GUINEA - U.S./FRENCH MEETING WITH PRESIDENT COMPAORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OUAGADOUGOU 001158

SIPDIS

E.O. 12928: DECL: 11/23/2014
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GV, UV
SUBJ: GUINEA - U.S./French Meeting with President Compaore

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)

1. (C) Summary: AF DAS Fitzgerald and French MFA Africa Advisor
Montel urged President Compaore to take advantage of the window of
opportunity provided by the assassination attempt against CNDD leader
Moussa Dadis Camara. The U.S. and France emphasized that acting CNDD
leader General Sekouba Konate offered the only real hope for a
political transition that could meet all parties' concerns and allow
for a real democratic transition. Compaore agreed that the
assassination attempt had dramatically changed the situation but said
he would have to meet Konate personally this week to determine if he
was willing and able to accept the leadership role. If so, Compaore
is prepared to ask Morocco to have Dadis stay and to tell Dadis there
was no point in going back to Guinea. End Summary

2. (C) AF DAS William Fitzgerald and Foreign Minister Kouchner's
Africa Advisor Charlotte Montel met with Burkinabe President Blaise
Compaore on December 14 -- the day following the Ouagadougou meeting
of the International Contact Group for Guinea (reported SEPTEL).
Charge and French DCM attended as note takers. Compaore was joined
by Foreign Minister Bedouma Alain Yoda. Compaore said he had wanted
to meet with the two delegations given the important role the U.S.
and France are playing in the Guinea crisis.

3. (C) DAS Fitzgerald assured President Compaore that the U.S. and
France support his mediation efforts but voiced a shared concern that
there was a window of opportunity available now because of Dadis'
absence from Conakry that will be lost if something is not done
before Dadis tries to return from Morocco. Fitzgerald noted the risk
of reprisals should Dadis be allowed to return. Montel, noting the
frequent discussions about Guinea between Foreign Minister Kouchner
and Secretary Clinton and the unity of vision between the two
capitals, emphasized the deterioration of the situation and our
belief that Konate could be a viable and acceptable alternative to
Dadis through a democratic transition period. Recognizing that
Konate suggests he is "tired" and not interested in the leadership,
Montel called for a "dynamic" to get him to accept and to keep Dadis
out. Fitzgerald noted that the Forces Vives had clearly stated their
willingness the day earlier to work with Konate but, given the last
minute change in the CNDD delegation that put pro-Dadis hardliners in
charge, were unsure whether Konate had authority. Montel emphasized
that Konate would be hampered by a lack of control posed by pro-Dadis
troops "as long as the fiction of his return" remains. If Dadis
could be kept out, she felt Konate would be able to maintain order
through the transition.

4. (C) Compaore shared his view of the current situation and of his
strategy. His approach has been admittedly "prudent" given the risk
of escalated violence inherent in Guinea's fractured and
undisciplined military. "This is not a normal army where one general
is replaced by another. Each has his own troops loyal to him and now
we see the creation of militia as well." His original negotiating
paper did not specifically call for Dadis to step down since that was
likely only to provoke violence. He asesses Konate as someone who
would be the "ideal" solution for the crisis saying that, in his
previous encounters, he had seen someone who did not seek power.
That said, he is not sure Konate is politically willing or physically
able to displace Dadis through the transition. He will try to meet
with Konate in Conakry within the next few days to see if Konate is
up for the job. If not, pursuing this "ideal" solution is fruitless
and likely to provoke violence. If so, he is prepared to urge
Morocco to keep Dadis in Morocco and tell Dadis there is no hope for
him to gain any legitimacy. Compaore saw Dadis as a clearly unstable
element but, if Konate will not take the leadership, he sees the
continued need for a "Plan B" that accepts Dadis in some minimized
role but does not exclude him. In that vein, he continues to work on
a second draft of his mediation paper that establishes the artifice
of the "Council of the Republic" -- a collective body performing the
role of head of state but not head of government. Dadis could be
subsumed in this body while Konate might serve as the executive
agent.

5. (C) Compaore directed the Foreign Minister to share the current
draft with the U.S. and France. That document (e-mailed to
Department, Embassies Conakry, London and Paris, and USAU) does not
make reference to a "Council of the Republic." Instead, it presents
an amalgam of entities that apparently aim to diffuse power. It
includes: a "National Transition Council" -- a 150 person body
representing "the components of Guinean society" headed by a
president coming from the religious community who is selected by
consensus by the members of the National Transition Council; the
"Head of State of the Transition" coming from the security and
defense forces who names the Prime Minister; The "Government of
National Unity" directed by the Prime Minister (who shall come from
the Forces Vives). The document stipulates that legislative
elections should be held in May 2010 and presidential elections in

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October 2010. The document makes no specific exclusions of
individuals wishing to run for president but stipulates "The members
of the National Transition Council, the members of the Government of
Transition, and the members of the defense and security forces must
resign at least four months prior to the election.

6. (C) Comment: Compaore remains cautious to a fault in his
willingness to exploit Dadis' absence. He does, however, recognize
the opportunity and is certainly now engaged in sounding out Konate
as an alternative transition figure to Dadis who could be acceptable
to the Forces Vives and the international community. Compaore says
he already started talking with members of the CNDD to prepare them
for a transition without Dadis. Compaore is clearly aware of U.S.
and French interest and, according to the other delegations at the
ICG-G meeting, is hearing from ECOWAS, the AU and the UN that Konate
offers to one viable hope for a peaceful and consensual transition.
He still comes across as timid and reticent to push things too far,
too fast.

7. (U) DAS Fitzgerald cleared this cable.

8. (U) Conakry Minimize Considered.

HANKINS