Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09OSLO115
2009-02-13 14:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:  

PART I: CONSTRAINTS ON NORWAY'S MIDDLE EAST ROLE?

Tags:  PREL KPAL PGOV PINR IS NO 
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000115 

SIPDIS

EUR/NB, DRL, EUR/OHI, NEA/IPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: PREL KPAL PGOV PINR IS NO
SUBJECT: PART I: CONSTRAINTS ON NORWAY'S MIDDLE EAST ROLE?

REF: A. OSLO 90

B. 06 OSLO 1047

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000115

SIPDIS

EUR/NB, DRL, EUR/OHI, NEA/IPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: PREL KPAL PGOV PINR IS NO
SUBJECT: PART I: CONSTRAINTS ON NORWAY'S MIDDLE EAST ROLE?

REF: A. OSLO 90

B. 06 OSLO 1047

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Summary: Norway aspires to be a leader in Middle East
peace negotiations and could be a genuine asset in bringing
peace to the region. Norway's diplomatic principles, focus
on dialogue, and mediation history have helped raise Norway's
profile as a peacemaker. Its tense relationship with Israel
and anti-Semitism in Norway, as well as its approach to Hamas
and Hamas positions, could constrain the effectiveness of
Norway's desired high-profile mediator role. Part II of this
cable series explores the growth of anti-Semitism in Norway
and Part III analyses Norway's Foreign Minister's critical
role in elevating Norway on the world stage. End Summary.

Norwegian Diplomacy: Strengths and Desire for a Big Role
-------------- --------------

2. (C) Shaped by FM Stoere, Norwegian foreign policy
prioritizes peace promotion. Stoere is a skilled foreign
minister, drawing on national traditions of international
engagement, and adding his own focus on humanitarian aid and
peace promotion to create an appealing portrayal of Norway as
a world leader in peacemaking. Stoere dearly desires a
central role in shaping Middle East peace and believes he has
the ability to deliver. Norway brings clear strengths to the
table. Stoere has been careful to maintain constant ties
with Hamas (although no longer on the political level),
steady and significant support for the Palestinian Authority
and continued regular ties to Israel. Norway has a global
reputation for expertise in peace negotiations in Guatemala,
Tibet, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka among others, although
their efforts have floundered lately. Norway also willing to
spend substantial money in the promotion of peace. Norway's
non-EU membership can also at times be helpful. (Practically,
Norway follows the vast majority of EU positions but has
diverged, most notably in holding talks with the Tamil Tigers
and Hamas, EU designated terrorist groups.)

Mediation Expertise
--------------


3. (C) Norwegian society values dialogue above all. Talk,
even without any expectation of results, is seen as valuable.
Anyone who draws a line and refuses to talk to an opposing
party is seen as a radical unilateralist. Conversely,
Norwegians are extremely opposed to the use of military force
to achieve goals, no matter how laudable.


4. (C) Compounding this aversion to force, Norwegians do not
generally see any threats. For example, they do not see a
danger from terrorism. (This attitude prevails in the MFA
and other elites, despite FM Stoere's hotel being attacked by
suicide bombers in Kabul.) This societal attitude was
demonstrated by Norway's first terrorist case. Despite
shooting at Oslo's synagogue, planning to behead the Israeli
ambassador and to attack the Israeli and U.S. embassies, the
accused was convicted only of grave vandalism (although his
strict sentence showed some understanding of the severity of
the charges).


5. (C) Finally, Norway has substantial funds to back any
mediating role it chooses to play. Rich with energy funds,
it has for years been a leading donor to the Palestinian
authority, most recently chairing the Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee. Historically, it has been willing to commit to the
long-term, funding projects to promote peace in Sri Lanka for
example for over 27 years.


6. (C) Norway's desire to make a difference combined with the
willingness to expend time and money has made it a mediator
in conflicts as far a field as Sri Lanka, Colombia, Haiti,
and Sudan. It has elevated peace and reconciliation studies
in its universities and reorganized its Foreign Ministry to
showcase its expertise in this area. It revels in its
self-described role as the "moral superpower" and points to
the Oslo Peace Accords as a defining national moment.
Norway's History with its Jewish Community and Israel
-------------- --------------

7. (C) In the Middle East, however, its history may
constrain the role it can play. Norway's Jewish community has
always been very small and based in the country's biggest
cities, Oslo and Trondheim. Challenges confronted the
community early on. The birth of modern Norway was its 1814
constitution, which included a clause excluding Jews (later
removed in 1851). In German-occupied Norway, Norwegian
police cooperated with the Germans, rounding up almost all of
the Norwegian Jewish population, most of which were sent to
concentration camps.


8. (C) Post-war Norway cultivated close ties with Israel and
much political support existed for Israel. The Norwegian
Labor Party (long the dominant party in Norway) has
historically had close ties to Israel's labor party and Golda
Meir visited Oslo and reportedly had a friendly personal
relationship with Norwegian PM Gerhardsen. This resulted in
Norway secretly providing heavy water to the fledgling
Israeli nuclear program.


9. (C) The 1990s Oslo Process thrust Norway into Middle East
politics for the first time and seemed to herald peace in the
Middle East as well as a new peacemaker role for Norway. As
the Oslo Accords crumbled, ties
between Norway and Israel weakened. The Lebanon wars had a
major impact, with approximately 20,000 Norwegians serving in
UN peacekeeping forces in Lebanon from 1978 to 1998. These
soldiers came home with sympathetic reports about Palestinian
refugees and negative impressions of Israelis. Israeli
settlements and walls in the West Bank, and invasions of
Lebanon and Gaza contributed to Norwegians' increasingly
negative view of Israel.


10. (C) This shift was so dramatic that a 2006 cartoon in a
major newspaper depicted the PM of Israel as a concentration
camp guard. During the 2006 war in Lebanon prominent author
Jostein Gaarder made a statement saying "I refuse to
recognize the state of Israel" and characterized Judaism as
"an archaic national and warlike religion." (See septel and
ref B for a detailed discussion of anti-Semitism in Norway.)
By 2007, FM Stoere decided to recognize the Palestinian
Unity Government, which included Hamas Ministers. Hamas' vow
to destroy Israel was ignored or characterized as only
rhetoric by the Norwegians. Norway became the leading
dissenter to international norms (only joined by
Switzerland),willing to overlook Hamas' stated aims in
pursuit of dialogue at all costs. At this point, some
Israeli officials began to characterize Norway as the most
anti-Israel state in Europe. (Note: Although the GON would
deny it, there are clear signs that contacts with Hamas go
beyond a tactical desire for dialogue to a level of sympathy
for Hamas positions. The FM once told DCM for example that
one could not expect Hamas to recognize Israel without
knowing which borders Israel will have. While the FM
expresses some sympathy for Hamas' positions only in
unguarded moments, other prominent Norwegians go further.
End Note.)


11. (C) Norway's growing minority population also plays a
role in hardening public attitude toward Israel. The primary
minority groups in Norway (25% of Oslo's population) are
Muslim and stem from Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, and
Afghanistan. They are interested in Middle East politics and
not surprisingly very critical of Israel. (See reftel A.)
"Traditional" Norwegians are independently quite critical of
Israel as discussed above, but it is likely that this
viewpoint will be re-enforced by the growing minority groups
in Norway.

Gaza's Impact
--------------

12. (C) The recent Gaza war further hardened anti-Israel
attitudes in Norway's public and elite opinion, with the
notable exceptions of the Progress Party (about 25% of the
vote) and the small Christian Democratic Party. However the
size of recent pro-Israel (500) and anti-Israel
demonstrations (over 10,000) illustrate the prevailing
sentiments. (See reftel A.)


13. (C) Since the Gaza war, the question of whether
anti-Semitism is on the increase became the subject of an
intense public debate. Much of the debate centers on
defining when comments by public figures are or are not
anti-Semitic. Press coverage and public opinion of the Gaza
war was overwhelmingly, and at times vehemently, anti-Israeli
and pro-Palestinian (viewing Israeli tactics as brutal and
Palestinians as innocent victims). Therefore the question of
anti-Semitism has often been phrased in terms of when
criticism of Israel crosses the line into anti-Semitism.
(See septel for a detailed discussion of the strong comments
that have been made by leading Norwegian politicians
questioning the ability of Jewish members of the Obama
government to give unbiased advice and outlining the sense of
threat felt by the Norwegian Jewish community.)


14. (C) On the official level, Hamas' rocket attacks against
Israel received criticisms, but the clear focus of Norwegian
diplomacy encouraged Israel to be restrained and to maintain
dialogue. While FM Stoere has been careful to criticize both
parties, Norway clearly places most of the blame for the
conflict on Israel's policies.

Israel's Reaction
--------------

15. (C) The Israel Government has chosen, according to an
Embassy official, to take a very low key approach to Norway's
negative views towards Israel. They see no point in openly
pressing the government. With GON Ministers and Vice
Ministers having a track record of meeting with Hamas,
calling for boycotts of Israel, and showing up at violent
anti-Israeli riots, the Israel Embassy holds out very little
hope that the current GON can ever act moderately towards
Israel. That said, they appreciate that the GON MFA is
disciplining one of its own for anti-Semitic emails and that
an initial meeting between FM Stoere and the Israeli
Ambassador was very positive. They hope that small steps
suchQs an R&D agreement may bring some slight warming of
relations.


16. (C) However, the Israeli Embassy official noted that
while his view of the GON may be negative, the view of Norway
in the GOI is even less positive, and the view of the Israeli
public which sees only negative items about Norway in the
media is even less. Therefore, while Israel can tolerate
Norway being the Chair of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for
Palestine (ADHL),the idea of any greater role for Norway in
Middle East talks is unpalatable.

Comment
--------------

17. (C) Norway, and particularly their charismatic Foreign
Minister, has a strong interest in playing a peacemaker role.
With money to spend and open channels to all parties in the
conflict, they bring important assets to this role. However,
Norway's attitudes towards Israel and Hamas also constrain
Norwegian diplomatic efforts in the Middle East. Norwegian
public and elite opposition to most of Israel's actions and
their view that Israel does not value dialogue is widely
reported. A level of Norwegian sympathy for some Hamas'
positions, hidden behind its broad policy of dialogue with
all, should be kept in mind as we engage with Norway on U.S.
Middle East priorities. End comment.

WHITNEY
WHITNEY