Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09OUAGADOUGOU1038
2009-11-18 12:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ouagadougou
Cable title:  

BURKINABE STILL CONFIDENT OF PROGRESS ON GUINEA - BUT NOT TOO QUICKLY

Tags:  PREL PGOV GV UV 
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VZCZCXRO1450
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHOU #1038 3221243
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181243Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5801
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY 0064
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0722
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA 0002
C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 001038 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12928: DECL: 11/18/2014
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GV, UV
SUBJ: BURKINABE STILL CONFIDENT OF PROGRESS ON GUINEA - BUT NOT TOO
QUICKLY

REF: CONAKRY 722

C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 001038

SIPDIS

E.O. 12928: DECL: 11/18/2014
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GV, UV
SUBJ: BURKINABE STILL CONFIDENT OF PROGRESS ON GUINEA - BUT NOT TOO
QUICKLY

REF: CONAKRY 722

1. (C) Summary: Guinea mediator President Compaore will convene a
second round of CNDD and Forces Vives proximity talks November 19 and
20 in Ouagadougou. Bukinabe advisors indicate Compaore will present
a "synthesis paper" that pulls together agreement on most security
and humanitarian issues but recognizes fundamental differences on
political issues -- particularly the continued presence of Dadis. No
breakthrough is expected at this meeting. The Burkinabe see little
chance of an armed ECOWAS intervention force (as requested by the
Forces Vives but want more than the unarmed civilian ECOWAS
Observation Mission the CNDD has indicated it would accept.) End
Summary

2. (C) Charge met November 18 with MFA Cabinet Director Vincent
Zakane to get a read out on Burkinabe mediation efforts in Guinea.
Zakane, who has been intimately involved in President Compaore's
mediation efforts, confirmed that the two Guinean delegations as well
as AU and ECOWAS representatives would arrive in Ouagadougou today
for meetings November 19 and 20. Zakane noted that the talks would
be in proximity format since "it is still too early" to get the two
sides to sit at the table together. Zakane outlined that the two
previous visits of the Forces Vives and CNDD delegations had elicited
position papers on political, humanitarian and security issues.
Compaore had developed a synthesis from these two documents that
Zakane noted "tries to emphasize areas of convergence" in
humanitarian and security areas where "their positions are the same."
Zakane recognized that the two sides remain diametrically opposed on
the key political issues of transition back to rule of law --
particularly on the future role of Dadis. Highlighting somewhat
Compaore's limitations, Zakane noted that, as a mediator, "we have no
army to force a solution in Guinea. All we have is the force of
dialogue." Zakane, who did not share the synthesis document,
expected limited results from the November 19 and 20 talks as he
assumed the two parties would have to consult with their bases
further. Nonetheless, he said he was "personally optimistic" that
Compaore will eventually find a mutually acceptable political exit
strategy for Compaore -- noting the heavy political investment
Burkina Faso has made in this initiative.

3. (C) Charge noted that the U.S. strongly supports the idea of an
observation mission for Guinea to help stabilize the inherently
fragile situation. Zakane noted that the Forces Vives strongly
stressed the need for an armed intervention force or, at minimum, a
robust civil/military observation mission. The CNDD, on the other
hand, rejects completely the idea of an intervention force and is
opposed to a military observer element in any observation mission.
Noting that, "we can't introduce an intervention force if it will be
resisted by the Guinean armed forces," Zakane said he thought it
would be essential to have military members in any observation
mission, "to allow us to understand credibly what is going on and to
help diffuse any problems that arise with the military." Zakane
called the Guinean military "a sick institution" that, while an
important element in any solution, is itself deeply flawed.

4. (C) Noting Charge's experience in Mauritania, Zakane said the
precedents set following the Mauritanian coup played a heavy and
generally negative role in the Guinea crisis as "Dadis wants to be
treated by Aziz and the Forces Vives are afraid of being
diplomatically trapped like the Mauritanian opposition." Zakane was
critical of the recent history of international community response to
coups saying, "You reject them all but don't seem to have the will to
stick with it to the end. Coup leaders know there is a good chance
the international community will relent which, inevitably, gives them
incentive to stay on." Although somewhat contradictory from his
first argument, Zakane also criticized western efforts to exclude
individuals from post-coup elections since such exclusions "normally
stir up ethnic or tribal concerns." In the Guinea case, Zakane
noted, "Dadis has successfully personalized in himself the fate of
the Guinea Forestieres who see any effort to block his ability to
present his candidacy as an effort to marginalize their ethnic group
which has never been allowed to govern."

5. (U) Conakry Minimize considered.
HANKINS