Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09OSLO148
2009-03-09 07:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

AFGHAN IMMIGRANTS IN NORWAY

Tags:  ASEC PTER PGOV PINR KCRM AF NO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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R 090730Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7406
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0624
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 2521
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 8064
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0199
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1535
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3376
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000148 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2019
TAGS: ASEC PTER PGOV PINR KCRM AF NO
SUBJECT: AFGHAN IMMIGRANTS IN NORWAY

REF: A. A. 2006 OSLO 1451

B. B. 2007 OSLO 1099

C. C. 2007 OSLO 1157

D. B. 2008 OSLO 207

E. C. 2008 OSLO 993

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000148

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2019
TAGS: ASEC PTER PGOV PINR KCRM AF NO
SUBJECT: AFGHAN IMMIGRANTS IN NORWAY

REF: A. A. 2006 OSLO 1451

B. B. 2007 OSLO 1099

C. C. 2007 OSLO 1157

D. B. 2008 OSLO 207

E. C. 2008 OSLO 993

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (U) SUMMARY. Afghans represent one of Norway,s newest
immigrant communities with 72% having been in Norway less
than five years. The 8,000 registered Afghans currently
living in Norway (including Norwegian-born to immigrant
parents),are comprised primarily of refugees and asylum
seekers. The community's small numbers are quickly growing;
around 1300 new Afghans came to the country in 2008--twice as
many as 2007. Given their relatively short period of time
here compared to other similar groups, Afghans generally
appear to be integrating well, yet they struggle with many
hurdles typical of new immigrants. There is currently little
reason to worry about widespread radicalization among the
Afghan community, but given its quickly growing and changing
population, it is possible the trend could shift as new
refugees continue to arrive. END SUMMARY.

--------------
WHO ARE THEY AND WHERE ARE THEY FROM?
--------------


2. (U) About half of the Afghans in Norway live in Oslo with
the rest spread between Bergen, Trondheim, and other larger
cities. Norway initially became a destination for Afghans
fleeing the Taliban 10-15 years ago, but it is only within
the past five years that larger numbers have arrived. Family
reunification and new refugee applications are the primary
reasons for this growth. The Afghans' roughly 8,000-strong
contingent in Norway puts them at about mid-range among
similar immigrant communities that have a majority of members
with refugee backgrounds. Although much smaller than the
over 22,800 Iraqis in Norway, 21,800 Somalis, and 15,100
Iranians, Afghans are a rapidly growing segment of the
Norwegian immigrant community.


3. (U) Most Afghans in Norway are Hazaras, an ethnic group
whose members are predominantly Shia and are concentrated in
Kabul and central Afghanistan, as well as some areas of
Pakistan. Hazaras began to flee Afghanistan after the

Taliban came to power in 1996 and carried out a brutal
persecution of the group. The first few arrived in Norway
shortly after 1996, with gradually increasing numbers ever
since. The vast majority of Afghans in Norway have only
arrived within the last five years (72%).


4. (C) Norway has a long-term commitment to both military
and development engagement in Afghanistan with ISAF and the
UN. This commitment will likely lead to a continued influx of
Afghan refugee and asylum seekers. The issue of how to deal
with Afghan asylum seekers has in the past been
controversial. In the summer of 2006 Norwegian authorities
declared it safe for asylum seekers from parts of Afghanistan
to return. The Afghans affected disagreed and held some very
public protests outside the Norwegian Parliament, even
including hunger strikers. The government gave in (helped by
the worsening security situation in Afghanistan) but the
potential for difficulty remains.

--------------
HOW WELL ARE THEY INTEGRATING?
--------------


5. (U) Despite their short period of time in the country,
many Afghans appear to be integrating rather well. This is
thought to be because many individuals are better-educated
and well-off compared to most of their other countrymen even
prior to leaving Afghanistan. Many of the Afghans in Norway
also have impressive (again, relative to their time here)
language capabilities in Norwegian and English. Although
most work in restaurants, as taxi drivers, or in other menial
jobs, it is not uncommon to find Afghan doctors, lawyers, and
businessmen. Afghans' rate of employment is a respectable
65% for men. (Only 31% of Afghan women are employed).


6. (U) Although many Afghan immigrants are more educated
than their peers back home, they unfortunately appear to be
struggling with education here, even compared to fellow
immigrant groups. For example, Afghan student and social
organizations are few relative to other communities in
Norway, even in cities, although these can be expected to
grow with their population. Among registered individuals
aged 16-18 years, only 59.4% of first-generation Afghans are
enrolled in upper secondary education. Numbers for other
immigrant communities whose members are also mostly of
refugee background fare much better; 82.7% for Iranians,
71.7% for Iraqis, and 72% for Pakistanis. For Norwegians
born to immigrant parents (second generation immigrants),
however, Afghans' numbers jump to a respectable 87.5% of
16-18 year olds enrolled in upper secondary education,
although even here most other groups have numbers above 90%.
Hard numbers on Afghans in university are not yet available
given the community's small size. Post has been told
anecdotally, however, that there are many enrolled in local
universities, especially the University of Oslo--even more
than in London and other larger European cities.


7. (U) Housing has been another difficult issue for Afghans,
with many living in cramped quarters by Norwegian standards.
The percentage of Afghans living in households with two or
more families (11.8%) is more than double the national level
(4.3%). A majority (54.3%) live in dwellings with five or
more occupants, compared to just 17.4% nationally. Only 5.2%
live in pairs; nationally this number is 24.3%. All of these
numbers represent a broader trend across most immigrants,
which is their higher birthrate than non-immigrants.
Interestingly, the number that live alone is virtually the
same as the rest of Norway--16.3% for Afghans and 16.2% among
everyone else. This likely reflects the far greater number
of Afghan men than women in Norway, with single men living
alone (Afghans have thus far typically married mostly other
Afghans). Home ownership is drastically different from the
Norwegian average. While nationally 83.8% of Norwegians own
versus 16.2% who rent, the complete opposite is true of
Afghans; 80.9% rent, with just 19.1% owning a home. This
massive contrast may be a result of most Afghan immigrants'
short periods of residence in the country, with most opting
(or more likely only able) to rent while establishing
themselves.

--------------
IS RADICALIZATION A RISK?
--------------


8. (C) Radicalization among Afghan immigrants in Norway
appears to be a marginal risk. Afghanistan's Ambassador to
Norway Jawed Ludin is optimistic about their prospects for
success here, calling it an "amazingly open community" and
"educated and open-minded." His positive outlook for the
community comes in part from the strength of its individuals,
which as stated previously are among the most educated and
well-off of Afghans at home (yet ironically not very educated
here),leaving them in a better position for succss than
other struggling immigrant groups which ave fewer prospects
and a greater likelihood of eeling disenfranchised.
Ambassador Ludin's optimim is also a result of knowing why
Afghans came t Norway at all--to flee the crime and
deprivatio of their home country; they have no desire to
bing it with them.


9. (C) There are a few causes for concern, however. Ludin
mentioned concern over the activities of an Afghan mullah
named Abdul Raouf, whom he and Norwegian authorities have
been following for some time. According to the Ambassador,
Raouf has been involved with recruitment of people in asylum
centers to return to Afghanistan for potential terrorist
actions. Newspapers reported recently that an Afghan imam
(not named but we believe it to be Raouf) was visiting the
refugee centers (often located in small Norwegian rural towns
and therefore not exposed to the generally positive
influences of the urban Afghan community) to recruit suicide
bombers. Raouf is a well known character to embassy security
officials and to the Norwegian police. Norwegian police
share Ambassador Ludin,s concerns but feel unable to do much
aside from monitoring his behavior unless he does something
that violates Norwegian law.


10. (C) Ambassador Ludin's broader concern about Afghan
radicalization in Norway comes not from reservations about
the immigrants themselves, but rather from Norwegian society
and immigration policy, which he cautions may be "too naive
and laid back." In general he is somewhat pessimistic about
the ability of more liberal, pluralistic approaches to
integration actually succeeding. In Ludin's opinion, trying
too hard to accommodate new immigrants may have the opposite
of the desired effect. He notes that over-acceptance of
immigrants' culture and traditions (mentioning specifically
language and religious clothing) may in fact hinder their
integration into local life. By too easily allowing them to
fall back into their old habits and way of life, this would,
he says, in effect deny them of what they came here for in
the first place: to establish themselves in Norwegian life,
not be cloistered away in immigrant communities as if they
were back home.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) The Afghan community's small size and short period
of residence means that at this point it is somewhat
difficult to make accurate observations and predictions.
Some general trends can be formulated, however. First
generation Afghan immigrants are relatively well employed and
not in great danger of radicalization. As the community grows
due to continued influxes of refugees it will change, perhaps
increasing the potential for radicalization. The activities
of Abdul Raouf, as well as the generally conservative and
religious nature of most Afghan refugee seekers could point
to problems over the horizon as does the low level of
participation in the education system. END COMMENT.


WHITNEY