Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09OUAGADOUGOU1136
2009-12-08 12:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ouagadougou
Cable title:  

BURKINA FASO: MOD DISCUSSES WIDE RANGE OF REGIONAL

Tags:  PREL KPKO MASS PTER SNAR UV 
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VZCZCXRO0457
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHOU #1136/01 3421245
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081245Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5910
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0773
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0766
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0011
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OUAGADOUGOU 001136 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2019
TAGS: PREL KPKO MASS PTER SNAR UV
SUBJECT: BURKINA FASO: MOD DISCUSSES WIDE RANGE OF REGIONAL
SECURITY ISSUES WITH CDA.

OUAGADOUGO 00001136 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b & d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OUAGADOUGOU 001136

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2019
TAGS: PREL KPKO MASS PTER SNAR UV
SUBJECT: BURKINA FASO: MOD DISCUSSES WIDE RANGE OF REGIONAL
SECURITY ISSUES WITH CDA.

OUAGADOUGO 00001136 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b & d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Charge d'Affaires met with Minister of
Defense (MOD) on December 3 to officially handover the Letter
of Agreement (LOA) pertaining to the training and equipping
of a Burkinabe Gendarmerie Battalion (COESPU) scheduled to
deploy to Darfur under UNAMID leadership. Engaging in a wide
regional tour d'horizon, the MOD discussed the situation in
Guinea, Mali and Mauritania, analyzed the overall pan-Sahel
security situation, requested USG assistance within the TSCTP
framework and provided an update on the Darfur deployed Laafi
battalion. The Minister requested Africa Command's assistance
in obtaining additional resources to ensure border integrity
and surveillance. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) CDA initially met with MOD Yero Boly on December 3 to
hand over the Gendarmerie COESPU Letter of Agreement (LOA)
related to ACOTA training of a Burkinabe Gendarmerie formed
police unit deployment to the UNAMID mission in Darfur. The
MOD said they would look it over one final time and return it
to us signed as soon as possible. Boly then proceeded to
engage the CDA on Guinea, Mauritania and Mali and more
generally discussed internal and regional security issues and
provided an update on the deployed Burkinabe peacekeeping
battalion already in Darfur.

Guinea
--------------

3. (C) "Guinea is a fragile country" offered the MOD, and is
prone to further destabilizing acts (the meeting took place
before the assassination attempt on Dadis). The situation is
preoccupying and needs to be monitored closely, but, still
according to the MOD, Burkina's mediation efforts continue
and President Compaore remains very engaged.

Security in Northern Burkina Faso & Concerns about drugs and
weapons trafficking
-------------- --------------
-------------- --------------

4. (C) Noting the recent AQIM kidnappings in Mali and
Mauritania, Charge asked whether the Burkinabe armed forces

were increasing their security measures. Boly responded that
Burkina Faso's intelligence services have been monitoring the
Burkina/Niger/Mali border and collecting important
information. Despite these efforts, the country remains
vulnerable from a security standpoint. The MOD mused about
how to properly exploit the intelligence information and
leads they had obtained thus far. The Minister of Defense
explained that the northern cities of Markoy (and its
market),Gorom-Gorom, and Deou are of particular interest as
they are "infiltrated" and "Islamicized". Burkinabe
intelligence sources have uncovered Nigerian trained Nigerien
nationals (particularly former students of Koranic school in
Nigeria) who are operating in that region in a believed
liaison with AQIM. The GOBF has their names, they know who
they are, but don't know how to move forward and properly
exploit that information. Boly noted that small cells of the
type AQIM are know to dispatch currently have a relatively
high chance of circulating undetected by Burkinabe security
forces.


5. (C) The Ministries of Security and Defense are actively
cooperating, they are talking and trying to chart a
productive way forward. Some military personnel now work
under a special operating agreement with the Ministry of
Security and are integrated as Special Military Assistance
Brigades ("Compagnie Militaire d'Appui a la Securite").
Unfortunately while the manpower can be made available,
transportation hurdles remain with a significant lack of
vehicles to effectively patrol the border regions.


6. (C) Charge asked whether the GOBF has worked on a public
media strategy to alert the population in the north
especially to the risk of terrorism and radicalization. Boly
responded that they had not but that such an initiative would
be useful. Charge noted that Africa Command MIST teams would
probably be willing and able to assist the GOBF in such a
campaign should they decide to move forward.


7. (C) The GOBF is concerned about drug and weapons
transiting through Burkina Faso particularly in its northern
Sahelian region. The MOD is keen to know what USG
cooperation and resources might be made available, either
through TSCTP or Africa Command, to assist in the monitoring
and interdiction of these drugs and weapons. Charge noted
that there are additional USG programs that may also be
brought to Burkina Faso's assistance in counter-narcotics
programming. Clearly the MOD was looking to the USG to offer

OUAGADOUGO 00001136 002.2 OF 003


to fund the purchase of vehicles to patrol the border zone.

Pan-Sahel Security situation and initiatives
-------------- --------------

8. (C) Charge asked for the Minister's assessment of the
chances for regional counter-terrorism cooperation in the
face of the evidently increasing AQIM threat. Boly noted
that cooperation was fraught with difficulties adding that
Mali's attempt to hold a regional counter-terrorism
conference for well over a year is indicative of the problem.
There are many factors at play offered the MOD, Algeria's
position, Libya as a player -- even if only on the perimeter,
and internal political problems in Mali and Niger. While he
had seen some tentative steps following the Algerian
conference in Tamanrasset, Boly suggested that the Sahelian
countries were still unclear what Algeria really wanted --
suggesting Algeria was demanding much but offering little.
Gauging Mauritania, Mali and Niger, Boly noted "Aziz (of
Mauritania) is a soldier and understands the threat," but
suggested that Mali and Niger -- while increasingly focused
on the AQIM threat -- continued to see internal Tuareg issues
as more important. Boly added that he had recently made a
visit to Rabat and was told that no tran-Sahara/Sahel
solution could be developed with out Morocco's active
participation. That, he recognized brings in to complication
of Western Sahara and the inability of the Maghreb group to
function. Part of the problem, Boly suggested, is that
because some states can't get along in general, then they are
precluded, de facto, from getting along on a sensitive issue
like counter-terrorism. It is first and foremost a political
issue, and only then becomes a technical issue the MOD
offered. Niger/Burkina Faso and Mali can surely talk, but
can Morocco/Algeria talk the MOD wondered. Boly suggested
that Burkina Faso might be better placed then Algeria to
forge consensus between the three Sahelian countries while
recognizing such an initiative could irritate Algeria and,
perhaps, Libya. That said, Boly recognized that Burkina Faso
has probably only been lucky up to now that AQIM has not
focused activities here so Burkina Faso has an interest in
seeing the problem addressed.

Assistance within the TSCTP framework
-------------- --------------

9. (C) The MOD reiterated how happy Burkina was to be the
newest member of TSCTP and suggested that through that
program regional cooperation could be ameliorated. He said
that Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger did not always readily
share important information on a strictly bilateral basis,
but that perhaps through the TSCTP program that information
exchange could be enhanced. The Minister noted that Burkina
Faso had already highlighted to the Embassy and Africa
Command their need to enhance their border security
capabilities in the North. Charge noted that the proposal
had been noted and was under review in Stuttgart.

Peacekeeping operations
-------------- --------------

10. (C) Charge asked how the Minister had found their first
major deployment in a UN peacekeeping operation. Boly noted
the Darfur deployment had been a major increase in the
professionalization of the military allowing them to gain
expertice in multilateral operations. The minister stressed
that, without US assistance, deployment of the PKO battalion
would have been impossible. Despite US assistance, the
financial burden on Burkina Faso's budget remains
substantial, especially when factoring in costs and expenses
that had not been initially anticipated. This deployment was
a much "heavier" operation then they had originally thought
both in terms of manpower and financial constraints. The
GOBF has not yet been able to secure airlift to move 40-50
metric tons of equipment remaining in Ouagadougou and needed
in El Geneina. The Laafi Battalion, which has been flown into
Darfur in tranches, is expected to reach full complement by
December 27. Boly added that the pending deployment of a
formed police unit will be a further expansion of Burkina
Faso's peacekeeping contribution. He noted that the demand
for police units far exceeded that for military units,
indicative of the greater utility such units can have in
urban settings.


11. (C) Chief of Defense Brigadier General Dominique
Djendjere will spend Christmas with the Laafi battalion (he
will fly out on December 23 and remain through December 27.)


12. (C) This meeting turned out to be far more substantive
than originally anticipated. A civilian trained at the elite
French Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA),Defense
Minister Boly is believed to be one of President Compaore's

OUAGADOUGO 00001136 003.2 OF 003


closest confidants. Most telling, was Boly's recognition
that Burkina Faso is also subject to the AQIM threat as well
as his rather pessimistic view on the immediate prospects for
effective subregional counterterrorism cooperation. Building
on President Compaore's regional initiatives in Togo, Cote
d'Ivoire, and Guinea, the Minister is probably correct that
Burkina Faso could be effective in trying to facilitate
better cooperation between Mauritania, Mali , and Niger.


13. (U) Conakry and Tripoli Minimize Considered.
HANKINS