A REGIONAL APPROACH TOWARDS AQIM

C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 000569


NOFORN

DEPT FOR AF A/S CARSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019
TAGS: PTER PREL ML AL UV FR UK GE
SUBJECT: A REGIONAL APPROACH TOWARDS AQIM

Classified By: Classified by Samuel C. Laeuchli, Charge d,Affaires,
for Reasons 1.4 (B&D)


1. (C/NF) The recent spate of hostage-taking, murder and
military counter measures in the Sahel Region have brought to
the forefront the need for concerted action against AQIM.
Responding to these events, the countries of the region,
particularly Mali, appear to be eager to take concrete
actions against AQIM. Given that terrorist acts have
occurred in Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger and that
other regional players have been involved to a greater or
lesser extent in the issue, it is clear that any solution to
the problem of AQIM must be a regional one. This has been
underscored on multiple occasions by regional leaders
themselves. The fact that AQIM terrorists move unhindered
across the countries and borders of the region also argues
for a regional approach.

2.(C/NF) Although Burkina Faso is a somewhat peripheral
actor in these events, it has functioned in a mediating
capacity in both conflict resolution and hostage issues. It
would certainly play a secondary role in any regional
solution, but nonetheless we would like to propose some
thoughts on what a regional solution might look like and
suggest some steps as to how we might get there.


3. (C/NF) The goal of any regional approach should be
focused on changing the situation on the ground. This means
that AQIM must be deprived of safe havens in any of the
countries in the region through the application of military
pressure based on political resolve. Also, AQIM should be
deprived of sources of supplies, fuel, food and perhaps most
importantly, funding. We also need to cut off AQIM from
receiving support from local populations. To achieve these
goals, two things need to happen. The militaries and
governments in the region need to acquire the capacity and
resources to carry out these operations and the countries
need to cooperate with each other in order to be truly
effective. At this point, neither of these two conditions
is being met. The United States, working together with like
minded developed countries and the countries of the region,
can help create them both.


4. (C/NF) Why not TSCTP/OEF-TS? This effort cannot be
successful if undertaken by the United States alone. To
begin with, if we act without international partners, the
countries of the region will be highly suspicious of our
motives and will refuse to cooperate or will work against us.
In addition, if other donors are left out, they may be
suspicious of our motives and presence and advise regional
countries to resist U.S. initiatives. It will be very
difficult for the U.S. working alone to cajole the countries
of the region to work together, and history bears out that so
far this effort has not succeeded. We will need to leverage
the resources and political capital other countries could
bring to bear. Any effective coalition in the region should
include the key countries of the region, beginning with Mali
and Algeria but if things progress as desired, eventually
bringing in Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso
and perhaps Libya, but should also include former colonial
powers France and the UK plus more international actors such
as Canada, and perhaps Japan and Germany. The UK and Canada
are already preparing to increase their presence in the
region.


5. (C/NF) Such a coalition, perhaps called "Friends of the
Sahel" (FOS) could develop and implement a joint strategy to
combat AQIM. Elements of the strategy could include
strengthening the military capacity of the concerned
countries, joint patrols and information sharing to monitor
and control the borders between the countries, allowing hot
pursuit across borders or planning joint operations against
AQIM units. The strategy could also include broader, more
efficient intelligence sharing, information exchange on
terrorist financing and supply routes, cutting off supplies
of resources such as vehicles, gas, and communications
equipment, as well as working together on lessons learned and
leadership data on key extremists. Other countries in the
region, including Burkina Faso, could be involved in helping
curbing weapons and drug trafficking, and could provide other
political and logistical support to the effort. There should
be regional cooperation on the military, police, gendarme and
intelligence levels.


6. (C/NF) A related set of requirements would focus on
development in the region. Local populations, even where
limited in number, would have to see the benefits of turning
their back on AQIM and integrating more fully into national
and international economic and political structures. This
requires greater effort to provide both infrastructure and
services, including food security, health care and education,
in the region. This effort should be integrated and
coordinated with other donors to provide maximum effect.


7. (C/NF) The way ahead. Should the U.S. government agree
to such a strategy, one way of moving ahead would be to get
certain key G-8 allies on board with our approach. This
should initially be done bilaterally in capitals and
Washington to build a coalition around the idea. Then there
should be initial meetings with these allies as a group, and
after that bringing in the countries of the Sahel region.
This initial group of G-8 partners could work with us to
bring the regional actors on board. This process could
culminate in a Foreign Ministers, level meeting where a text
would be finalized outlining both a general approach and what
concrete actions needed to be taken. Then of course it would
take continued engagement and resources on the part of the
U.S. and our partners to keep the efforts on track, but there
would be a solid framework for further action, leading, if
successful, to the incapacitation of AQIM in the region.


LAEUCHLI