Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09OSLO511
2009-08-17 16:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

NORWAY'S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION NARRATIVE

Tags:  AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNY #0511/01 2291601
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171601Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7713
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0320
RUEHNO/USNATO BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1348
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0089
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFITT/NRC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000511 

SIPDIS

FOR ISN/MNSA (SCOTT DAVIS),GENEVA (CD),UNVIE (IAEA),USUN
(POL),USNATO (POL),USEU (POL)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA
IAEA, NPT, NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY'S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION NARRATIVE

REF: A. STATE 83600

B. OSLO 507

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Cherrie Daniels for reaso
ns 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000511

SIPDIS

FOR ISN/MNSA (SCOTT DAVIS),GENEVA (CD),UNVIE (IAEA),USUN
(POL),USNATO (POL),USEU (POL)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA
IAEA, NPT, NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY'S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION NARRATIVE

REF: A. STATE 83600

B. OSLO 507

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Cherrie Daniels for reaso
ns 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary: In response to reftel A, poloff held
extensive discussions on August 14 with Knut Langeland,
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Ambassador for
Disarmament Affairs. Langeland spelled out Norway's position
on nonproliferation and disarmament issues in response to our
promptings in reftel A paragraph 6. This cable provides an
overview of Norway's nonproliferation priorities to help
policymakers prepare for the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) Review Conference. Key Norwegian nonproliferation
decisionmakers were previously catalogued in reftel B. End
Summary.

NORWEGIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD KEY ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Prior to beginning discussion of specific
nonproliferation regimes, Langeland referred poloff to the
latest exchange of letters between Foreign Minister Jonas
Gahr Stoere and Secretary Clinton dated 06/25/2009, in which
areas of common interest were specifically mentioned. Text
of the relevant paragraphs from Stoere's letter to S follow:

"...let me express my appreciation for the strong U.S.
commitment for a world free of nuclear weapons. U.S.
leadership is vital if we are to reduce and eventually
eliminate nuclear danger. In this respect it is of the
greatest importance to secure a positive and forward looking
outcome of the NPT 2010 Review Conference. This includes
engaging the non-aligned movement (NAM) to strengthen the
non-proliferation regime. We are exploring ways to reach out

and develop a substantial dialogue with key players in NAM.
We have established extensive cooperation with countries such
as Indonesia, South Africa and Chile. We are eager to move
these issues forward, and would like to stay in close touch
with the aim of securing a successful NPT Review Conference
in 2010.

"The forthcoming review of NATO's strategic concept provides
us with an opportunity to strengthen the Alliance's arms
control profile. This can, in its turn, be important for the
NPT outcome.

"Norwegian and U.S. officials are also working on how to best
secure the establishment of a fuel bank for low enriched
uranium under IAEA auspices. Negotiating a verifiable
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and implementing
relevant non-proliferation instruments will in this context
be of great importance." (End of excerpts.)

As for the specific nonproliferation regimes mentioned in Ref
A para 6, Ambassador Langeland provided the following
comments on each issue:

-Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): "Norway recommends
strongly that the U.S. ratify the CTBT. We consider it an
important tool for disarmament and nonproliferation. We are
encouraged by the strong support of the Obama administration
and hopefully the U.S. will not vote against the CTBT in the
U.N. first committee as has been the case since 2001."

-Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT): "Norway fully
supports the FMCT and is encouraged that the new U.S.
administration supports an FMCT that will be verifiable.
Norway considers the verifiability of the FMCT to be crucial.
If we are to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, we
must deal with the issue of existing stocks in one way or
another. We are pragmatic on how to achieve this, and we
could explore different avenues on how to destroy existing
stocks of fissile materials and convert them to peaceful
uses. As a preliminary matter, we need more transparency on
the issue of existing stocks. Norway supports Robert
Einhorn's ideas on a Fissile Material Control Initiative
(FMCI)."
-NPT: "Norway wants a forward-looking outcome of the Review
Conference, by which we mean that the 2010 conference will
further strengthen the nonproliferation dimensions of the
NPT. Specifically, we would like to advance the universality
of the Additional Protocol and nuclear fuel cycle
arrangements. Also, Norway considers it vital to look
further into the disarmament dimensions of the NPT. One way
of doing this is to revisit the outcomes of the 2000 Review
Conference and consider them in light of new realities."
Langeland continued: "Overall, we would like the Review
Conference to affirm President Obama's goal of a nuclear-free
world and identify concrete steps to achieve it. The Review
Conference will be an opportunity for the U.S., NATO, and
other nuclear weapon states to show we are reducing the
salience of nuclear weapons in the security policy of our
countries. Hopefully, we will see support for nuclear weapon
free zones. Norway is happy to see that the Penlidaba treaty
will soon enter into force. It is important that the
declared nuclear weapon states sign a protocol guaranteeing
the integrity of such zones."

-U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts: "Norway welcomes the
framework agreement reached by Presidents Obama and Medvedev
in July 2009 and believes it will be the most important
operative agreement for the next 18 years. We see it as
involving deeper cuts to nuclear arsenals than the Moscow
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) and the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),and are pleased that
limits are set on both warheads and means of delivery. We are
also pleased," Langeland added, "that verification is built
into the agreement. We consider this agreement to be an
important step and hopefully it will be followed by other
agreements addressing both strategic and substrategic
weapons."

OVERARCHING NORWEGIAN POLICY
--------------


3. (SBU) From the broadest perspective, Norwegian policy on
nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament is informed by three
high policy-level principles, which are:
-Security at the lowest level of armament.
-A world free of weapons of mass destruction.
-A world free of conventional weapons having unacceptable
humanitarian implications (e.g. cluster munitions).
These three principles were made explicit in the fall of 2008
in Stortingsmelding ("Parliament White Paper") number 27.

COUNTRIES THE NORWEGIANS WORK WITH
--------------


4. (C) Amb. Langeland listed several areas of the GON's
international cooperation on these matters:
-Norway works closely with the UK on verification of
disarmament.
-The Seven Nation cross-regional initiative - which includes
South Africa, Indonesia, Chile, Australia, the UK, Romania,
and Norway - put forward a nonproliferation/disarmament
consensus text in 2005 for consideration at the UN World
Summit. The countries have maintained consultations
afterward. Langeland suggested that there may be a new group
of countries that will come to consensus on a similar text in

2010.
-Norway worked closely with Germany in the context of the
German-Norwegian disarmament initiative within NATO, proposed
in July 2007.
-With the United States, Norway is happy about the exchange
of letters between Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister
Stoere referred to in paragraph 2. NPT Preparatory
Conference Three involved an "encouraging" meeting between
Steffen Kongstad, the MFA's Director General for Security
Policy, and Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary for the
Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation,
according to Langeland.
-Also at Preparatory Conference Three, Norway worked closely
within NATO on a joint paper defining common positions on
disarmament and nonproliferation, cooperating with The
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Poland, Turkey, and Lithuania.
-Finally, Langeland also listed Australia and Japan as "close
partners" on disarmament and nonproliferation matters.

THE ROLE THE NORWEGIANS PLAY
--------------


5. (C) Norway is, according to Langeland, very actively
working on the NPT. He stated that Norway's ambition is to
support and sustain the NPT, Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC),and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Norway
"considers these as important in setting fundamental norms on
nonproliferation and WMD." In the BWC, Norway is actively
contributing in the implementation of the current program of
work. For example, there was a June 2009 workshop in Oslo on
disease surveillance, which was organized jointly with the
Indonesian government and the UN Secretariat. In the CWC, the
Norwegians provide funds for implementation of other
countries' national nonproliferation obligations.

HOW NORWEGIAN POLICY IS DEVELOPED
--------------


6. (C) Many nonproliferation issues are addressed at the
working level in the MFA. If policy level decisions must be
made, an internal memorandum is drafted by the
nonproliferation section of the MFA and circulated up to the
foreign minister. Such a policy level decision may then be
cleared through the Ministry of Defense. Langeland said that
there is no set protocol and the treatment of any particular
issue is bureaucratic until policy parameters are approached,
at which point the question is forwarded to the appropriate
political level. Langeland added that "it is the firm
Norwegian policy to be inside NATO, and considerations of
NATO strategic objectives inform our other nonproliferation
and disarmament policies."

ROLE OF NGOS
--------------


7. (C) Norway has no nuclear power industry. The GON
provides money to academic institutions in the amount of
about $6 million per year to investigate how to strengthen
nonproliferation regimes. The GON has extensive contacts with
the NGO community interested in nonproliferation, and the MFA
"takes the temperature" of these NGOs' thinking. According
to Langeland, "no Norwegian politician would want to be
embarrassed in public by them." Langeland went on to say,
"the political reality is that no one in Norway really
likes nuclear weapons, but again, we take being a NATO
partner seriously."


8. (C) Regarding the additional NPT questions of reftel A,
paragraph 7, key alliances are covered in paragraph 3. Due
to the relatively compressed nature of the Norwegian MFA, it
is post's impression that Norwegian Missions to the UN, CD,
and the IAEA do not deviate from guidance received from Oslo.
The MFA Section on Nonproliferation and Disarmament usually
sends personnel directly to all major nonproliferation
meetings. Post therefore feels that the Norwegians need no
further guidance from the MFA in Oslo in order to engage on
Review Conference objectives.


9. (C) Comment: Based upon poloff's 12 months of
consultations with Amb. Langeland on various nonproliferation
and disarmament issues, it is post's estimation that he is
completely plugged into the MFA's policy on disarmament and
nonproliferation, and that his statements catalogued in para
2 accurately restate the bedrock of Norwegian policy on these
matters. One side note of interest: It was Langeland who
drafted the portions of Foreign Minister Stoere's letter to S
in paragraph 2 above. End Comment.
HEG