Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09OUAGADOUGOU138
2009-03-05 08:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ouagadougou
Cable title:  

BURKINA FASO's MANDATE ON THE UNSC

Tags:  PREL UNSC AF UV 
pdf how-to read a cable
R 050825Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4689
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 000138 


DEPT FOR AF/W DORSEY LOCKHART

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019
TAGS: PREL UNSC AF UV
SUBJECT: BURKINA FASO's MANDATE ON THE UNSC

Classified by Ambassador Jeanine Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

REF: A) 2008 OUAGADOUGOU 333; B) 2008 OUAGADOUGO 791;
C) 2008 OUAGADOUGO 1027

C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 000138


DEPT FOR AF/W DORSEY LOCKHART

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019
TAGS: PREL UNSC AF UV
SUBJECT: BURKINA FASO's MANDATE ON THE UNSC

Classified by Ambassador Jeanine Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

REF: A) 2008 OUAGADOUGOU 333; B) 2008 OUAGADOUGO 791;
C) 2008 OUAGADOUGO 1027


1. (C) Summary: During the first year of its mandate on the UN
Security Council (UNSC),Burkina Faso has produced a voting record
that has been a balancing act between support for U.S. initiatives,
tempered by respect for the country's traditional friends and allies.
On several occasions, such as a key vote in favor of a U.S.
resolution on Zimbabwe, and on the recognition of Kosovo, Burkina has
voted with the United States. However, on other issues, such as the
Sudan, Iran, and the Russia-Georgia conflict, Burkina has either
sided with the African Union, abstained from voting altogether, or
decided to wait for international consensus. Burkina Faso almost
never takes the lead on an issue, preferring instead to sign its name
to declarations made by sub-regional, regional, and international
organizations. In the coming year, Burkina Faso will continue to
look for guidance from regional and sub-regional organizations,
namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),and
the African Union (AU). On issues of importance to the U.S., we will
need to lobby Burkina Faso hard in order to gain its support. End
Summary.

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Burkina's Mixed Voting Record
--------------


2. (C) During the first year of its mandate on the UN Security
Council (UNSC),Burkina Faso has produced a voting record that has
been a balancing act between support for U.S. initiatives, tempered
by respect for the country's traditional friends and allies. While
Burkinabe officials point out that during its first year on the UNSC,
Burkina Faso has supported the U.S position on issues such as
Zimbabwe and Kosovo, the country has not played a leadership role on
other international issues where there is little consensus from the
international community. On most issues of a regional nature,
Burkina Faso favors waiting for regional organizations to draft
public statements and to make policy decisions and plans of action.
In response to issues outside of Africa, Burkina Faso can be swayed,
but does not typically have a truly national interest. On
international issues in particular, Burkinabe policies tend to be
more cautious, awaiting leadership from others, such as the AU, or

occasionally, the United States, and will wait for international and
regional consensus before taking a position. For example, Vincent
Zakane, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) chief of staff has told
us that he believed regional bodies should be the first international
organizations to respond to crises in Africa. For Burkina, this
would mean acting in agreement with ECOWAS before bringing an issue
to the AU, and then to the UN (or UNSC).

--------------
Zimbabwe and Kosovo
--------------


3. (C) However, there have been notable exceptions. In July, 2008,
Burkina Faso voted with the U.S. and against the African Union (AU)
on a Zimbabwe resolution. This was a break from normal Burkinabe
policy to adhere to the decisions of regional institutions. Post
believes that Burkina Faso voted in this manner because, after
participating actively in consultations and meetings on Zimbabwe in
New York and discussions with high-level officials in Ouagadougou,
the leadership was convinced that the SADC had failed to produce a
solution, and that a resolution from the UNSC would serve to
strengthen any actions that would eventually be taken by the AU.
This decision was important for Burkina Faso in that it was a break
from their normal course of action to follow the lead of the AU.


4. (C) On the issue of Kosovo recognition, Burkina Faso was one of
the first African countries to recognize Kosovo as an independent
nation. This was also a break from its traditional role of voting
with the AU, which had yet to make a decision on Kosovo. While
Burkina recognized Kosovo, MFA officials also acknowledged that they
were uncomfortable about making such a unilateral decision. Post
believed that what finally convinced Burkina Faso to recognize Kosovo
was the largely international consensus that Kosovo was already
functioning as an independent nation. MFA officials said that
recognizing the nation's independence was just a formality. (Reftel
A)

--------------
The Glass Half Empty
--------------


5. (C) When Russia invaded Georgia, the U.S. demarched Burkina Faso
asking it to make public statements condemning Russia's actions and
calling for a cease-fire. While Burkina Faso agreed that Russia's
actions were unacceptable to the international community, MFA
representatives also said that Burkina would not make public
statements because it would have been one of the only African nations
to take a hard-line stance against Russia. For fear of acting
unilaterally, Burkina Faso refused to be a forerunner on the issue
and instead chose to await further international consensus and to
only support resolutions made within the UNSC. (Reftel B)


6. (C) On the issue of Iran, Burkinabe diplomats indicated that
Burkina Faso was a strong proponent of nuclear non-proliferation.
Burkinabe diplomats had recognized that the Non Aligned Movement
(NAM),which includes both Burkina and Iran, was divided on the issue
of Iran, but indicated that this division would not alter their
commitment to non-proliferation. However, following a request in
November, 2008 from the U.S. to vote against a no-action motion at
the UN, Burkina Faso chose to abstain rather than vote against the
resolution. (Reftel C)

--------------
Comment: Looking Ahead
--------------


7. (C) In its second year on the Security Council, Burkina Faso will
most likely continue to make its decisions based on sub-regional,
regional, and international consensus. On issues of major importance
to the U.S. where we seek support from Burkina Faso, it will be
necessary to lobby hard both in Ouagadougou and in New York.
Furthermore, it will be necessary to lean on general international
consensus when it supports the U.S. position. Where this is not
possible, it will be important to influence other members of ECOWAS
and/or of the AU. While Burkina Faso's position can sometimes be
moved after careful and extensive lobbying, the U.S. should not
expect Burkina to take an independent position or to be the first
African country to act.

JACKSON