort.
Although Foreign Minister Kouchner has not personally
involved himself, the rest of the MFA leadership, including
Araud and now especially Audibert, remain influential (Note:
Indeed, Audibert stated in a recent meeting that he expected
to spend the majority of his time this coming year on nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament issues). Although
lower-ranking, Martin Briens' technical expertise has allowed
him to play a prominent role in shaping and explaining
France's diplomatic efforts. The Elysee - through Richier
and Guillaud - directs and manages the GOF strategy, and is
especially visible when President Sarkozy is personally
involved, as in the run-up to the September 24 UNSC nuclear
summit. Sarkozy's Diplomatic Advisor (NSA-equivalent)
Jean-David Levitte oversees the Elysee effort and is
empowered to broker compromises on especially sensitive
questions.


-- What are the key factors that drive adoption or rejection
of particular policies or positions on nuclear arms control
or nonproliferation issues?

This is discussed in detail in reftel B.


-- How many people in host country's missions (New York,
Geneva, and Vienna) to arms control fora deal with arms
control and nonproliferation issues? Who are they?

According to MFA contacts, deputies at relevant French
missions are key interlocutors on actual negotiations, in
addition to Ambassadors/PermReps. Names of relevant officials
are given above.


-- Are mission personnel and resources augmented during key
relevant meetings?

Aside from the attendance of official delegations, MFA NPT
desk officer Celine Jurgensen told us that mission personnel
and resources are not generally augmented during key
meetings. However, she said the MFA Office of Disarmament
and Nuclear Nonproliferation may be getting a new desk
officer to deal specifically with FMCT.


-- What are the roles and influence of the host country's
nuclear power industry (if any),academia, and
non-governmental organizations in nuclear arms control and
nonproliferation decision-making?

Academia and NGOs do not play a significant role in French
arms control and nonproliferation decision-making. The
French civilian nuclear industry, however, is one of the
world's most developed and internationally active. The GOF
strongly desires to foster French industry and sees the
strengthening of a global nonproliferation regime as opening
the door to increased - and politically uncontroversial -
opportunities for French nuclear firms.


-- What are the key alliances with other governments on arms
control and nonproliferation issues; for example, the
Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77)?

France is most closely allied to the P3 countries and plans
to devote significant effort to achieving P5 consensus

PARIS 00001183 004.2 OF 004


whenever possible. French officials are concerned that the
NAM or G-77 countries will successfully divert attention from
important nonproliferation goals by focusing too exclusively
by disarmament by nuclear weapons states.


-- To what extent does the host government appear to
influence, follow, or diverge from the NAM or G-77 line?

See above response.


-- How much flexibility do the Missions to the UN, CD, and
IAEA appear to have, and to what extent do they appear to
receive guidance from capital? To what extent do they need
further guidance from capital to engage on RevCon objectives?

Post defers to USUN, Geneva, and Vienna for authoritative
answers to these questions. In general, however, French
positions reported by U.S. missions to arms control fora seem
to track quite closely with what post hears from Paris-based
officials.
RIVKIN