Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09OSLO171
2009-03-17 08:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

(C) NORWAY'S MORE POSITIVE IRAQ POLICY

Tags:  EPET PREL PGOV IZ NO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1395
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHNY #0171/01 0760834
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 170834Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7422
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0099
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 3379
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSLO 000171 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2019
TAGS: EPET PREL PGOV IZ NO
SUBJECT: (C) NORWAY'S MORE POSITIVE IRAQ POLICY

REF: A. STATE 21447

B. STATE 18283

C. 2008 OSLO 385

D. 2008 OSLO 387

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSLO 000171

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2019
TAGS: EPET PREL PGOV IZ NO
SUBJECT: (C) NORWAY'S MORE POSITIVE IRAQ POLICY

REF: A. STATE 21447

B. STATE 18283

C. 2008 OSLO 385

D. 2008 OSLO 387

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Summary. Recognizing the improved situation in Iraq
and wishing to support President Obama, Norway decided to
"even further normalize relations" with Iraq and to consider
a possible political level visit. Despite this positive
direction, the GON continues to be skeptical to engagement
with Iraq and has little internal motivation to act. An
external stimulus may be needed to translate these new
intentions into action. A key opportunity to push the GON
would be a meeting with the Secretary on the margins of the
April Antarctic Treaty Ministerial. End Summary.

--------------
GON's Previous Iraq policy
--------------


2. (C) PM Stoltenberg withdrew Norway's small contributions
to the multi-national effort in Iraq after his election in

2005. His government (and the public) have remained opposed
to any increase in Norwegian activity in Iraq. The GON did
continue a small scale program of cooperation with the Iraqi
Ministry of Oil and continues to donate humanitarian aid
through the UN. For the past year, Norway's main
interactions with Iraq have dealt with domestic Norwegian
concerns; concluding an agreement on the return of asylum
seekers and establishing an Iraqi embassy in Oslo.


3. (C) Iraqis comprise the third largest immigrant group in
Norway (approximately 22,000) and the number of Iraqis coming
to Norway is growing. The number of Iraqi asylum cases has
dramatically increased from 2007 and the GON is eager to
tighten rules to discourage such immigration and to faciliate
their eventual return to Iraq. In previous discussions the
GON had insisted upon an asylum agreement before upgrading
ties.


4. (C) The Iraqi Embassy is now up and running but there is
only a regional ambassador at this time. Progress on the
asylum agreement has been harder to obtain; during the
February visit the GON learned that negotiation authority for
the asylum agreement shifted from the Iraqi MFA to PM
Maliki's office. The Norwegian MFA views this as a set-back

to reaching agreement and on March 11 decided to put that
issue on hold.

--------------
Visit to Baghdad Lays the Groundwork
--------------


5. (C) The MFA's Iraq desk officer has been active in
advocating for greater GON engagement, posesses an excellent
knowledge of the situation in Iraq, and visits Baghdad
frequently. In February she visited with the Iraqi MFA,
Justice Minister, Information Minister, Minister for
Migration and Displacement and the U.S. and other embassies.



6. (C) In other meetings, the MFA learned that Iran had been
in contact with StatoilHydro, Norway's majority state-owned
energy company, about the possibility of opening an office in
Baghdad. Iranian officials had long told the MFA and
StatoilHydro that an agreement on the Anaran oil field, which
straddles the Iraqi-Iranian border, would not be possible
until U.S. troops leave Iraq, or a schedule is established
for their departure. With the conclusion of the SOFA
agreement, the Iranians have apparently concluded that the
time is right to push for an MOU on Anaran with the Iraqis
and may believe that StatoilHydro could help. The MFA was
told by the Iraqis that an MOU with Kuwait was first priority
but that they were interested in resolving the Anaran issue
with Iran as well. StatoilHydro is now considering the idea
of opening a Baghdad office but has not yet decided. (Note:
Repeated embassy and USG pressure resulted in a pledge by
StatoilHydro to discontinue future Anaran aspirations.
Congressional testimony by U/S Burns last summer heightened
interest in StatoilHydro's Iranian operations and imposition
of possible penalties of the Iran Sanctions Act.)

--------------
Decision on Broad Shift in Policy
--------------


7. (C) During a March 11 internal meeting, the GON decided
to shift policy on Iraq to something the MFA desk officer

OSLO 00000171 002 OF 002


characterized as "even further normalizing relations." In
effect, this means dropping its insistence on an asylum
agreement and agreeing to consider a political level visit
this year. Responding to a GOI request, the GON also
decided to expand its bilateral oil program with the Iraqi
Ministry of Oil. The expanded program will include the
Norwegian Ministries of Finance and Environment and may
involve greater cooperation with the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative Secretariat (based in Oslo) as well.
The question over opening a Norwegian embassy or presence in
Baghdad is also being considered. The MFA is also in the
process of changing its travel advisory for Northern Iraq to
reflect the safer conditions in that area.

--------------
Details to Follow...Need a Push from USG
--------------


8. (C) Details on the improved relationship are currently
being developed for eventual consideration by the FM.
Although our MFA contacts were not willing to share the fine
points of their paper, elements in this new plan will include
a recommendation on establishing a diplomatic presence in
Baghdad, a FM visit to Baghdad, and how the bilateral oil
program could be expanded. Separately, but likely in close
consultation with the GON, StatoilHydro is certain to be
considering the issue of opening an office in Baghdad. These
two processes are linked, and although the MFA does not admit
to any joint decision making process, they do say that the
possibility of establishing a diplomatic presence in Baghdad
would increase if StatoilHydro was present in Iraq.


9. (C) Comment: A bilateral meeting between the Secretary
and FM Stoere would be a perfect opportunity to personally
urge Stoere to visit Baghdad and to consider opening a
diplomatic presence. Stoere prides himself on close personal
relations with fellow leaders and we judge him likely to
respond positively to the Secretary. Given the GON's vague
commitment to visit Iraq (sometime in the next year) and the
general reluctance of the MFA to establish an embassy in
Baghdad due to the high costs of security and the absence of
any domestic pressure to do so (with the exception of our
energetic ally in the MFA Iraq desk) we believe it important
for high-level USG officials to push FM Stoere.


10. (C) The issue of StatoilHydro and its involvement in the
Anaran field is more complicated given ongoing concerns over
StatoilHydro's investments in Iran (South Pars gas field and
Anaran) and CEO Helge Lund's very public promises to withdraw
from the already existing South Pars investment following
recapture of investment cost and to halt further development
of Anaran. Although increased StatoilHydro involvement in
Baghdad would help facilitate GON re-engagement in Iraq it
may also lead to increased investment in Iran, or at least
joint investment in the Anaran field. Department may wish to
speak with StatoilHydro representatives to shape their
decision on Iraq. End Comment.
WHITNEY