Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09OUAGADOUGOU187
2009-03-18 17:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ouagadougou
Cable title:  

DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN BURKINA FASO IN 2010 AND BEYOND

Tags:  PGOV KDEM UV 
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R 181703Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4745
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 000187 


DEPT FOR AF/W DORSEY LOCKHART

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM UV
SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN BURKINA FASO IN 2010 AND BEYOND

Classified by Charge d'Affairs Samuel C. Laeuchli for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 000187


DEPT FOR AF/W DORSEY LOCKHART

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM UV
SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS IN BURKINA FASO IN 2010 AND BEYOND

Classified by Charge d'Affairs Samuel C. Laeuchli for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In the next three to five years, Burkina Faso's
fledgling democracy has the potential to make significant progress.
Priority areas include: merging and strengthening the numerous weak
and fragmented opposition parties; increasing the capacity of
political parties to conduct campaigns through training and access to
resources; improving the education of the electorate; and enhancing
freedom of the media. While the government and political parties
must make many of these improvements on their own, opposition parties
and the media would also benefit from enhanced training. While any
short-term improvements will not significantly impact the 2010
presidential elections, they will be key for the elections in 2015.
All advancements will be for naught, however, if President Blaise
Compaore decides to change the constitution and run for re-election
in 2015. At this point, only Compaore knows what he will do. End
Summary.

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Burkina's weak and fragmented opposition
--------------


2. (C) There are currently no less than 130 different, active,
political parties in Burkina Faso. Political leaders agree that the
numerous parties are a serious impediment to increasing the power and
influence of any individual opposition group. Further exacerbating
the problem is the fact that much of the "opposition" actually
supports the President and his policies although they are not
officially aligned with the ruling party, the Congress for Democracy
and Progress (CDP). The Alliance for Democracy and
Federation/African Democratic Rally (ADF/RDA) is the second largest
party in Burkina after the CDP. While the ADF/RDA considers itself
to be the major opposition party, it supports the President 99
percent of the time and is included in Compaore's government. Of the
38 opposition members elected to the National Assembly in 2007, 25
are known to be closely aligned with President Compaore and/or the
ruling CDP, leaving only 13 true opposition members.


3. (U) The large number of parties means that public resources for
campaign finance and for establishing party offices throughout the
country are potentially very limited. However, in order to qualify
for public campaign financing, parties must have earned at least five

percent of the votes in the last election. Therefore, only the CDP
and ADF/RDA now qualify for public funding. While the National
Independent Commission for Elections (CENI) and National Assembly are
considering lowering this requirement to three percent, such a change
would still only allow five parties to receive funding. Currently,
the CDP has a stronghold on all areas of politics within Burkina Faso
because it benefits from significant government funding and it
benefited from pre-Compaore political infrastructures, making it the
only party with active political leadership in each of the country's
45 provinces.


4. (C) In recent years, several opposition groups have combined their
efforts, forming coalitions to prepare for elections. Of these
groups, the most promising for the future is the left-leaning
Sankarist coalition. This group of parties supports the
socialist-era principles of the former Burkinabe President, Thomas
Sankara. Among the Sankarist parties, the most prominent is the
Union for Rebirth/Sankarists Movement (UNIR/MS) party. Benewende
Sankara, UNIR/MS leader and former presidential candidate, told
Poloff that, pending discussions at their March, 2009 planning
conference, the Sankarists will select a common candidate for the
2010 Presidential elections. Unfortunately, coalition groups in
Burkina Faso have historically had a short lifespan, eventually
returning to the same fragmented parties that existed before they
were merged.

--------------
Burkina's uneducated electorate
--------------


5. (C) Another fundamental problem that must be addressed in the
coming years is that of literacy and civic education for the general
population. Mahama Sawadogo, the leader of the CDP in the National
Assembly, was particularly concerned about the impact of education on
democracy in Burkina Faso. In 2007, the World Bank estimated that
over 70 percent of Burkina's population was illiterate. Sawadogo
personally estimated that this number was even higher -- closer to 90
percent. He commented that due to literacy problems, the electorate
is often manipulated, particularly in rural areas, which has led to
election fraud. Sankara, of UNIR/MS, told Poloff that the general
population does not even understand the purpose of voting, and those
that do vote do not understand the harm of participating in fraud,
such as accepting payment for their votes. The problems worsen when
cultural norms permit men and local chiefs to dictate their spouses'
and villages' votes. In previous elections, opposition groups have
accused the CDP of buying votes and tampering with ballot boxes by
manipulating these societal weaknesses. In a similar vein, Sankara
believed that improving voter education will increase the
transparency of the elections and will enable parties to campaign
according to their platforms rather than personal relationships or
bribes.

-------------- ---
In Preparation for 2010 Presidential elections
-------------- ---


6. (C) In order to make progress, ADF/RDA and UNIR/MS members agreed
that opposition parties will need: (1) to greatly alter their
strategies for developing coalitions and seeking support from the
public; (2) training; and (3) resources they can use to create
political bases throughout the country. The government and political
opposition groups must work together to improve campaign practices
and to allow opposition groups to have access to public funding. The
overwhelming influence and resources accessible to the CDP are
additional obstacles the opposition must overcome. According to
Sawadogo, comparing the CDP to opposition parties is "like comparing
David and Goliath." While opposition and CDP members did not
specifically comment on the 2010 presidential candidates to Poloff,
they implied that President Compaore is widely expected to run, and
to win with a sweeping majority.

--------------
Prospects for 2015 elections
--------------


7. (C) In 2015, Compaore could decide to run again by amending the
constitution, or he could step aside and groom one his supporters
and/or advisors to run as the CDP candidate (with support from
smaller allied parties). In 2000, President Compaore and the CDP
altered Burkina Faso's constitution limiting the presidential mandate
to two terms of five years. In 2005, following a petition from
UNIR/MS leader Benewende Sankara, the constitutional court ruled that
the 2000 amendment was not retroactive, thereby legitimizing
Compaore's candidacy in 2005 and allowing him to run again in 2010
despite the fact that he has been in office since 1987. Compaore won
the 2005 elections with an overwhelming majority of the votes. The
remaining votes were divided between thirteen other candidates, who
each received between five and less than point five percent of the
votes.


8. (C) Comment: While the outcome of the 2010 Presidential election
is not entirely a 'fait accompli,' significant democratic development
is not a short-term proposition. The real focus for Burkina's
opposition will be the 2015 elections. With political will from the
sitting government, the ruling party and opposition leaders, and
input from the international donor community, Burkina Faso can make
significant progress between now and 2015 by training politicians,
the media, and the public in democratic values and basic education.
Opposition leaders must also commit to work together, at time
relinquishing their leadership roles to form solid and sustainable
coalition groups.


9. (C) Comment cont'd: Ultimately, the major factor for the 2015
elections will be whether Compaore decides to run. Within the
national government, he faces few obstacles to changing the
constitution. While he seems to care deeply about international
opinions, Compaore's (or his supporters') desire to remain in power
could outweigh any concerns about his image in the international
community. U.S. initiatives such as the National Democratic
Institute Project to strengthen the capacity of political parties
(scheduled to start this year) and future projects to train the media
will influence the progress of democracy in the face of these
challenges. Ultimately, the litmus test for Burkina's democracy will
be on the road to 2015 and not in 2010.

LAEUCHLI