WEST AFRICA: FRENCH MFA OFFICIAL'S JULY 30

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001040

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2019
TAGS: PREL XY IV NG GV CM MR FR
SUBJECT: WEST AFRICA: FRENCH MFA OFFICIAL'S JULY 30
COMMENTS

REF: PARIS 997

Classified By: Kathleen Allegrone, Political Minister-Counselor, 1.4 (b
/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA AF Deputy DAS-equivalent Laurent Bigot
on July 30 commented on a range of West Africa issues:

-- Cote d'Ivoire: Bigot thought elections were still
possible, if not likely, on November 29.

-- Niger: He feared that President Tandja's quest for a
third term not only represented a naked bid for power but
also demonstrated Tandja's belief that he is Niger's savior.

-- Guinea: Bigot said that Guinea seemed "hopeless" and
described CNDD president Moussa Dadis Camara as "crazy but
dangerously charismatic."

-- Cameroon: He thought that President Biya would continue
to play a low-key, Cameroon-focused approach despite FM
Kouchner's recent urging that he display more leadership.
During Biya's recent visit to France, Sarkozy reportedly
stressed the importance of "democratization."

-- Mauritania: The French are relieved that the elections
have taken place free of major problems. Bigot noted that
France's shift in policy to be more accepting of Aziz was
based on his prior demonstrated willingness to work with
France on regional anti-terrorism. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Laurent Bigot provided an overview of several
African issues on July 30. (BIO NOTES: Bigot is the deputy
to MFA AF/W DAS-equivalent Christine Fages; Fages is the only
MFA AF DAS-equivalent who has a deputy. Bigot will replace
Fages as AF/W DAS-equivalent on September 1, when Fages
becomes the MFA's Deputy Spokesperson, which Bigot described
as a highly challenging but prestigious position within the
MFA. He said that present spokesperson Eric Chevallier had
recommended her about a month ago to FM Bernard Kouchner and
that Kouchner had signaled his approval a few days ago.
Fages would have become DAS-equivalent for AF/C had this not
taken place. Chevallier himself will soon leave to became
Ambassador to Syria. END BIO NOTES.)

Cote d'Ivoire
--------------

3. (C) Bigot said that he shared AF A/S-equivalent Stephane
Gompertz's relative optimism about the November 29 elections
in Cote d'Ivoire (reftel). The electoral process was moving
forward, albeit less smoothly than one might like.
Nonetheless, Bigot thought that there was nothing that now
indicated that the November 29 goal could not be met. He
said that one big hurdle would be the publication of the
electoral lists, scheduled to take place soon. If the
candidates all accept the lists, the Ivoirians will have
overcome a major hurdle.


4. (C) Bigot (please PROTECT for comments in this
paragraph) indicated disapproval that President Sarkozy and
FM Kouchner had recently publicly expressed skepticism about
the November 29 elections and about President Gbagbo's
integrity, which had led Ivoirians to engage in a war of
words via the press. Bigot thought that the Presidency's
mistrust of Gbagbo stemmed from the fact that Bruno Joubert,
Deputy Diplomatic Advisor and Senior Africa Advisor at the
Presidency, had been MFA AF A/S-equivalent in November 2004,
when the Bouake bombing incident occurred. Bigot thought
that that experience may have left Joubert with a permanent
mistrust of Gbagbo, which he conveyed to Sarkozy and
Kouchner. Although Bigot expressed disapproval over the
public statements Sarkozy and Kouchner had made, he conceded
that the statements might goad Gbagbo into adhering to the
elections timetable, "if only to prove our leaders wrong."
He hoped that would be the case.

Niger
--------------

5. (C) Bigot said that the GOF remained firmly opposed to
President Tandja's bid to remain in power, especially since
his announcement followed shortly after Sarkozy's visit
there, during which Sarkozy was convinced that Tandja would
leave power as constitutionally mandated. Bigot said that if
Tandja succeeded in obtaining a third term, there would
necessarily be a weakening of democracy in Niger, "which will
only benefit AQIM and other Sahel terrorist elements." Bigot
thought that Tandja was motivated by the age-old reluctance
of a dictator to cede power and by his apparent belief that
is on some divine mission, that only he can fulfill, to serve
as Niger's savior.


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6. (C) Bigot also noted that family wealth was involved.
Tandja's wife and one of their sons, Bigot reported, had
their own private businesses that benefited from having
Tandja in power. The son had substantial dealings with China
with respect to various natural resource concessions in Niger
the Chinese had been accorded. Tandja's remaining in power
would help ensure that this financial pipeline did not dry up.

Guinea
--------------

7. (C) When Guinea was raised, Bigot's first reaction was
to describe it as "hopeless." He had been there earlier in
the year accompanying Cooperation and Francophonie Secretary
of State Joyandet shortly after President Conte's death and
CNDD president Moussa Dadis Camara's seizure of power. Bigot
had also attended the recent International Contact Group
meeting in Conakry. He described the country as being in
extremely desperate straits. When asked about Dadis, Bigot's
first reaction was to describe him as "crazy." Bigot
provided examples of his erratic behavior, including not
falling asleep most nights until 5:00 or 6:00 am because of
his fear of coups during the night and his waking up in the
early afternoon, with no work getting done before 3:00 pm at
the earliest. What saved Dadis, Bigot believed, was his very
charismatic nature and his ability to command attention as a
speaker. This, Bigot said, was a "dangerous quality" given
Dadis's other characteristics.


8. (C) Bigot said that Joyandet would soon revisit Guinea,
in conjunction with a visit to Mauritania to attend President
Aziz's inaugural ceremonies, and also to Niger. In Guinea,
Joyandet planned to deliver a stern message on the need to
move forward on elections in 2009 or else face international
condemnation. Bigot was not optimistic about elections in
Guinea in 2009.


9. (C) Bigot closed by remarking that Dadis's statements
about being in power only for a transitory period, his stated
desire to put Guinea on the right path, and his stated
intention to fight corruption, quite eerily evoked memories
of very similar statements Conte made when he came to power,
"and we all know what happened after that."

Cameroon
--------------

10. (C) Bigot said that Cameroon President Biya's visit to
France the previous week had gone well. Biya met with several
ministers and business leaders. At a January 23 dinner
hosted by FM Kouchner, Kouchner urged Biya to play a more
active leadership role in Africa, now that he was one of
Africa's senior leaders, especially following Gabon President
Bongo's passing. At a January 24 lunch, Sarkozy reportedly
stressed the importance of democratization in Cameroon as
well as elsewhere.


11. (C) Bigot said he was not sure that Biya would become
more of an activist. His style had long been low-key and
focused on Cameroon and not bigger regional or international
issues. Biya was not an extrovert seeking the limelight; he
preferred playing an "under the radar" role, Bigot believed.
Bigot thought that while Biya's low-key style made him a bit
invisible, it also served to protect him from the kind of
scrutiny that high-profile public leaders (such as Bongo)
often attract. Thus journalists did not spend much time
digging through his dirty linen and reporting on his personal
and family finances as front-page news items as they had with
Bongo and others. Bigot suspected that Biya would continue
to shun attention and go about his business quietly, as
seemed to be his habit.

Mauritania
--------------

12. (C) As had A/S-equivalent Gompertz (reftel),Bigot
expressed relief that the elections had gone fairly smoothly
in Mauritania. The picture shifted drastically once Wade's
accord was accepted, he noted. "Once that disparate group
came to agreement, we thought we were in the clear."


13. (C) Bigot confided that the GOF, at both the MFA and
Presidency, had initially been strongly anti-coup. That
changed over time, he said, as the French military and
intelligence services stressed the need to avoid alienating
Mauritania and to work with Aziz on counter-terrorism so long
as he held power. Bigot said that one key factor was that
the French had worked closely with Aziz on PTER issues before
the coup, and he had demonstrated a certain reliability and
commitment. Bigot said the French shift in policy that took
place in December 2008, which resulted in a more tolerant
position on Aziz's staying in power (provided that acceptable
elections took place at some point),was based largely on his
proven willingness to work with France on terrorism.

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